After my reader D.M.'s husband died in 2004, she worried that, when she herself died, the bulk of her estate would go to the state of California instead of to her eight adult children. D.M. is 77 years old, and her assets consist mostly of $100,000 in cash and a house worth about $700,000.
Five of her children make good incomes and live on their own, but two of her daughters and a son live with her in her house. Her son is blind but holds down a minimum-wage job. Her daughters work but, because of a series of unfortunate relationships and events, have outstanding bills that eat up most of their income. Each depends on D.M. for support.
A lawyer wisely advised D.M. to create a trust to protect her assets, but the question troubling her is, what's the right thing to do in terms of dividing her assets among her children?
If D.M. were to die and leave ownership of the house equally to her eight children, it would have to be sold. The three children now living there would be unlikely to be able to afford a new home, and their inheritance would quickly be eaten up by high rents. If the house were left solely to the three children, they could continue living there -- but the other five children would be shortchanged.
"I know it is up to me in the final analysis," D.M. writes, "but should I divide my assets evenly or according to their needs?"
I sometimes joke with my own children that I plan to die broke, thus avoiding any arguments over who gets what when I'm gone. A few years ago I went so far as to give my son-in-law, as a gift, a copy of the Stephen Pollan/Mark Levine book "Die Broke: A Radical 4-Part Personal Finance Plan" (Collins, 1997).
But I'm kidding, of course, and D.M.'s question is one that I regularly receive in various guises from many readers: "Must I treat my children equally when it comes to money, gifts or inheritances?"
The answer, of course, is no. It's your money and your stuff, so you can do with it whatever you want. You owe your children nourishment, protection and so forth when they're young, but the parent/child relationship carries with it no built-in ethical obligation as far as inheritance is concerned.
There are consequences to your actions, though. You have the right, for example, to favor one child over another for no apparent reason, but there's no fairness to such action, and it's very likely to create animosity toward yourself while you're alive and, after you're gone, animosity among your children.
D.M. has a compelling reason to provide for her children at different levels after she's gone, however. Three of her children seem clearly to be more in need. One reasonable solution might be for her to leave her house to the three who live in it and to split the $100,000 in cash among her other five children. If that's what D.M. is inclined to do, she should do so with a clear conscience.
The right thing for D.M. to do, after she decides how she wants to divide her assets after her death, is to talk with all of her children to let them know what she has decided to do. She doesn't need to explain herself or to ask their permission, but simply to let them know what to expect.
And the right thing for each of them to do is to thank her.
Sunday, December 03, 2006
SOUND OFF: MADONNA'S ADOPTION
My readers were of mixed opinion about whether Madonna's adoption of a Malawian boy should have been fast-tracked because of her financial gifts to the country.
"Is it right that Madonna and other stars be allowed to circumvent the law because of their status or financial contributions?" asks Wendy Hagmaier of Fullerton, Calif. "No. This would mean that the rich could traffic in human beings."
Lena Lukings of London, Ontario, thinks that it all boils down to money.
"While I realize that Madonna can and will change that little boy's life far beyond what any parent can imagine," she writes, "I believe that money was behind the rapid adoption. Within days Madonna had that child in England. There just was not enough time allotted for a reasonable decision to be made."
J.J. Singh of La Palma, Calif., however, sees nothing wrong with the adoption.
"I question the challenge by the Human Rights Consultative Committee," Singh writes. "Their only objection appears to be the fast-track adoption procedures implemented. The committee has not objected to the child being adopted by Madonna."
A.J. Williams of Fullerton, Calif., agrees. "She is saving that child from a life of poverty and disease," Williams writes. "So what if her occupation fast-tracks her? It is that much sooner that the child can be rescued!"
Check out other opinions at http://jeffreyseglin.blogspot.com/2006/10/sound-off-madonna-and-child.html or post your own by clicking on "comments" below. You don't need to register if you post anonymously, but please include you name and location in the body of your comments.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of "The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business" (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics. He is also the administrator of http://jeffreyseglin.blogspot.com, a Web log focused on ethical issues.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 609 Greenwich St., 6th floor, New York, N.Y. 10014-3610.
"Is it right that Madonna and other stars be allowed to circumvent the law because of their status or financial contributions?" asks Wendy Hagmaier of Fullerton, Calif. "No. This would mean that the rich could traffic in human beings."
Lena Lukings of London, Ontario, thinks that it all boils down to money.
"While I realize that Madonna can and will change that little boy's life far beyond what any parent can imagine," she writes, "I believe that money was behind the rapid adoption. Within days Madonna had that child in England. There just was not enough time allotted for a reasonable decision to be made."
J.J. Singh of La Palma, Calif., however, sees nothing wrong with the adoption.
"I question the challenge by the Human Rights Consultative Committee," Singh writes. "Their only objection appears to be the fast-track adoption procedures implemented. The committee has not objected to the child being adopted by Madonna."
A.J. Williams of Fullerton, Calif., agrees. "She is saving that child from a life of poverty and disease," Williams writes. "So what if her occupation fast-tracks her? It is that much sooner that the child can be rescued!"
Check out other opinions at http://jeffreyseglin.blogspot.com/2006/10/sound-off-madonna-and-child.html or post your own by clicking on "comments" below. You don't need to register if you post anonymously, but please include you name and location in the body of your comments.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of "The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business" (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics. He is also the administrator of http://jeffreyseglin.blogspot.com, a Web log focused on ethical issues.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 609 Greenwich St., 6th floor, New York, N.Y. 10014-3610.
Thursday, November 30, 2006
SOUND OFF: NO SMOKERS NEED APPLY
Mike Hofman, the executive editor at Inc. magazine, posted an item on the magazine's blog about a Massachusetts man who sued Scotts lawncare company after he was fired after failing a drug test that showed nicotine in his system...even though he didn't smoke on the job. (Read the item at http://blog.inc.com/archives/2006/11/30/smokers_firing_sparks_lawsuit.html)
It reminded me of a Sound Off question I posed to readers back in January 2005, shortly after Weyco, an employee-benefits company in Michigan, announced it would begin testing its employees for nicotine use. Most of my readers were outraged. You can read their unedited responses at http://marketing.nytsyn.com/nytsyn/editorial/rightthing24.html if you scroll down the page.
If you'd like to post a comment on the current case that's in Mike's blog item or written about in more detail at http://www.boston.com/business/globe/articles/2006/11/30/off_the_job_smoker_sues_over_firing/, or about the issue of employers testing employees for nicotine use in general, you can click on "comments" below.
It reminded me of a Sound Off question I posed to readers back in January 2005, shortly after Weyco, an employee-benefits company in Michigan, announced it would begin testing its employees for nicotine use. Most of my readers were outraged. You can read their unedited responses at http://marketing.nytsyn.com/nytsyn/editorial/rightthing24.html if you scroll down the page.
If you'd like to post a comment on the current case that's in Mike's blog item or written about in more detail at http://www.boston.com/business/globe/articles/2006/11/30/off_the_job_smoker_sues_over_firing/, or about the issue of employers testing employees for nicotine use in general, you can click on "comments" below.
Sunday, November 26, 2006
SOUND OFF: INFLUENCING ELECTIONS
The day after the recent midterm elections, President George W. Bush announced the resignation of Donald Rumsfeld, his secretary of defense.
Not long before the elections, the president had been quoted as saying that he would not replace Rumsfeld and that he hoped Rumsfeld would serve for the rest of the Bush administration. As it turned out, however, the two men had been discussing Rumsfeld's resignation for quite some time and the departure was planned whether or not the Democrats took control of the House or Senate.
Bush told reporters that he had not wanted to influence the elections by making an announcement beforehand, even though he knew what he planned to do. Some Republicans who lost close races complained, arguing that Rumsfeld's resignation, had it been announced prior to the election, might have given them enough of a boost to hold onto their seats.
Do you believe that it was ethical for Bush not to announce Rumsfeld's resignation until after the midterm elections? If so, was it ethical for him to say that he planned no change, even when he now says that he was in fact planning a change?
Send your thoughts to rightthing@nytimes.com or post them here by clicking on "COMMENTS" below. Please include your name, your hometown and the name of the newspaper in which you read this column. Readers' comments may appear in an upcoming column.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of "The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business" (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics. He is also the administrator of http://jeffreyseglin.blogspot.com, a Web log focused on ethical issues.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 609 Greenwich St., 6th floor, New York, N.Y. 10014-3610.
Not long before the elections, the president had been quoted as saying that he would not replace Rumsfeld and that he hoped Rumsfeld would serve for the rest of the Bush administration. As it turned out, however, the two men had been discussing Rumsfeld's resignation for quite some time and the departure was planned whether or not the Democrats took control of the House or Senate.
Bush told reporters that he had not wanted to influence the elections by making an announcement beforehand, even though he knew what he planned to do. Some Republicans who lost close races complained, arguing that Rumsfeld's resignation, had it been announced prior to the election, might have given them enough of a boost to hold onto their seats.
Do you believe that it was ethical for Bush not to announce Rumsfeld's resignation until after the midterm elections? If so, was it ethical for him to say that he planned no change, even when he now says that he was in fact planning a change?
Send your thoughts to rightthing@nytimes.com or post them here by clicking on "COMMENTS" below. Please include your name, your hometown and the name of the newspaper in which you read this column. Readers' comments may appear in an upcoming column.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of "The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business" (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics. He is also the administrator of http://jeffreyseglin.blogspot.com, a Web log focused on ethical issues.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 609 Greenwich St., 6th floor, New York, N.Y. 10014-3610.
Sunday, November 19, 2006
AN AWKWARD MATTER OF CONSCIENCE
Several weeks ago I wrote about Dr. Mary Hanna, who had received $184,000 toward her medical education from the U.S. Army in exchange for committing herself to four years of active duty and four years of reserve duty once she had become a doctor. In December 2005, however, as she was completing her medical residency, Hanna notified the Army that she wanted reclassification as a conscientious objector, based on religious beliefs that she recently had embraced.
As reported in The Boston Globe, Hanna wrote in her application for conscientious-objector status that she felt that she would betray "moral and religious principles by participating in war in any way." The Army denied her initial request, but she appealed.
I asked my readers if they thought that Hanna was morally bound to carry out the commitment she had made to the Army, even if she repays the money with interest, as her lawyer says she is willing to do? Or did her new religious obligation trump her previous contractual agreement?
Not surprisingly, I received a tremendous amount of reader response.
"A contract is a contract," writes Red Wolfe of Melbourne, Fla., speaking for many of my readers. "Buying out is not, nor should it be, an option. So suck it up and do the honorable thing and do your duty as per your contract, regardless of second thoughts."
Jean Crawford, a former Army nurse who now lives in Charlotte, N.C., served three years of active duty in exchange for receiving a salary from the Army while completing her nursing degree. Hanna's offer to repay the debt doesn't resolve anything, she writes, because the Army could have used that money to help someone else through medical school "who would have served without whining."
Crawford believes that being a conscientious objector is perfectly consistent with being an Army doctor.
"She would have the opportunity to treat not only her fellow soldiers, but also the wounded enemy and wounded civilians -- a very, very conscientious thing to do," she says.
Many readers point out that physicians are noncombatants who do not carry guns.
"They are not expected to fight," writes Gwen Wooldridge of Huntington Beach, Calif., "just cure."
A number of readers expressed suspicion of Hanna's recent, "convenient" conversion into a conscientious objector.
Even some of those who are willing to give her the benefit of the doubt, however, believe that it should be the Army's decision, not hers, as to whether Hanna should serve her terms of active and reserve duty. If the Army needs medical staff, writes Dave Marohl of Sun Prairie, Wis., it would be wrong to let her off the hook.
"The choice should be their option," he writes, "rather than given to the person who has chosen to duck her responsibilities."
Readers such as Phil Clutts of Harrisburg, N.C., believe that the Army should accept Hanna's offer to repay the money and relieve her of her obligation.
Requiring her "to meet her contractual -- and moral -- obligation to the Army could backfire," writes Clutts, who is concerned that she might be so distressed by her internal conflicts as to be unable to function effectively. "Why take the chance, if the government can get its money back?"
Since I posed my question to readers, the case has gone to trial and a federal judge has reversed the Army's decision, ruling that Hanna must be discharged from the Army as a conscientious objector.
That was the legal verdict, but was it, independent of the niceties of the law, the right thing to do? I don't believe so.
Hanna would have been wise to raise her concerns well before the precise moment that her call to duty was coming due. But faith doesn't work on a timetable, and I don't question her claim that this is a matter of faith.
What troubles me, rather, is her conclusion that she cannot conscientiously be involved with the military in any way.
As several of my readers point out, her role as a physician would make her a noncombatant. If she feels that, even so, she cannot treat soldiers or civilians who are injured during war because she disapproves of war, how does that translate into nonmilitary contexts? I agree with Mary Burson, a reader from Laguna Niguel, Calif., who finds Hanna's objections too simplistic.
"As a civilian physician," Burson writes, "she would conscientiously object to smoking, drug addiction, overeating and gang activity, but she would not refuse to treat patients whose ailments or injuries resulted from these causes. It would be morally wrong."
Hanna made a commitment, and that commitment does not vanish because she now sees it in a different light. She is obligated to avoid viewing the situation in black-and-white and instead to make more of an effort to find a way in which her newfound religious sensibilities and her earlier contractual obligation can be rationalized.
Her faith may, for example, prohibit her from doing anything that would enable a wounded soldier to return to the battleground and prolong the war. But that prohibition would probably not extend to barring her from using her skills stateside, at a veteran's hospital, treating wounded soldiers who will never see battle again. Perhaps this sort of compromise would satisfy the Army, perhaps not -- but it is Hanna's responsibility to explore every alternative, rather than simply folding up her cards and going home.
As for the Army's responsibilities in the case, Hanna has the same right to apply for conscientious-objector status that anyone else has, and the Army has the moral obligation to take her application seriously. It would be wrong for reviewers to approach her application prejudiced by the suspicion that her religious conversion is the result of cowardice or the desire to earn more money in civilian practice.
It is obligated to consider her application carefully and without prejudice, in short, but it is not obligated to grant her conscientious-objector status if, in the Army's opinion, she does not qualify for it. And, like Hanna herself, the Army leadership should avoid either/or scenarios and try to find a way for her to serve out her obligation without dismissing out of hand her religious objections.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of "The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business" (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics. He is also the administrator of http://www.jeffreyseglin.com, a Web log focused on ethical issues.
To post a response to this column click on "COMMENTS" below. You can choose to post anonymously so you don't have to register, but plese include your name and location in your post.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 609 Greenwich St., 6th floor, New York, N.Y. 10014-3610.
As reported in The Boston Globe, Hanna wrote in her application for conscientious-objector status that she felt that she would betray "moral and religious principles by participating in war in any way." The Army denied her initial request, but she appealed.
I asked my readers if they thought that Hanna was morally bound to carry out the commitment she had made to the Army, even if she repays the money with interest, as her lawyer says she is willing to do? Or did her new religious obligation trump her previous contractual agreement?
Not surprisingly, I received a tremendous amount of reader response.
"A contract is a contract," writes Red Wolfe of Melbourne, Fla., speaking for many of my readers. "Buying out is not, nor should it be, an option. So suck it up and do the honorable thing and do your duty as per your contract, regardless of second thoughts."
Jean Crawford, a former Army nurse who now lives in Charlotte, N.C., served three years of active duty in exchange for receiving a salary from the Army while completing her nursing degree. Hanna's offer to repay the debt doesn't resolve anything, she writes, because the Army could have used that money to help someone else through medical school "who would have served without whining."
Crawford believes that being a conscientious objector is perfectly consistent with being an Army doctor.
"She would have the opportunity to treat not only her fellow soldiers, but also the wounded enemy and wounded civilians -- a very, very conscientious thing to do," she says.
Many readers point out that physicians are noncombatants who do not carry guns.
"They are not expected to fight," writes Gwen Wooldridge of Huntington Beach, Calif., "just cure."
A number of readers expressed suspicion of Hanna's recent, "convenient" conversion into a conscientious objector.
Even some of those who are willing to give her the benefit of the doubt, however, believe that it should be the Army's decision, not hers, as to whether Hanna should serve her terms of active and reserve duty. If the Army needs medical staff, writes Dave Marohl of Sun Prairie, Wis., it would be wrong to let her off the hook.
"The choice should be their option," he writes, "rather than given to the person who has chosen to duck her responsibilities."
Readers such as Phil Clutts of Harrisburg, N.C., believe that the Army should accept Hanna's offer to repay the money and relieve her of her obligation.
Requiring her "to meet her contractual -- and moral -- obligation to the Army could backfire," writes Clutts, who is concerned that she might be so distressed by her internal conflicts as to be unable to function effectively. "Why take the chance, if the government can get its money back?"
Since I posed my question to readers, the case has gone to trial and a federal judge has reversed the Army's decision, ruling that Hanna must be discharged from the Army as a conscientious objector.
That was the legal verdict, but was it, independent of the niceties of the law, the right thing to do? I don't believe so.
Hanna would have been wise to raise her concerns well before the precise moment that her call to duty was coming due. But faith doesn't work on a timetable, and I don't question her claim that this is a matter of faith.
What troubles me, rather, is her conclusion that she cannot conscientiously be involved with the military in any way.
As several of my readers point out, her role as a physician would make her a noncombatant. If she feels that, even so, she cannot treat soldiers or civilians who are injured during war because she disapproves of war, how does that translate into nonmilitary contexts? I agree with Mary Burson, a reader from Laguna Niguel, Calif., who finds Hanna's objections too simplistic.
"As a civilian physician," Burson writes, "she would conscientiously object to smoking, drug addiction, overeating and gang activity, but she would not refuse to treat patients whose ailments or injuries resulted from these causes. It would be morally wrong."
Hanna made a commitment, and that commitment does not vanish because she now sees it in a different light. She is obligated to avoid viewing the situation in black-and-white and instead to make more of an effort to find a way in which her newfound religious sensibilities and her earlier contractual obligation can be rationalized.
Her faith may, for example, prohibit her from doing anything that would enable a wounded soldier to return to the battleground and prolong the war. But that prohibition would probably not extend to barring her from using her skills stateside, at a veteran's hospital, treating wounded soldiers who will never see battle again. Perhaps this sort of compromise would satisfy the Army, perhaps not -- but it is Hanna's responsibility to explore every alternative, rather than simply folding up her cards and going home.
As for the Army's responsibilities in the case, Hanna has the same right to apply for conscientious-objector status that anyone else has, and the Army has the moral obligation to take her application seriously. It would be wrong for reviewers to approach her application prejudiced by the suspicion that her religious conversion is the result of cowardice or the desire to earn more money in civilian practice.
It is obligated to consider her application carefully and without prejudice, in short, but it is not obligated to grant her conscientious-objector status if, in the Army's opinion, she does not qualify for it. And, like Hanna herself, the Army leadership should avoid either/or scenarios and try to find a way for her to serve out her obligation without dismissing out of hand her religious objections.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of "The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business" (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics. He is also the administrator of http://www.jeffreyseglin.com, a Web log focused on ethical issues.
To post a response to this column click on "COMMENTS" below. You can choose to post anonymously so you don't have to register, but plese include your name and location in your post.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 609 Greenwich St., 6th floor, New York, N.Y. 10014-3610.
Sunday, November 12, 2006
SOUND OFF: SHUT UP AND READ THIS COLUMN
On Oct. 21, in his inaugural address as the 26th president of Washington & Lee University in Lexington, Va., Kenneth Ruscio said: "...at precisely the time we need mutual understanding, we are descending inexorably into a public discourse of incivility and mistrust."
A cry has arisen for more civil behavior in everything from political advertising to college campuses, but for Ruscio civility requires more than simply polite behavior. (Here's a link to his complete address: http://www2.wlu.edu/web/page/normal/1247.html )
Here's my question for you: Is a cry for civil behavior the same thing as a cry for concealment of one's honest feelings? Or are civility and candor compatible?
Send your thoughts to rightthing@nytimes.com or post them at http://www.jeffreyseglin.com. Please include your name, your hometown and the name of the newspaper in which you read this column. Readers' comments may appear in an upcoming column.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of "The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business" (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics. He is also the administrator of http://www.jeffreyseglin.com, a Web log focused on ethical issues.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 609 Greenwich St., 6th floor, New York, N.Y. 10014-3610.
A cry has arisen for more civil behavior in everything from political advertising to college campuses, but for Ruscio civility requires more than simply polite behavior. (Here's a link to his complete address: http://www2.wlu.edu/web/page/normal/1247.html )
Here's my question for you: Is a cry for civil behavior the same thing as a cry for concealment of one's honest feelings? Or are civility and candor compatible?
Send your thoughts to rightthing@nytimes.com or post them at http://www.jeffreyseglin.com. Please include your name, your hometown and the name of the newspaper in which you read this column. Readers' comments may appear in an upcoming column.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of "The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business" (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics. He is also the administrator of http://www.jeffreyseglin.com, a Web log focused on ethical issues.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 609 Greenwich St., 6th floor, New York, N.Y. 10014-3610.
THE RIGHT THING: FOR WHOM THE BOOTH TOLLS
"If they don't know how to merge, they shouldn't be on the road," my wife often mutters -- if you consider a mutter an utterance that could be heard from several cars over through closed windows -- when we get stuck behind a line of traffic that bottlenecks because of drivers who don't know how to seamlessly move from two lanes into one.
As a native Bostonian, my wife learned to drive among those whose offensive-driving skills are legendary. She knows the ways of the road, including who has the right of the way in a rotary -- or a roundabout, depending on where you live -- and, while she can get from any point A to any point B faster than I can, she's never had a speeding ticket. There was the time that a stray policeman's horse crashed into the back of her Chevy Impala as she was waiting at a stop light on Dorchester Avenue, but no one could have seen that one coming.
So when a question about proper toll-booth ethics arises, I turn first to my wife.
Here's the question: If there are only three booths accepting cash and a long line at each booth, what obligation, if any, does a waiting driver have to someone who drives past in another lane until, right before the booths, he or she signals a desire to cut into the line of waiting cars, all of whom have been waiting for much longer than has the new arrival?
My wife ponders the question, but before she can answer I introduce an additional consideration: Does it matter that there are always big signs warning that backing up at a toll booth is illegal?
And then, as she's about to utter her pronouncement, I add a final twist: Does it make a difference whether the driver was clueless until the last moment or simply too impatient to wait in a long line?
My wife's answers, based on her estimable knowledge of the road, match my own take on the ethics of the situation.
First, a waiting driver has no obligation to let another driver cut into line in front of her. She earned the place she occupies fairly, and is not obligated to give it up to another driver simply because that driver has placed himself in an awkward position.
That said, because the cutting driver cannot legally back up at the toll booth, it could present a traffic hazard not to let him cut into line. The driver may have been heading to a booth that registered scanning devices and not have realized until the last minute that he was in the wrong lane. If he doesn't get out of that lane, he could be in the way of other cars, especially if other drivers make the same mistake and the line to cut builds up.
Because safety is an issue, despite the absence of any ethical obligation to give way, the right thing to do is to let him cut into line in front of you. Fairness to the drivers who have waited patiently behind you comes into play, but safety trumps patience in this scenario.
The situation is different in a grocery store, where there is no meaningful safety consideration. There it's wrong to let a person cut in front of you when there are people waiting behind you, unless they too give their OK.
My wife and I agree that it does make a difference whether the driver was clueless or simply too impatient, at least in terms of how we feel about yielding, but that, by the time he's up there waiting to cut into line, the safest course is still to let him in. One incivility should not breed another, particularly when safety is at stake.
And, my wife adds, it wouldn't kill you to turn off your windshield wipers when it's raining, so that the toll collectors don't get soaked.
As a native Bostonian, my wife learned to drive among those whose offensive-driving skills are legendary. She knows the ways of the road, including who has the right of the way in a rotary -- or a roundabout, depending on where you live -- and, while she can get from any point A to any point B faster than I can, she's never had a speeding ticket. There was the time that a stray policeman's horse crashed into the back of her Chevy Impala as she was waiting at a stop light on Dorchester Avenue, but no one could have seen that one coming.
So when a question about proper toll-booth ethics arises, I turn first to my wife.
Here's the question: If there are only three booths accepting cash and a long line at each booth, what obligation, if any, does a waiting driver have to someone who drives past in another lane until, right before the booths, he or she signals a desire to cut into the line of waiting cars, all of whom have been waiting for much longer than has the new arrival?
My wife ponders the question, but before she can answer I introduce an additional consideration: Does it matter that there are always big signs warning that backing up at a toll booth is illegal?
And then, as she's about to utter her pronouncement, I add a final twist: Does it make a difference whether the driver was clueless until the last moment or simply too impatient to wait in a long line?
My wife's answers, based on her estimable knowledge of the road, match my own take on the ethics of the situation.
First, a waiting driver has no obligation to let another driver cut into line in front of her. She earned the place she occupies fairly, and is not obligated to give it up to another driver simply because that driver has placed himself in an awkward position.
That said, because the cutting driver cannot legally back up at the toll booth, it could present a traffic hazard not to let him cut into line. The driver may have been heading to a booth that registered scanning devices and not have realized until the last minute that he was in the wrong lane. If he doesn't get out of that lane, he could be in the way of other cars, especially if other drivers make the same mistake and the line to cut builds up.
Because safety is an issue, despite the absence of any ethical obligation to give way, the right thing to do is to let him cut into line in front of you. Fairness to the drivers who have waited patiently behind you comes into play, but safety trumps patience in this scenario.
The situation is different in a grocery store, where there is no meaningful safety consideration. There it's wrong to let a person cut in front of you when there are people waiting behind you, unless they too give their OK.
My wife and I agree that it does make a difference whether the driver was clueless or simply too impatient, at least in terms of how we feel about yielding, but that, by the time he's up there waiting to cut into line, the safest course is still to let him in. One incivility should not breed another, particularly when safety is at stake.
And, my wife adds, it wouldn't kill you to turn off your windshield wipers when it's raining, so that the toll collectors don't get soaked.
Monday, November 06, 2006
FOR WHOSE EYES ONLY? PART II
After reading this week's column (The Right Thing: FOR WHOSE EYES ONLY?) in the Charlotte Observer, reader Ralph Lowrance of Charlotte, wrote me:
Mr. Seglin:
I read with interest your comments about whether someone should look at a document, inadvertently left on his desk or on a copier, which showed confidential information. In short, you said that looking at confidential information is "tantamount to theft."
A recent column by your colleague Randy Cohen defended not only looking at confidential information (the salaries of all employees, in this case), but also advocated disseminating the information to everyone in the company.
In a future column, would you reconcile your position with his?
Thank you.
Ralph Lowrance
Charlotte, NC
The column by Mr. Cohen that Mr. Lowrance refers to appears at
Mr. Seglin:
I read with interest your comments about whether someone should look at a document, inadvertently left on his desk or on a copier, which showed confidential information. In short, you said that looking at confidential information is "tantamount to theft."
A recent column by your colleague Randy Cohen defended not only looking at confidential information (the salaries of all employees, in this case), but also advocated disseminating the information to everyone in the company.
In a future column, would you reconcile your position with his?
Thank you.
Ralph Lowrance
Charlotte, NC
The column by Mr. Cohen that Mr. Lowrance refers to appears at
Salary Exposure - New York Times
As for reconciliation, in this instance, Mr. Cohen and I disagree on the appropriate ethical response to the situation and I continue to maintain, as I did in my column, that it is inappropriate to take advantage of confidential information that you have inadvertently received.
I encourage other readers to read both columns and to weigh in.
Sunday, November 05, 2006
FOR WHOSE EYES ONLY?
A reader in Madison, Wis., alerted me to a political battle that is brewing in her city, which is the state capital. The issue revolves around campaign documents detailing the Democratic Party's strategic plans for the November election that somehow ended up in Republican hands.
The Republicans say that the documents were found in a copy machine in the state Capitol building, suggesting that someone in the Democratic Party may illegally have used state resources for campaign purposes. The Democrats claim that a Republican operative came across the documents that had been inadvertently left in a binder near the copy machine and rifled through them.
A reporter for The Wisconsin State Journal reports that the executive director of the Wisconsin Committee to Elect a Republican Senate told him that the documents were "used to further the cause of Republican candidates."
My reader wants to know how careless a competitor has to be before it is fair to copy found documents and use them for your own purposes.
"How public does the place have to be?" she asks. "Is it never right? Is it sometimes right?"
From an ethical standpoint, where a document is found does not matter. If it was clearly marked, the person who found it knew that its contents were confidential and belonged to someone else. It may be a political windfall to find documents that reveal your opponent's game plan, but using material that clearly belongs to someone else is tantamount to theft. The material doesn't, after all, leap from the copier into your hands.
The right thing to do in such a situation is either to walk on by or, better yet, to return the material -- unread, of course -- to its rightful owners. The owners may suspect that you read the material, but their suspicions are their own problem, though not as great a problem as their carelessness with sensitive documents.
Such considerations aren't limited to the political world, of course. The same sort of questions that my reader raises can be asked about any documents that clearly are meant to be confidential but are left within your easy view or grasp. What if, for example, a list of confidential salary information for your entire company is left at the copy machine by a human-resources employee?
While it's a natural temptation to want to know how you stack up against your colleagues, it would be wrong to study the material if you know that it's confidential and has been accidentally left behind. You may want to seize the opportunity to prove how underpaid you are compared to others, but there is no honor in capitalizing on someone else's mistake to further your own career.
Chances are that you wouldn't even think of popping into your boss's office to read her e-mail if she had left it up on her screen. Reading printed material that is clearly confidential, simply because you have accidental access, is every bit as wrong.
Professionals should certainly be taken to task when they are careless with sensitive information.
The negligent Democrat in Madison has doubtless gotten an earful from his or her superiors, and if he or she used a state-owned copy machine for party purposes, there will probably be legal consequences as well.
But someone else's carelessness is no justification for doing the wrong thing -- even if you stand to gain from doing so.
The Republicans say that the documents were found in a copy machine in the state Capitol building, suggesting that someone in the Democratic Party may illegally have used state resources for campaign purposes. The Democrats claim that a Republican operative came across the documents that had been inadvertently left in a binder near the copy machine and rifled through them.
A reporter for The Wisconsin State Journal reports that the executive director of the Wisconsin Committee to Elect a Republican Senate told him that the documents were "used to further the cause of Republican candidates."
My reader wants to know how careless a competitor has to be before it is fair to copy found documents and use them for your own purposes.
"How public does the place have to be?" she asks. "Is it never right? Is it sometimes right?"
From an ethical standpoint, where a document is found does not matter. If it was clearly marked, the person who found it knew that its contents were confidential and belonged to someone else. It may be a political windfall to find documents that reveal your opponent's game plan, but using material that clearly belongs to someone else is tantamount to theft. The material doesn't, after all, leap from the copier into your hands.
The right thing to do in such a situation is either to walk on by or, better yet, to return the material -- unread, of course -- to its rightful owners. The owners may suspect that you read the material, but their suspicions are their own problem, though not as great a problem as their carelessness with sensitive documents.
Such considerations aren't limited to the political world, of course. The same sort of questions that my reader raises can be asked about any documents that clearly are meant to be confidential but are left within your easy view or grasp. What if, for example, a list of confidential salary information for your entire company is left at the copy machine by a human-resources employee?
While it's a natural temptation to want to know how you stack up against your colleagues, it would be wrong to study the material if you know that it's confidential and has been accidentally left behind. You may want to seize the opportunity to prove how underpaid you are compared to others, but there is no honor in capitalizing on someone else's mistake to further your own career.
Chances are that you wouldn't even think of popping into your boss's office to read her e-mail if she had left it up on her screen. Reading printed material that is clearly confidential, simply because you have accidental access, is every bit as wrong.
Professionals should certainly be taken to task when they are careless with sensitive information.
The negligent Democrat in Madison has doubtless gotten an earful from his or her superiors, and if he or she used a state-owned copy machine for party purposes, there will probably be legal consequences as well.
But someone else's carelessness is no justification for doing the wrong thing -- even if you stand to gain from doing so.
SOUND OFF: YOUR TEAM AIN'T DOODLEY-SQUAT
My readers had mixed reactions to Boston University's new zero-tolerance policy for foul language and sexist or racist comments from fans at university sporting events. Most applauded the university's policy, however.
"Emotions can run strong and can get out of control at sports events," writes Bert Hoogendam of Sarnia, Ontario, "but nobody has the right or privilege to use swear words and any other vulgar expressions."
"A ticket to a paid event is not a license for the `fans' to personally assault a participant," agrees Anthony Elia of Mission Viejo, Calif.
"Sometimes the parents of these students don't teach their own kids about citizenship and how to be good people in this society," writes Connie Alvarez of Orange, Calif., "and schools sometimes have to step in and play that role."
"The students who feel that they need to use such language -- anywhere -- need an extensive vocabulary course," writes Merrilee Gardner of Irvine, Calif.
But Chuck Jones of Anaheim, Calif., disagrees."Seems that, because something offends them, it's OK to suspend that pesky First Amendment," Jones writes. "Just another example of hypocrisy in our society."
Check out other opinions at http://jeffreyseglin.blogspot.com/2006/10/sound-off-watch-your-mouth.html or post your own at by clicking on "comments" below.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of "The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business" (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics. He is also the administrator of http://jeffreyseglin.blogspot.com, a Web log focused on ethical issues.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 609 Greenwich St., 6th floor, New York, N.Y. 10014-3610.
"Emotions can run strong and can get out of control at sports events," writes Bert Hoogendam of Sarnia, Ontario, "but nobody has the right or privilege to use swear words and any other vulgar expressions."
"A ticket to a paid event is not a license for the `fans' to personally assault a participant," agrees Anthony Elia of Mission Viejo, Calif.
"Sometimes the parents of these students don't teach their own kids about citizenship and how to be good people in this society," writes Connie Alvarez of Orange, Calif., "and schools sometimes have to step in and play that role."
"The students who feel that they need to use such language -- anywhere -- need an extensive vocabulary course," writes Merrilee Gardner of Irvine, Calif.
But Chuck Jones of Anaheim, Calif., disagrees."Seems that, because something offends them, it's OK to suspend that pesky First Amendment," Jones writes. "Just another example of hypocrisy in our society."
Check out other opinions at http://jeffreyseglin.blogspot.com/2006/10/sound-off-watch-your-mouth.html or post your own at by clicking on "comments" below.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of "The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business" (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics. He is also the administrator of http://jeffreyseglin.blogspot.com, a Web log focused on ethical issues.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 609 Greenwich St., 6th floor, New York, N.Y. 10014-3610.
Sunday, October 29, 2006
SOUND OFF: MADONNA AND CHILD
A clamor of condemnation has followed the singer Madonna's adoption of a year-old boy from Malawi, a nation in southeastern Africa. The Human Rights Consultative Committee has challenged the adoption in court, and some have claimed that Madonna is being given special treatment because of her celebrity and her financial generosity to the country through her charity, Raising Malawi, which is setting up an orphanage for 4,000 Malawian children and trying to raise $3 million to support AIDS orphans. Madonna insists that in adopting the boy she has done everything according to the law.
Two questions: Do you see any problem with the adoption being fast-tracked because of who Madonna is and because of her financial gifts to the country? And, in either case, does the media have any business delving into this sort of personal issue simply because the adoptive parent happens to be famous?
Send your thoughts to rightthing@nytimes.com or post them here by clicking on "comments" below. Please include your name, your hometown and the name of the newspaper in which you read this column. Readers' comments may appear in an upcoming column.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of "The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business" (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics. He is also the administrator of http://www.jeffreyseglin.com, a Web log focused on ethical issues.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 609 Greenwich St., 6th floor, New York, N.Y. 10014-3610.
Two questions: Do you see any problem with the adoption being fast-tracked because of who Madonna is and because of her financial gifts to the country? And, in either case, does the media have any business delving into this sort of personal issue simply because the adoptive parent happens to be famous?
Send your thoughts to rightthing@nytimes.com or post them here by clicking on "comments" below. Please include your name, your hometown and the name of the newspaper in which you read this column. Readers' comments may appear in an upcoming column.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of "The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business" (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics. He is also the administrator of http://www.jeffreyseglin.com, a Web log focused on ethical issues.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 609 Greenwich St., 6th floor, New York, N.Y. 10014-3610.
KEEP ON TRUCKING
Occasionally a reader sends me a question for which the answer seems obvious. Take the guy who gets a speeding ticket while driving a company car, on company time, and wants to know whether he or his employer is responsible for paying the ticket.
It doesn't take an ethicist to know, right off, that it's the driver who's responsible for paying. His employer didn't break the law -- he did, and he should be held accountable.
The question has always seemed black-and-white to me, with little room for argument. As with many things, however, even this question can fall into an area tinged with gray.
A reader from Orange County, Calif., writes that he recently received a speeding ticket for going 63 mph in a 55-mph zone while driving his employer's tractor/trailer vehicle. The reader explained to his employer that he always sets the cruise control to 55 miles per hour, so he knows that he was not speeding, but his boss replied bluntly that he does not pay speeding tickets.
This wasn't good enough for my reader, who considers himself a careful driver: "In almost 30 years of commercial driving," he writes, "I had never gotten a speeding ticket."
Convinced that something must be wrong somewhere, he took the truck to a garage -- on his own time and at his own expense -- to have it checked out.
"The shop found that the speedometer was out of calibration by 8 miles per hour!" he writes.
As a result, my reader now takes his GPS unit with him and checks the speedometer on every truck he drives.
"I have found that many of the trucks have inaccurate speedometers," he says, "and have written them up."
The employer is legally and ethically bound to ensure that the company's trucks are safe to be on the road. My reader wants to know if the employer has the same obligation to ensure that the speedometers are correct.
"Is he responsible for speeding tickets we receive when they are out of calibration?" he asks.
The employer absolutely is responsible for making sure that all of the equipment on every company truck works. Besides earning a driver an unfair ticket, a speedometer that's out of whack also could endanger other drivers on the road -- although I'd like to think that a seasoned truck driver would know to drive carefully, regardless of what his speedometer says.
If the employer has not checked the accuracy of the truck's speedometer and a driver receives a speeding ticket as a result, it's the employer's responsibility to pay the ticket.
The right thing for the employer to do is not only to pay the speeding ticket, but also to reimburse my reader for the expenses he incurred in having the truck's speedometer checked. The employer should also check the accuracy of the speedometers on his entire fleet of trucks.
It's fine and good to hold employees personally responsible for their actions while on the job, but employers must likewise take responsibility when it's their carelessness that causes a problem.
It doesn't take an ethicist to know, right off, that it's the driver who's responsible for paying. His employer didn't break the law -- he did, and he should be held accountable.
The question has always seemed black-and-white to me, with little room for argument. As with many things, however, even this question can fall into an area tinged with gray.
A reader from Orange County, Calif., writes that he recently received a speeding ticket for going 63 mph in a 55-mph zone while driving his employer's tractor/trailer vehicle. The reader explained to his employer that he always sets the cruise control to 55 miles per hour, so he knows that he was not speeding, but his boss replied bluntly that he does not pay speeding tickets.
This wasn't good enough for my reader, who considers himself a careful driver: "In almost 30 years of commercial driving," he writes, "I had never gotten a speeding ticket."
Convinced that something must be wrong somewhere, he took the truck to a garage -- on his own time and at his own expense -- to have it checked out.
"The shop found that the speedometer was out of calibration by 8 miles per hour!" he writes.
As a result, my reader now takes his GPS unit with him and checks the speedometer on every truck he drives.
"I have found that many of the trucks have inaccurate speedometers," he says, "and have written them up."
The employer is legally and ethically bound to ensure that the company's trucks are safe to be on the road. My reader wants to know if the employer has the same obligation to ensure that the speedometers are correct.
"Is he responsible for speeding tickets we receive when they are out of calibration?" he asks.
The employer absolutely is responsible for making sure that all of the equipment on every company truck works. Besides earning a driver an unfair ticket, a speedometer that's out of whack also could endanger other drivers on the road -- although I'd like to think that a seasoned truck driver would know to drive carefully, regardless of what his speedometer says.
If the employer has not checked the accuracy of the truck's speedometer and a driver receives a speeding ticket as a result, it's the employer's responsibility to pay the ticket.
The right thing for the employer to do is not only to pay the speeding ticket, but also to reimburse my reader for the expenses he incurred in having the truck's speedometer checked. The employer should also check the accuracy of the speedometers on his entire fleet of trucks.
It's fine and good to hold employees personally responsible for their actions while on the job, but employers must likewise take responsibility when it's their carelessness that causes a problem.
Sunday, October 22, 2006
STOP ME BEFORE I CHARGE AGAIN!
Ethical concepts differ greatly from person to person and from culture to culture, but there's at least one that practically everybody can agree with: Parents have an ethical responsibility to protect their children.
How far that obligation extends changes as the years pass, however. When a little boy is learning to walk, for example, it's a parent's responsibility to make sure that he doesn't tumble down ungated stairs. Long before the boy becomes a teenager, though, the responsibility for recognizing the potential danger of those stairs has passed to him.
The same is true in financial matters. Parents are obligated to teach their children how to be financially responsible, and if a girl runs into financial trouble by, say, keeping poor records for a paper route, her parents are responsible for helping her resolve her mistakes.
Many college students are still maturing financially, so it is reasonable for parents to step in to try to help their children when they fall into financial trouble. That's what A.M., a reader from Orange County, Calif., did six years ago, when her daughter ran up credit-card debt that she could not pay off.
A.M. and her husband hoped that their daughter would learn from that experience, but apparently not. Now married and expecting her second child, she and her husband are so burdened with mortgage and credit-card debt that they may lose their home.
"While we want to offer help," A.M. writes, "we don't feel that it should be in the form of financial aid. They are adults."
A.M. is absolutely correct. Now that her daughter is in her 20s, she is obligated to take responsibility for her own financial well-being. Bailing her out would prolong her daughter's immaturity and rob her of the chance to do the right thing for herself.
There are no set rules about where to draw the line between stepping in and standing back, between fixing things for your kids and teaching them to take responsibility for their own actions. Some teenagers will recklessly tumble down stairs and some 20-somethings will get into financial trouble. Continuing to fix every mistake a child makes does the child no favor. It runs counter to the ultimate ethical responsibility of parents: letting their children, once grown, live their own lives.
A.M. does not want to lend her daughter the money to get out of the financial mess she has gotten herself into. This is a reasonable decision.
The right thing for A.M. to do is to let her daughter's family resolve their own problems, and to be ready with advice if and when her daughter turns to her for help. If asked, A.M. can steer her to a credit-counseling agency who can help her devise a repayment plan. The National Foundation for Credit Counseling, the umbrella organization for credit counselors, is reachable at www.nfcc.org and can point A.M.'s daughter to a reputable, nonprofit credit-counseling agency in her area. These agencies receive a cut of the repayment plans they devise.
A.M.'s primary parental obligation now is to treat her daughter like an adult. This means allowing her to make her own mistakes and to correct those mistakes for herself -- no matter how painful it may be for a mother to watch her daughter stumble.
How far that obligation extends changes as the years pass, however. When a little boy is learning to walk, for example, it's a parent's responsibility to make sure that he doesn't tumble down ungated stairs. Long before the boy becomes a teenager, though, the responsibility for recognizing the potential danger of those stairs has passed to him.
The same is true in financial matters. Parents are obligated to teach their children how to be financially responsible, and if a girl runs into financial trouble by, say, keeping poor records for a paper route, her parents are responsible for helping her resolve her mistakes.
Many college students are still maturing financially, so it is reasonable for parents to step in to try to help their children when they fall into financial trouble. That's what A.M., a reader from Orange County, Calif., did six years ago, when her daughter ran up credit-card debt that she could not pay off.
A.M. and her husband hoped that their daughter would learn from that experience, but apparently not. Now married and expecting her second child, she and her husband are so burdened with mortgage and credit-card debt that they may lose their home.
"While we want to offer help," A.M. writes, "we don't feel that it should be in the form of financial aid. They are adults."
A.M. is absolutely correct. Now that her daughter is in her 20s, she is obligated to take responsibility for her own financial well-being. Bailing her out would prolong her daughter's immaturity and rob her of the chance to do the right thing for herself.
There are no set rules about where to draw the line between stepping in and standing back, between fixing things for your kids and teaching them to take responsibility for their own actions. Some teenagers will recklessly tumble down stairs and some 20-somethings will get into financial trouble. Continuing to fix every mistake a child makes does the child no favor. It runs counter to the ultimate ethical responsibility of parents: letting their children, once grown, live their own lives.
A.M. does not want to lend her daughter the money to get out of the financial mess she has gotten herself into. This is a reasonable decision.
The right thing for A.M. to do is to let her daughter's family resolve their own problems, and to be ready with advice if and when her daughter turns to her for help. If asked, A.M. can steer her to a credit-counseling agency who can help her devise a repayment plan. The National Foundation for Credit Counseling, the umbrella organization for credit counselors, is reachable at www.nfcc.org and can point A.M.'s daughter to a reputable, nonprofit credit-counseling agency in her area. These agencies receive a cut of the repayment plans they devise.
A.M.'s primary parental obligation now is to treat her daughter like an adult. This means allowing her to make her own mistakes and to correct those mistakes for herself -- no matter how painful it may be for a mother to watch her daughter stumble.
SOUND OFF: TEXTBOOK WHEELCHAIRS
The book publisher Houghton Mifflin has run into criticism for publishing textbooks with photos depicting children in wheelchairs who are actually child models who can walk, instead of models who actually use wheelchairs.
My readers held mixed opinions about this controversy.
"The idea that a person with a disability is (depicted) is, in the end, probably a more important factor than if the person is actually disabled," writes Cynthia Dines of Carmichael, Calif. "However, morally I disagree with the publisher's decision. It represents what is common in the corporate world: that money, not people, is the bottom line."
Linda Saxon of Amherstburg, Ontario, goes a step further.
"Persons with disabilities should be hired equally to portray persons with and without disabilities," Saxon writes, "so that society can embrace diversity and put an end to stereotyping. A disability is just one characteristic of a person, like someone having red hair or blue eyes."
But Karrin Hopper of Trabuco Canyon, Calif., believes that the controversy is a tempest in a teapot.
"Too much is being made about nothing," she writes. "A model is paid to bring an idea to life, similar to an actor. ... The publisher should be praised for its effort to show a diverse group of children."
Laura Oliver of Aliso Viejo, Calif., seconds that notion.
"Do these critics who charge Houghton Mifflin have no life?" Oliver asks. "Do they really have nothing better to do than to research a picture and find out if the models are really disabled?"
Check out other opinions at http://jeffreyseglin.blogspot.com/2006/09/sound-off-wheelchair-walkers.html or post your own by clicking on "comments" below.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of "The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business" (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics. He is also the administrator of http://www.jeffreyseglin.com, a Web log focused on ethical issues.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 609 Greenwich St., 6th floor, New York, N.Y. 10014-3610.
My readers held mixed opinions about this controversy.
"The idea that a person with a disability is (depicted) is, in the end, probably a more important factor than if the person is actually disabled," writes Cynthia Dines of Carmichael, Calif. "However, morally I disagree with the publisher's decision. It represents what is common in the corporate world: that money, not people, is the bottom line."
Linda Saxon of Amherstburg, Ontario, goes a step further.
"Persons with disabilities should be hired equally to portray persons with and without disabilities," Saxon writes, "so that society can embrace diversity and put an end to stereotyping. A disability is just one characteristic of a person, like someone having red hair or blue eyes."
But Karrin Hopper of Trabuco Canyon, Calif., believes that the controversy is a tempest in a teapot.
"Too much is being made about nothing," she writes. "A model is paid to bring an idea to life, similar to an actor. ... The publisher should be praised for its effort to show a diverse group of children."
Laura Oliver of Aliso Viejo, Calif., seconds that notion.
"Do these critics who charge Houghton Mifflin have no life?" Oliver asks. "Do they really have nothing better to do than to research a picture and find out if the models are really disabled?"
Check out other opinions at http://jeffreyseglin.blogspot.com/2006/09/sound-off-wheelchair-walkers.html or post your own by clicking on "comments" below.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of "The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business" (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics. He is also the administrator of http://www.jeffreyseglin.com, a Web log focused on ethical issues.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 609 Greenwich St., 6th floor, New York, N.Y. 10014-3610.
Sunday, October 15, 2006
SOUND OFF: A DUTY TO SERVE
Mary Hanna's medical education cost $184,000, which was paid for by the U.S. Army. Hanna had committed herself, once she became a doctor, to giving the Army four years of active duty and four years of reserve duty. Now that she's finished her residency, however, Hanna has notified the Army that she wants reclassification as a conscientious objector based on religious beliefs that she has recently embraced.
The case is now winding its way through the courts, but there are ethical questions that don't depend on the legalities: Hanna's lawyer says that she's willing to repay the money, but even so is she morally bound to carry out the commitment she made to the Army? Or does a new religious obligation trump an old contractual agreement?What do you think?
Send your thoughts to rightthing@nytimes.com or post them here by clicking on "Comments" below. You can choose the anonymous posting option, but please consider including your name, your hometown and the name of the newspaper in which you read this column in the text of your response. Readers' comments may appear in an upcoming column.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of "The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business" (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics. He is also the administrator of www.jeffreyseglin.com, a Web log focused on ethical issues.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 609 Greenwich St., 6th floor, New York, N.Y. 10014-3610.
The case is now winding its way through the courts, but there are ethical questions that don't depend on the legalities: Hanna's lawyer says that she's willing to repay the money, but even so is she morally bound to carry out the commitment she made to the Army? Or does a new religious obligation trump an old contractual agreement?What do you think?
Send your thoughts to rightthing@nytimes.com or post them here by clicking on "Comments" below. You can choose the anonymous posting option, but please consider including your name, your hometown and the name of the newspaper in which you read this column in the text of your response. Readers' comments may appear in an upcoming column.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of "The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business" (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics. He is also the administrator of www.jeffreyseglin.com, a Web log focused on ethical issues.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 609 Greenwich St., 6th floor, New York, N.Y. 10014-3610.
PARTY ON! ... TO A POINT
Former Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis' sentiment, "Sunshine is the best disinfectant," has long been a mantra for those seeking truth by shining a bright light on all the facts. The term "transparency" -- making the ways businesses, governments or other institutions operate clear enough for outsiders to understand -- is another rallying cry for full disclosure.
G.S., a reader from Ohio, recently e-mailed me about a situation that has come up at the middle school where he teaches, a situation that in his opinion cries out for a more transparent approach.
The school has a social committee that plans activities for the staff during and after school hours. Some of the funds for its activities are raised by staff members who bring in baked goods to be sold to students. The committee also collects $10 from each staff member for a flower fund to be drawn upon whenever major events occur in the lives of staff members or their families.
This year the head of the social committee has decided to spend $200 for food at a bar that has agreed to host the staff's annual Christmas party. G.S. is concerned for several reasons.
First, there's the party's location. He believes that most parents would "be offended" if they knew that the money their children paid for baked goods was going to pay for a staff party in a bar, even if the money is earmarked for food and not liquor. Second, he doesn't believe that any of the money collected for flowers should be used for the party. And finally he sees a conflict of interest in the head of the social committee steering the party to a bar owned by her best friend, a former staff member.
If money from the flower fund is indeed to be used to pay for the Christmas party, G.S. has every reason to be upset. The money collected from staff members for flowers should not be used for any purpose other than flowers, unless they themselves specifically agree to the new use. People give their flower money for that specific purpose, and the right thing for the social-committee chair to do is to make sure -- and to give a clear accounting as evidence -- that every penny raised did indeed go to the purchase of flowers. Anything left over should be saved for future flower purchases.
He also is right to be concerned about the potential conflict of interest represented by the committee chairwoman steering the party to her best friend's bar. Even if this represents the best deal the staff could get, the appearance of a conflict is inevitable. Ideally the chairwoman would have allowed others to shop for a location, with her friend's bar naturally among the options. If the results of this survey determined that the bar in question was the best choice, it would remove any suspicion that the chairwoman was using her position to benefit a friend.
G.S. is on shakier ground, however, in questioning whether the event should take place at a bar. Unless there is a school rule forbidding staff functions being held in such establishments -- and of course assuming that no students or other minors will be at the party -- there's no clear problem with having the party there. As for the children and their parents, they're probably more concerned about the baked goods than about where the money will be spent.
The right thing for the social committee to do is to segregate the money collected for the flower fund from its general-use funds, and to ensure that all flower money goes for the purpose intended. The chairwoman should also go out of her way to avoid any perception of a conflict by making sure that, if a party occurs at a friend's bar, it's for the benefit of the social committee and not solely for the benefit of her friend.
G.S., a reader from Ohio, recently e-mailed me about a situation that has come up at the middle school where he teaches, a situation that in his opinion cries out for a more transparent approach.
The school has a social committee that plans activities for the staff during and after school hours. Some of the funds for its activities are raised by staff members who bring in baked goods to be sold to students. The committee also collects $10 from each staff member for a flower fund to be drawn upon whenever major events occur in the lives of staff members or their families.
This year the head of the social committee has decided to spend $200 for food at a bar that has agreed to host the staff's annual Christmas party. G.S. is concerned for several reasons.
First, there's the party's location. He believes that most parents would "be offended" if they knew that the money their children paid for baked goods was going to pay for a staff party in a bar, even if the money is earmarked for food and not liquor. Second, he doesn't believe that any of the money collected for flowers should be used for the party. And finally he sees a conflict of interest in the head of the social committee steering the party to a bar owned by her best friend, a former staff member.
If money from the flower fund is indeed to be used to pay for the Christmas party, G.S. has every reason to be upset. The money collected from staff members for flowers should not be used for any purpose other than flowers, unless they themselves specifically agree to the new use. People give their flower money for that specific purpose, and the right thing for the social-committee chair to do is to make sure -- and to give a clear accounting as evidence -- that every penny raised did indeed go to the purchase of flowers. Anything left over should be saved for future flower purchases.
He also is right to be concerned about the potential conflict of interest represented by the committee chairwoman steering the party to her best friend's bar. Even if this represents the best deal the staff could get, the appearance of a conflict is inevitable. Ideally the chairwoman would have allowed others to shop for a location, with her friend's bar naturally among the options. If the results of this survey determined that the bar in question was the best choice, it would remove any suspicion that the chairwoman was using her position to benefit a friend.
G.S. is on shakier ground, however, in questioning whether the event should take place at a bar. Unless there is a school rule forbidding staff functions being held in such establishments -- and of course assuming that no students or other minors will be at the party -- there's no clear problem with having the party there. As for the children and their parents, they're probably more concerned about the baked goods than about where the money will be spent.
The right thing for the social committee to do is to segregate the money collected for the flower fund from its general-use funds, and to ensure that all flower money goes for the purpose intended. The chairwoman should also go out of her way to avoid any perception of a conflict by making sure that, if a party occurs at a friend's bar, it's for the benefit of the social committee and not solely for the benefit of her friend.
Sunday, October 08, 2006
TAKE ME OUT TO THE POSTSEASON!
Fans of the Philadelphia Phillies are not accustomed to seeing their team in baseball's postseason play. The last time the Phillies reached the playoffs was in 1993, and the last time they won the World Series was in 1980.
But as the 2006 season wound to a close, the Phillies were neck and neck with the Los Angeles Dodgers in a battle for the National League wild-card berth, which would launch them into the playoffs for only the second time in a quarter-century.
As fate would have it, the Phillies came up short once again, to the despair of Philadelphians far and wide -- and, perhaps, to the relief of one former Philadelphian, K.P., a reader of this column in Charlotte, N.C.
When it seemed possible, near the end of the season, that the team might make it to the postseason, Phillies fans who held season tickets were sent playoff tickets, just in case the team made it to postseason play. K.P. received his recently deceased father's postseason tickets.
K.P.'s father had been a 30-year Phillies season-ticket holder. In January, when he died unexpectedly of a heart attack, K.P. inherited his tickets. Because K.P. was no longer living in Philadelphia, he sold the tickets at face value to a former colleague of his father's.
When the former colleague asked K.P. about postseason tickets, however, K.P. told him that he was planning to use them himself or to sell them to other friends who had inquired earlier.
K.P. wanted to know if he was under any ethical obligation to offer the postseason tickets to the former colleague."I must be," he wrote to me, "because I will feel bad if I don't!"
K.P. has no reason to feel bad. When he agreed to sell the colleague the regular-season tickets, he says, they didn't discuss the postseason since "it appeared very unlikely at the time," any more than they discussed whether K.P. would be willing to sell his tickets for the 2007 season. K.P. received his father's 2006 tickets in March and sent them onto the colleague, who promptly mailed him a check.
The reason K.P. is torn about whether he is being fair to the colleague is that season-ticket holders generally have first dibs on playoff tickets if their team makes it to the postseason. But it is K.P., not the colleague, who is the season-ticket holder. As long as he didn't violate any state or federal ticket-reselling laws or whatever conditions the Phillies organization may place on reselling tickets, K.P. had the right to sell as many or as few of his father's tickets as he wanted.
In short, the colleague has gotten what he paid for, and should not have expected to receive anything beyond what he agreed to purchase back in March.
If the same situation comes up next year, should K.P. give the colleague the first chance to buy the postseason tickets if he doesn't use them himself? I'm sure the colleague would appreciate the gesture, but K.P. has no obligation to do so.
K.P. was clear with his father's old colleague about exactly what he was buying when he bought the tickets, so he's already done the right thing. The colleague is lucky to have acquired tickets in a season when the Phillies made the end of regular-season play more exciting than usual for their fans.
"My dad would have enjoyed this season," K.P. writes, "although he was accustomed to Phillies October disappointment!"
But as the 2006 season wound to a close, the Phillies were neck and neck with the Los Angeles Dodgers in a battle for the National League wild-card berth, which would launch them into the playoffs for only the second time in a quarter-century.
As fate would have it, the Phillies came up short once again, to the despair of Philadelphians far and wide -- and, perhaps, to the relief of one former Philadelphian, K.P., a reader of this column in Charlotte, N.C.
When it seemed possible, near the end of the season, that the team might make it to the postseason, Phillies fans who held season tickets were sent playoff tickets, just in case the team made it to postseason play. K.P. received his recently deceased father's postseason tickets.
K.P.'s father had been a 30-year Phillies season-ticket holder. In January, when he died unexpectedly of a heart attack, K.P. inherited his tickets. Because K.P. was no longer living in Philadelphia, he sold the tickets at face value to a former colleague of his father's.
When the former colleague asked K.P. about postseason tickets, however, K.P. told him that he was planning to use them himself or to sell them to other friends who had inquired earlier.
K.P. wanted to know if he was under any ethical obligation to offer the postseason tickets to the former colleague."I must be," he wrote to me, "because I will feel bad if I don't!"
K.P. has no reason to feel bad. When he agreed to sell the colleague the regular-season tickets, he says, they didn't discuss the postseason since "it appeared very unlikely at the time," any more than they discussed whether K.P. would be willing to sell his tickets for the 2007 season. K.P. received his father's 2006 tickets in March and sent them onto the colleague, who promptly mailed him a check.
The reason K.P. is torn about whether he is being fair to the colleague is that season-ticket holders generally have first dibs on playoff tickets if their team makes it to the postseason. But it is K.P., not the colleague, who is the season-ticket holder. As long as he didn't violate any state or federal ticket-reselling laws or whatever conditions the Phillies organization may place on reselling tickets, K.P. had the right to sell as many or as few of his father's tickets as he wanted.
In short, the colleague has gotten what he paid for, and should not have expected to receive anything beyond what he agreed to purchase back in March.
If the same situation comes up next year, should K.P. give the colleague the first chance to buy the postseason tickets if he doesn't use them himself? I'm sure the colleague would appreciate the gesture, but K.P. has no obligation to do so.
K.P. was clear with his father's old colleague about exactly what he was buying when he bought the tickets, so he's already done the right thing. The colleague is lucky to have acquired tickets in a season when the Phillies made the end of regular-season play more exciting than usual for their fans.
"My dad would have enjoyed this season," K.P. writes, "although he was accustomed to Phillies October disappointment!"
SOUND OFF: WHO CARES WHAT CELEBRITIES THINK?
Most of my readers who responded think that too much fuss is being made about recent negative comments made by movie star Mel Gibson, Sen. George Allen of Virginia and civil-rights leader Andrew Young about particular races or religions.
"It is hypocritical to overly publicize the comment of a one-time incident for most public figures," writes Susan Riberdy of Windsor, Ontario. "It is sad that we as a society focus on what famous people say, when we ignore the racial cleansing and atrocities around the world."
Joseph Sabatini of West Chester, Ohio, agrees."The personal lives of celebrities do not interest me in the least," he writes. "I have all the concerns I need in my life to succeed and be prosperous. There is no time for such nonsense."
"We should stop the carping censorship and let people state their opinions," writes Dunbar Jewell of Charlotte, N.C. "We each can then evaluate for ourselves without the all-knowing, Goebbels-like press shaping our minds."
Not that everyone was sympathetic. Sunny Carney of Columbus, Ohio, probably spoke for many in saying, "Gibson, Allen, Young and others of their ilk should practice that old bit of advice: Think before you speak!"
Check out other opinions at
http://jeffreyseglin.blogspot.com/2006/09/sound-off-does-persons-past-forgive.html or post your own at by clicking on "Comments" below.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of "The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business" (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics. He is also the administrator of http://jeffreyseglin.blogspot.com, a Web log focused on ethical issues.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 609 Greenwich St., 6th floor, New York, N.Y. 10014-3610.
"It is hypocritical to overly publicize the comment of a one-time incident for most public figures," writes Susan Riberdy of Windsor, Ontario. "It is sad that we as a society focus on what famous people say, when we ignore the racial cleansing and atrocities around the world."
Joseph Sabatini of West Chester, Ohio, agrees."The personal lives of celebrities do not interest me in the least," he writes. "I have all the concerns I need in my life to succeed and be prosperous. There is no time for such nonsense."
"We should stop the carping censorship and let people state their opinions," writes Dunbar Jewell of Charlotte, N.C. "We each can then evaluate for ourselves without the all-knowing, Goebbels-like press shaping our minds."
Not that everyone was sympathetic. Sunny Carney of Columbus, Ohio, probably spoke for many in saying, "Gibson, Allen, Young and others of their ilk should practice that old bit of advice: Think before you speak!"
Check out other opinions at
http://jeffreyseglin.blogspot.com/2006/09/sound-off-does-persons-past-forgive.html or post your own at by clicking on "Comments" below.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of "The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business" (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics. He is also the administrator of http://jeffreyseglin.blogspot.com, a Web log focused on ethical issues.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 609 Greenwich St., 6th floor, New York, N.Y. 10014-3610.
Sunday, October 01, 2006
SOUND OFF: WATCH YOUR MOUTH
Boston University officials recently announced a zero-tolerance policy for foul language and sexist or racist comments from fans at university sporting events. Anyone caught violating this policy will be expelled from the event, and repeat offenders may be permanently barred from attending sports events.
Students have argued that the policy infringes on longstanding traditions and the right to free speech. But a university official disagreed, telling The Boston Globe, "I don't equate school spirit with the yelling of obscenities."
Is the university right to ban such language at games? Or, by doing so, has it censored the fans' right to free expression? What do you think?
Send your thoughts to rightthing@nytimes.com or post them by clicking on "comments" below. Please include your name, your hometown and where you read this column. Readers' comments may appear in an upcoming column.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of "The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business" (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics. He is also the administrator of http://jeffreyseglin.blogspot.com, a Web log focused on ethical issues.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 609 Greenwich St., 6th floor, New York, N.Y. 10014-3610.
Students have argued that the policy infringes on longstanding traditions and the right to free speech. But a university official disagreed, telling The Boston Globe, "I don't equate school spirit with the yelling of obscenities."
Is the university right to ban such language at games? Or, by doing so, has it censored the fans' right to free expression? What do you think?
Send your thoughts to rightthing@nytimes.com or post them by clicking on "comments" below. Please include your name, your hometown and where you read this column. Readers' comments may appear in an upcoming column.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of "The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business" (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics. He is also the administrator of http://jeffreyseglin.blogspot.com, a Web log focused on ethical issues.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 609 Greenwich St., 6th floor, New York, N.Y. 10014-3610.
MIND-READERS NEED NOT APPLY
When I visited my father in Minneapolis recently, he reminisced about being a teenager living in New York. On one occasion he was approached by a man in Times Square asking for money to help make bus fare. My father gave him some change.
After he did, the man paused a moment and then said, "Listen, I'm not going to lie to you. I'm going to use the money to buy wine."
My father laughs now at the unexpected honesty he encountered.It may be rare to encounter so honest a confession, but many people are troubled by doubt as to how a stranger asking for money will really use the funds.
As soon as T.G., a reader from Laguna Niguel, Calif., hears somebody on the street say "Excuse me?" she instinctively thinks to herself, "Am I going to dig into my wallet this time or not?"
"But whichever I decide," she writes, "I never feel that I've made the right decision."
While she resents the request for cash, T.G. also feels sorry for the supplicant.
"It's humiliating to have to beg," she writes, "unless, of course, it's easier than digging ditches, picking strawberries, washing pots and pans, or serving burgers and fries."
T.G. lives on modest means herself, and she wonders if, when asked for bus fare or gas money to visit a mother, the right thing to do might be to ask for some verifiable scrap of information, such as the mom's telephone number. Then she wonders why, if things are that tough, the mother hasn't sent gas money already.
"Would that remind them that it's really not fair to ask strangers for money?" she muses.
Or, she asks, would the right thing be to turn them down, "realizing that millions of people generally make their own luck and that, if it weren't for us easy touches out there, the alternative might be to actually find some sort of paying job."
Finally she wonders if the right thing would be to simply be grateful that all they want is cash, and therefore to hand it over and walk away, "knowing that I will never see them again and will have assuaged my conscience without having inconvenienced myself in a way that might actually help solve the problem?"
From a practical point of view, it's impossible for her to tell if a given beggar will use her money to buy dinner or to buy drugs. She can't follow the beggar around for the rest of the day to track how her money is used, and wouldn't want to if she could. There is, of course, an ethical obligation on the beggar's part not to obtain money under false pretenses, but it's not feasible for her to determine her charitable giving based on whether or not the beggar meets that obligation.
Instead, regardless of how exactly a beggar asks for money, she should assume that it will go toward his or her general expenses, whatever they may be. Think of it as analogous to giving to a college's general fund, instead of to a specific fund-raising drive for a particular building or program. In such a case you'd give or not give based on your impression of the college itself, and that's the right approach to take here.
Because there is no obligation for her to give to the beggar, there's no reason for T.G. to feel guilty for refusing to give -- that's a perfectly reasonable response. And if she neither believes nor disbelieves anything she's told in a solicitation, she doesn't have to feel that she's been duped if the money winds up going for something other than the beggar said it would.
For my part, when someone asks me for money for coffee or for something to eat, I usually offer to buy it for them if I happen to be close to a coffee shop. But if I'm not near one, or if the request isn't that specific, sometimes I simply hand over cash and sometimes I don't. On the occasions when I do, regardless of what the beggar may have said, I make no assumptions about how the money will be spent -- it's a donation to the beggar's general fund.
The right thing for T.G. to do when asked for money, as it is for anybody else, is to decide whether or not she wants to give. If she does, fine. If she doesn't, also fine. But her decision should not be based on any expectation of how the money will be spent.
After he did, the man paused a moment and then said, "Listen, I'm not going to lie to you. I'm going to use the money to buy wine."
My father laughs now at the unexpected honesty he encountered.It may be rare to encounter so honest a confession, but many people are troubled by doubt as to how a stranger asking for money will really use the funds.
As soon as T.G., a reader from Laguna Niguel, Calif., hears somebody on the street say "Excuse me?" she instinctively thinks to herself, "Am I going to dig into my wallet this time or not?"
"But whichever I decide," she writes, "I never feel that I've made the right decision."
While she resents the request for cash, T.G. also feels sorry for the supplicant.
"It's humiliating to have to beg," she writes, "unless, of course, it's easier than digging ditches, picking strawberries, washing pots and pans, or serving burgers and fries."
T.G. lives on modest means herself, and she wonders if, when asked for bus fare or gas money to visit a mother, the right thing to do might be to ask for some verifiable scrap of information, such as the mom's telephone number. Then she wonders why, if things are that tough, the mother hasn't sent gas money already.
"Would that remind them that it's really not fair to ask strangers for money?" she muses.
Or, she asks, would the right thing be to turn them down, "realizing that millions of people generally make their own luck and that, if it weren't for us easy touches out there, the alternative might be to actually find some sort of paying job."
Finally she wonders if the right thing would be to simply be grateful that all they want is cash, and therefore to hand it over and walk away, "knowing that I will never see them again and will have assuaged my conscience without having inconvenienced myself in a way that might actually help solve the problem?"
From a practical point of view, it's impossible for her to tell if a given beggar will use her money to buy dinner or to buy drugs. She can't follow the beggar around for the rest of the day to track how her money is used, and wouldn't want to if she could. There is, of course, an ethical obligation on the beggar's part not to obtain money under false pretenses, but it's not feasible for her to determine her charitable giving based on whether or not the beggar meets that obligation.
Instead, regardless of how exactly a beggar asks for money, she should assume that it will go toward his or her general expenses, whatever they may be. Think of it as analogous to giving to a college's general fund, instead of to a specific fund-raising drive for a particular building or program. In such a case you'd give or not give based on your impression of the college itself, and that's the right approach to take here.
Because there is no obligation for her to give to the beggar, there's no reason for T.G. to feel guilty for refusing to give -- that's a perfectly reasonable response. And if she neither believes nor disbelieves anything she's told in a solicitation, she doesn't have to feel that she's been duped if the money winds up going for something other than the beggar said it would.
For my part, when someone asks me for money for coffee or for something to eat, I usually offer to buy it for them if I happen to be close to a coffee shop. But if I'm not near one, or if the request isn't that specific, sometimes I simply hand over cash and sometimes I don't. On the occasions when I do, regardless of what the beggar may have said, I make no assumptions about how the money will be spent -- it's a donation to the beggar's general fund.
The right thing for T.G. to do when asked for money, as it is for anybody else, is to decide whether or not she wants to give. If she does, fine. If she doesn't, also fine. But her decision should not be based on any expectation of how the money will be spent.
Sunday, September 24, 2006
TELL ME YOUR TALES
Don't forget to send me your stories about ethical dilemmas that have nagged at you. Draw them from any aspect of your life, but please keep your submission to no more than 300 words.
I'll run some of these stories in an upcoming column, and those whose stories are used in that column will receive a copy of my book, "The Right Thing" (Smith Kerr, 2006).
Include your name, address and telephone number, and submit your story by Oct. 10 to: rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 609 Greenwich St., 6th floor, New York, N.Y. 10014-3610.
I'll run some of these stories in an upcoming column, and those whose stories are used in that column will receive a copy of my book, "The Right Thing" (Smith Kerr, 2006).
Include your name, address and telephone number, and submit your story by Oct. 10 to: rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 609 Greenwich St., 6th floor, New York, N.Y. 10014-3610.
A UNIVERSAL QUESTION
If you know yourself to be a universal blood donor, one whose donated blood can be used by others regardless of their blood type, are you obligated to refrain from doing anything that might take you out of the donor pool?
An e-mail from Melanie McDonald, a reader in Stanton, Calif., raised that tricky question.
McDonald has O-negative blood, making her blood compatible with people of any other blood type. Now 50, she has been donating blood for more than 15 years. She also likes to travel, but is hesitant to go abroad because she worries about the medications and vaccines that she would have to take to avoid diseases such as malaria and hepatitis.
"I think this would restrict my being able to donate blood," she writes. "Morally, I feel I have an obligation to keep my blood `pure."'
She's quite right, but the restriction has nothing to do with any medications she might take. After returning from countries where malaria is a problem, donors are supposed to go a year without showing any symptoms before they resume giving blood, regardless of whether they took antimalarial medications before traveling.
Does McDonald have a responsibility to refrain from visiting such countries because she is a universal blood donor? Of course not.
The right thing for McDonald to do -- for any traveler to do -- is to take the appropriate medications and to not expose herself recklessly to any diseases she might inadvertently bring back into her country. She should also make sure to alert blood banks to which she's been giving blood that she will be unavailable for a year.
Even if McDonald did spend her life trying to keep her blood "pure" so that it would be ready for donation, there's no guarantee that she'd be successful -- as she learned a few years back, when she was deemed too anemic to donate. Although McDonald is among what is estimated to be only 1 in every 15 people in the United States who have O-positive blood, she should not be expected, by others or by herself, to lock herself up to keep from being exposed to anything that could possibly taint her blood.
Sure, if she's torn between traveling to a country that has a history of malaria and one that doesn't, I'd encourage her to choose the former. But she has no ethical obligation to do so.
She shouldn't worry about setting a bad example for others, either. Even if she takes an occasional year off from giving blood, the fact that she's been regularly donating for almost two decades and plans to continue to do so is behavior for others to emulate, regardless of their blood type.
An e-mail from Melanie McDonald, a reader in Stanton, Calif., raised that tricky question.
McDonald has O-negative blood, making her blood compatible with people of any other blood type. Now 50, she has been donating blood for more than 15 years. She also likes to travel, but is hesitant to go abroad because she worries about the medications and vaccines that she would have to take to avoid diseases such as malaria and hepatitis.
"I think this would restrict my being able to donate blood," she writes. "Morally, I feel I have an obligation to keep my blood `pure."'
She's quite right, but the restriction has nothing to do with any medications she might take. After returning from countries where malaria is a problem, donors are supposed to go a year without showing any symptoms before they resume giving blood, regardless of whether they took antimalarial medications before traveling.
Does McDonald have a responsibility to refrain from visiting such countries because she is a universal blood donor? Of course not.
The right thing for McDonald to do -- for any traveler to do -- is to take the appropriate medications and to not expose herself recklessly to any diseases she might inadvertently bring back into her country. She should also make sure to alert blood banks to which she's been giving blood that she will be unavailable for a year.
Even if McDonald did spend her life trying to keep her blood "pure" so that it would be ready for donation, there's no guarantee that she'd be successful -- as she learned a few years back, when she was deemed too anemic to donate. Although McDonald is among what is estimated to be only 1 in every 15 people in the United States who have O-positive blood, she should not be expected, by others or by herself, to lock herself up to keep from being exposed to anything that could possibly taint her blood.
Sure, if she's torn between traveling to a country that has a history of malaria and one that doesn't, I'd encourage her to choose the former. But she has no ethical obligation to do so.
She shouldn't worry about setting a bad example for others, either. Even if she takes an occasional year off from giving blood, the fact that she's been regularly donating for almost two decades and plans to continue to do so is behavior for others to emulate, regardless of their blood type.
SOUND OFF: A CHECKUP ON HOTEL CHECK-INS
For the most part my readers think that hotels are wrong to pre-charge credit cards for reserved rooms.
Bill Wotring of Fullerton, Calif., found nothing wrong with the practice, however, as long as the hotel tells you that the charge will be made. When in doubt, he suggests, ask.
Stevie Book of Charlotte, N.C. disagrees."Hotels should not charge a credit card to hold a reservation until check-in or the cancellation-policy date has been met," she writes.
David Douey of Windsor, Ontario, considers the practice "unethical ... because you have not yet availed yourself of their services at all."
Carol Goodsell of Sherman, Ill., agrees, and also points out that such charges might affect a person's credit limit.
If you end up canceling your reservation, writes Cathy Olson of Foothill Ranch, Calif., extra steps will be needed to credit the charges: "Soon credit institutions will add transaction charges!"
Belinda Sanders of Cypress, Calif., wants to know where "the consideration, product, benefit or service" is for the consumer: "Let me go give the nearest tire dealer $500 to use for his own purposes -- until I happen to need new tires!"
Check out other opinions at http://jeffreyseglin.blogspot.com/2006/08/sound-off-hey-wait-isnt-that-my-money.html or post your own by clicking on "comments" or "post a comment" below.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of "The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business" (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics. He is also the administrator of http://jeffreyseglin.blogspot.com, a Web log focused on ethical issues.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 609 Greenwich St., 6th floor, New York, N.Y. 10014-3610. Please include your name, location, and contact information.
Bill Wotring of Fullerton, Calif., found nothing wrong with the practice, however, as long as the hotel tells you that the charge will be made. When in doubt, he suggests, ask.
Stevie Book of Charlotte, N.C. disagrees."Hotels should not charge a credit card to hold a reservation until check-in or the cancellation-policy date has been met," she writes.
David Douey of Windsor, Ontario, considers the practice "unethical ... because you have not yet availed yourself of their services at all."
Carol Goodsell of Sherman, Ill., agrees, and also points out that such charges might affect a person's credit limit.
If you end up canceling your reservation, writes Cathy Olson of Foothill Ranch, Calif., extra steps will be needed to credit the charges: "Soon credit institutions will add transaction charges!"
Belinda Sanders of Cypress, Calif., wants to know where "the consideration, product, benefit or service" is for the consumer: "Let me go give the nearest tire dealer $500 to use for his own purposes -- until I happen to need new tires!"
Check out other opinions at http://jeffreyseglin.blogspot.com/2006/08/sound-off-hey-wait-isnt-that-my-money.html or post your own by clicking on "comments" or "post a comment" below.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of "The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business" (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics. He is also the administrator of http://jeffreyseglin.blogspot.com, a Web log focused on ethical issues.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 609 Greenwich St., 6th floor, New York, N.Y. 10014-3610. Please include your name, location, and contact information.
Friday, September 22, 2006
HEWLETT-PACKARD'S LEAKS
As CEO Mark Hurd gets ready for a press conference this afternoon and has agreed to testify before Congress next week, there has been a great deal of coverage of the methods that Hewlett-Packard used to trace information leaks. One result of the discovery of how the leaks were traced has been the announced resignation of HP's board chair Patricia Dunn come January.
Yesterday, I spoke with Robin Young, host of NPR's "Here and Now" program about the issue. The segment of the show can be heard by going to http://www.here-now.org/shows/2006/09/20060921.asp and clicking on "Listen" under the "HP Leaks" story description.
Yesterday, I spoke with Robin Young, host of NPR's "Here and Now" program about the issue. The segment of the show can be heard by going to http://www.here-now.org/shows/2006/09/20060921.asp and clicking on "Listen" under the "HP Leaks" story description.
Sunday, September 17, 2006
SOUND OFF: WHEELCHAIR WALKERS
The book publisher Houghton Mifflin came under fire recently when a front-page story in The Wall Street Journal revealed that some of its textbooks had included photographs of children in wheelchairs who were actually child models who could walk. (Aiming for Diversity, Textbooks Overshoot - WSJ.com)
It's common for models to be hired to pose as something they're not in order to advertise a product or illustrate a point, but critics charge that Houghton Mifflin, in its effort to be politically correct by including wheelchair-bound children, should have hired models who actually used chairs in real life.
What do you think? Is it wrong for textbook publishers to use pictures of models who aren't what they appear to be? Is there a difference between a model pretending to be, say, a doctor and one pretending to be a disabled person? Or is this a case of too much fuss being made about an otherwise praiseworthy effort to show a diverse group of children?
Send your thoughts to rightthing@nytimes.com or post them by clicking on "comments" below. Please include your name, your hometown and the name of the newspaper in which you read this column. Readers' comments may appear in an upcoming column.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of "The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business" (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics. He is also the administrator of http://jeffreyseglin.blogspot.com/, a Web log focused on ethical issues.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 609 Greenwich St., 6th floor, New York, N.Y. 10014-3610.
It's common for models to be hired to pose as something they're not in order to advertise a product or illustrate a point, but critics charge that Houghton Mifflin, in its effort to be politically correct by including wheelchair-bound children, should have hired models who actually used chairs in real life.
What do you think? Is it wrong for textbook publishers to use pictures of models who aren't what they appear to be? Is there a difference between a model pretending to be, say, a doctor and one pretending to be a disabled person? Or is this a case of too much fuss being made about an otherwise praiseworthy effort to show a diverse group of children?
Send your thoughts to rightthing@nytimes.com or post them by clicking on "comments" below. Please include your name, your hometown and the name of the newspaper in which you read this column. Readers' comments may appear in an upcoming column.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of "The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business" (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics. He is also the administrator of http://jeffreyseglin.blogspot.com/, a Web log focused on ethical issues.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 609 Greenwich St., 6th floor, New York, N.Y. 10014-3610.
NOTHING WRONG WITH CHECKING A CHARITY
When a son or daughter dies, it's a tragedy for the parents. Some parents channel their grief into doing good works in memory of their child.
A reader from Ohio e-mailed me to let me know of a couple who had started a charitable golf tournament after their 17-year-old son died several years ago. Their son was a promising athlete, so the couple solicits donations from various sports teams, vacation destinations and athletic facilities. These items are auctioned off after the golf outing, with the proceeds to be used to help underprivileged kids in the community get the expensive sports equipment they need to participate in organized sports.
In theory, it's a terrific tribute to the memory of a young athlete. In practice, well, that's another story.
My Ohio reader writes that in the past two or three years she has witnessed some disturbing incidents involving the parents who lost their son.
"On one occasion," she writes, "a donated item that was not sold during the auction was given to a family member as a Christmas present. The following year a trip that was not sold was given as a gift to the parents of this couple."
She also suspects that gift certificates for dinners and rounds of golf have been personally used by the couple instead of being auctioned off.
If she's right, my reader says, "this couple has found a way to earn a living from the death of their son on the backs of generous donors."
She is "appalled by this couple's lack of good judgment with respect to the donated items," she writes. "Am I being too hard on this couple?"
She isn't. However sad the parents' loss of their child undoubtedly is, there's no ethical justification for any charitable organization, large or small, to solicit donations for a particular purpose and then turn around and let organizers take goods or proceeds for personal use. If the accusations are true, the couple is probably also violating the law by committing fraud.
The accusations may not be true, of course. It's quite possible that the parents have compensated their organization for any goods or services that they may personally have taken advantage of, with the proceeds going to the designated cause. If so, the parents are guilty of nothing more than insensitivity to the appearance of wrongdoing.
The right thing for my reader to do is to ask the parents for an accounting of how they have used the donations they have received. This is a reasonable question to ask of any charity before you donate to it.
If they balk at providing this information, or if my reader still suspects fraudulent activity after she hears back from them, she should report them to the charitable-law section of the state attorney general's office. The Web site for the National Association of State Charity Officials, at www.nasconet.org, lists the offices responsible for charitable organizations and solicitations in each state, while Canadians can find information about registered charities at www.cra-arc.gc.ca.
It's abhorrent to think that anyone would prey on the kindness of others by using a child's death to solicit funds for a worthy cause in his memory and then put those funds to other uses. It would be wrong for my reader or others to turn a blind eye to such practices if they have proof of wrongdoing.
A reader from Ohio e-mailed me to let me know of a couple who had started a charitable golf tournament after their 17-year-old son died several years ago. Their son was a promising athlete, so the couple solicits donations from various sports teams, vacation destinations and athletic facilities. These items are auctioned off after the golf outing, with the proceeds to be used to help underprivileged kids in the community get the expensive sports equipment they need to participate in organized sports.
In theory, it's a terrific tribute to the memory of a young athlete. In practice, well, that's another story.
My Ohio reader writes that in the past two or three years she has witnessed some disturbing incidents involving the parents who lost their son.
"On one occasion," she writes, "a donated item that was not sold during the auction was given to a family member as a Christmas present. The following year a trip that was not sold was given as a gift to the parents of this couple."
She also suspects that gift certificates for dinners and rounds of golf have been personally used by the couple instead of being auctioned off.
If she's right, my reader says, "this couple has found a way to earn a living from the death of their son on the backs of generous donors."
She is "appalled by this couple's lack of good judgment with respect to the donated items," she writes. "Am I being too hard on this couple?"
She isn't. However sad the parents' loss of their child undoubtedly is, there's no ethical justification for any charitable organization, large or small, to solicit donations for a particular purpose and then turn around and let organizers take goods or proceeds for personal use. If the accusations are true, the couple is probably also violating the law by committing fraud.
The accusations may not be true, of course. It's quite possible that the parents have compensated their organization for any goods or services that they may personally have taken advantage of, with the proceeds going to the designated cause. If so, the parents are guilty of nothing more than insensitivity to the appearance of wrongdoing.
The right thing for my reader to do is to ask the parents for an accounting of how they have used the donations they have received. This is a reasonable question to ask of any charity before you donate to it.
If they balk at providing this information, or if my reader still suspects fraudulent activity after she hears back from them, she should report them to the charitable-law section of the state attorney general's office. The Web site for the National Association of State Charity Officials, at www.nasconet.org, lists the offices responsible for charitable organizations and solicitations in each state, while Canadians can find information about registered charities at www.cra-arc.gc.ca.
It's abhorrent to think that anyone would prey on the kindness of others by using a child's death to solicit funds for a worthy cause in his memory and then put those funds to other uses. It would be wrong for my reader or others to turn a blind eye to such practices if they have proof of wrongdoing.
Sunday, September 10, 2006
YOU TELL ME YOURS
A letter from Louise Hernandez of Yorba Linda, Calif., reminds me that personal stories can bring to life the ways that most of us deal with day-to-day ethical choices.
Hernandez sent me a copy of the winning essay in her Rotary Club district's annual ethics-essay contest for high-school students. The winner, Eunice Kwon of Pasadena High School, wrote about how she and several of her friends who were "the smart kids" at school had lapsed into a culture of cheating.
"I came into high school strong, proud and ready to take on the new challenges that I faced," she wrote. "By my third year I was weak, desperate and ready to do whatever it took to keep myself ahead. I cheated."
Kwon didn't feel too bad about it at first.
"After all, there was maybe one person in all of my AP classes who never openly cheated," she explained. "The rest of my friends quite candidly copied homework from each other and shared test questions on a daily basis."
Kwon and her friends are not alone. The Josephson Institute's Survey of American Youth found that 62 percent of high-school students surveyed said that they had cheated on a test and 83 percent had copied someone else's homework. Sadly, Kwon recognized that she and her friends "were the future leaders of America and we were the biggest cheaters in school."
But then something happened that forced Kwon to recognize that what she was doing was wrong. A friend called to tell her that he had found the password to a teacher's online grading book and that he could easily change their grades.
"He was excited," Kwon wrote. "I felt like throwing up."
The suggestion shocked her. Copying homework was one thing, hacking into a teacher's computer was quite another.
"It jolted my common sense," she wrote, "and woke me up from the nightmare I was living." She realized that her previous offenses, "no matter how petty, were all forms of cheating."
Kwon's essay can be found at http://www.district5300.org/essaycontest/2006-2007a/2006WinningEssay.pdf and the Josephson Institute's findings are at http://www.josephsoninstitute.org/Survey2004/data-tables_2004_behavior.pdf.
It took a specific incident to shake Kwon into acknowledging that, regardless of the degree, cheating is wrong. But she is not the only one who has had to decide the right thing to do in a difficult situation.
So now it's your turn to tell me what kinds of ethical dilemmas nag at you. Draw them from any aspect of your life -- work, romance, family, community -- in which you find them.
Provide as much detail as possible, but keep your submission to no more than 300 words. I'll run some of these stories in an upcoming column. Those whose stories are used in that column will receive a copy of my book, "The Right Thing" (Smith Kerr, 2006).
Include your name, address and telephone number, and submit your story by Oct. 10 to: rightthing@nytimes.com or The Right Thing, The New York Times Syndicate, 609 Greenwich St., 6th floor, New York, N.Y. 10014-3610.
Hernandez sent me a copy of the winning essay in her Rotary Club district's annual ethics-essay contest for high-school students. The winner, Eunice Kwon of Pasadena High School, wrote about how she and several of her friends who were "the smart kids" at school had lapsed into a culture of cheating.
"I came into high school strong, proud and ready to take on the new challenges that I faced," she wrote. "By my third year I was weak, desperate and ready to do whatever it took to keep myself ahead. I cheated."
Kwon didn't feel too bad about it at first.
"After all, there was maybe one person in all of my AP classes who never openly cheated," she explained. "The rest of my friends quite candidly copied homework from each other and shared test questions on a daily basis."
Kwon and her friends are not alone. The Josephson Institute's Survey of American Youth found that 62 percent of high-school students surveyed said that they had cheated on a test and 83 percent had copied someone else's homework. Sadly, Kwon recognized that she and her friends "were the future leaders of America and we were the biggest cheaters in school."
But then something happened that forced Kwon to recognize that what she was doing was wrong. A friend called to tell her that he had found the password to a teacher's online grading book and that he could easily change their grades.
"He was excited," Kwon wrote. "I felt like throwing up."
The suggestion shocked her. Copying homework was one thing, hacking into a teacher's computer was quite another.
"It jolted my common sense," she wrote, "and woke me up from the nightmare I was living." She realized that her previous offenses, "no matter how petty, were all forms of cheating."
Kwon's essay can be found at http://www.district5300.org/essaycontest/2006-2007a/2006WinningEssay.pdf and the Josephson Institute's findings are at http://www.josephsoninstitute.org/Survey2004/data-tables_2004_behavior.pdf.
It took a specific incident to shake Kwon into acknowledging that, regardless of the degree, cheating is wrong. But she is not the only one who has had to decide the right thing to do in a difficult situation.
So now it's your turn to tell me what kinds of ethical dilemmas nag at you. Draw them from any aspect of your life -- work, romance, family, community -- in which you find them.
Provide as much detail as possible, but keep your submission to no more than 300 words. I'll run some of these stories in an upcoming column. Those whose stories are used in that column will receive a copy of my book, "The Right Thing" (Smith Kerr, 2006).
Include your name, address and telephone number, and submit your story by Oct. 10 to: rightthing@nytimes.com or The Right Thing, The New York Times Syndicate, 609 Greenwich St., 6th floor, New York, N.Y. 10014-3610.
SOUND OFF: GIVING SECOND CHANCES
Readers felt that it was not an option to simply ignore the situation of a talented employee who failed to show up for a meeting with a customer, losing his company a $100,000 contract, because he had resumed drinking after having been sober for many years.
"Under no circumstances is overlooking it the right choice in this matter," writes Peggy Lawson of Middletown, Ohio. "(This) is more than just a missed opportunity for my company -- this is a health issue for this employee, and will impact his performance in the future, as well as his position on the team."
"As much as it hurt financially, I wouldn't fire a loyal, productive employee over a single episode," writes Tom Gebell of Minneapolis. "I would require the employee to go for treatment."
Phil Clutts of Charlotte, N.C., agrees.
"In view of his excellent work history," Clutts writes, "I would tell him that I was putting him on two weeks of unpaid leave and that, if he swore that it would never happen again, he could then go about his business as usual."
"He has to be a full partner in any real solution," writes Vaughn Brink of Mission Viejo, Calif.
Check out other opinions at http://jeffreyseglin.blogspot.com/2006/08/sound-off-second-chances.html, post your own by clicking on "comments" below, or e-mail them to me at rightthing@nytimes.com.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of "The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business," is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics. He is also the administrator of http://jeffreyseglin.blogspot.com, a Web log focused on ethical issues.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 609 Greenwich St., 6th floor, New York, N.Y. 10014-3610.
"Under no circumstances is overlooking it the right choice in this matter," writes Peggy Lawson of Middletown, Ohio. "(This) is more than just a missed opportunity for my company -- this is a health issue for this employee, and will impact his performance in the future, as well as his position on the team."
"As much as it hurt financially, I wouldn't fire a loyal, productive employee over a single episode," writes Tom Gebell of Minneapolis. "I would require the employee to go for treatment."
Phil Clutts of Charlotte, N.C., agrees.
"In view of his excellent work history," Clutts writes, "I would tell him that I was putting him on two weeks of unpaid leave and that, if he swore that it would never happen again, he could then go about his business as usual."
"He has to be a full partner in any real solution," writes Vaughn Brink of Mission Viejo, Calif.
Check out other opinions at http://jeffreyseglin.blogspot.com/2006/08/sound-off-second-chances.html, post your own by clicking on "comments" below, or e-mail them to me at rightthing@nytimes.com.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of "The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business," is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics. He is also the administrator of http://jeffreyseglin.blogspot.com, a Web log focused on ethical issues.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 609 Greenwich St., 6th floor, New York, N.Y. 10014-3610.
Sunday, September 03, 2006
SOUND OFF: DOES A PERSON'S PAST FORGIVE HIS PRESENT SINS?
Recently, reports have surfaced that movie star Mel Gibson, Sen. George Allen of Virginia and civil-rights leader Andrew Young have each made negative comments about particular races or religions.
Gibson has apologized for his anti-Semitic comments when he was pulled over by police officers for driving under the influence. Allen has apologized for referring to an Indian gentleman taping one of his rallies for his opponent as "macaca." And Young resigned from his job helping to improve Wal-Mart's public image after he suggested that Jews, Koreans and Arabs have ripped off the black community by overcharging them in mom-and-pop stores in urban settings.
Each incident begs the question of whether a person's accomplishments or behavior leading up to the incident in question should make a difference in how we respond.
What do you think? How would you respond to the comments of Gibson, Allen and Young? And do their past accomplishments color your reaction?
Send your thoughts to rightthing@nytimes.com or post them by clicking on "comments" below. Please include your name, your hometown and the name of the newspaper in which you read this column. Readers' comments may appear in an upcoming column.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of "The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business" (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics. He is also the administrator of http://jeffreyseglin.blogspot.com, a Web log focused on ethical issues.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 609 Greenwich St., 6th floor, New York, N.Y. 10014-3610.
Gibson has apologized for his anti-Semitic comments when he was pulled over by police officers for driving under the influence. Allen has apologized for referring to an Indian gentleman taping one of his rallies for his opponent as "macaca." And Young resigned from his job helping to improve Wal-Mart's public image after he suggested that Jews, Koreans and Arabs have ripped off the black community by overcharging them in mom-and-pop stores in urban settings.
Each incident begs the question of whether a person's accomplishments or behavior leading up to the incident in question should make a difference in how we respond.
What do you think? How would you respond to the comments of Gibson, Allen and Young? And do their past accomplishments color your reaction?
Send your thoughts to rightthing@nytimes.com or post them by clicking on "comments" below. Please include your name, your hometown and the name of the newspaper in which you read this column. Readers' comments may appear in an upcoming column.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of "The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business" (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics. He is also the administrator of http://jeffreyseglin.blogspot.com, a Web log focused on ethical issues.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 609 Greenwich St., 6th floor, New York, N.Y. 10014-3610.
TIPS FOR DOING GOOD BUSINESS
We've all experienced moments when a sudden shock of recognition makes us want a do-over on an action just taken. For L.M. of Yorba Linda, Calif., it came the morning after she had hosted a birthday dinner for a group of 10 relatives and her husband at a restaurant at the MGM Grand Hotel & Casino in Las Vegas.
"We all had a wonderful time eating, drinking and celebrating," L.M. writes. "The service was good, but not outstanding. When the bill came, I added an appropriate 20 percent tip and charged the meal to my credit card."
L.M. was surprised when, as she was leaving, the waitress gave her a big hug. The next morning she had a good idea why.On the bill for breakfast, she noticed that a gratuity had been automatically added. When she checked her bill from the night before, she realized that she had added a tip to one that had already been charged.
When L.M. made the reservation, she was not told that because of the size of her party a gratuity would automatically be added. She wants to know if the restaurant has a responsibility to let its customers know ahead of time.
L.M. is right in thinking that it's good service to tell customers when gratuities will automatically be added. At many restaurants, a note to this effect is included on the menu.
But as long as the automatic gratuity was itemized separately and clearly on the bill for the meal, the restaurant technically fulfills its minimal obligation of informing the diner of the charge.
L.M. also wants to know if the waitress did the right thing by accepting the double gratuity without checking to see if it was an error. "Is it OK to take advantage of someone who is in the throes of entertaining guests who are celebrating a special occasion?" she asks.
The assumption that the waitress took advantage of L.M. and should have said something presumes she knew the double tip was a mistake. She easily could have thought that L.M. was simply being overly generous on this special occasion.
L.M. says that her letter to the manager of the MGM Grand's restaurant asking for clarity on the policy has gone unanswered. Even if the manager doesn't agree with L.M.'s complaint, it's wrong for him not to respond. That's just good customer service.
The right thing for the restaurant to do is to make its automatic-gratuity policy clearer to diners. On the Web site for its restaurants, there is a note that all parties over six must call ahead. When called, the restaurant representative should inform the customer when an automatic gratuity will be charged. The customer shouldn't have to ask.
But that doesn't mean that L.M. shouldn't be held responsible for paying the bill she signed off on. The right thing for her to do is pay it. You can bet that from now on she'll read her dinner bills much more closely, regardless of whether she's caught up in the celebratory moment.
"We all had a wonderful time eating, drinking and celebrating," L.M. writes. "The service was good, but not outstanding. When the bill came, I added an appropriate 20 percent tip and charged the meal to my credit card."
L.M. was surprised when, as she was leaving, the waitress gave her a big hug. The next morning she had a good idea why.On the bill for breakfast, she noticed that a gratuity had been automatically added. When she checked her bill from the night before, she realized that she had added a tip to one that had already been charged.
When L.M. made the reservation, she was not told that because of the size of her party a gratuity would automatically be added. She wants to know if the restaurant has a responsibility to let its customers know ahead of time.
L.M. is right in thinking that it's good service to tell customers when gratuities will automatically be added. At many restaurants, a note to this effect is included on the menu.
But as long as the automatic gratuity was itemized separately and clearly on the bill for the meal, the restaurant technically fulfills its minimal obligation of informing the diner of the charge.
L.M. also wants to know if the waitress did the right thing by accepting the double gratuity without checking to see if it was an error. "Is it OK to take advantage of someone who is in the throes of entertaining guests who are celebrating a special occasion?" she asks.
The assumption that the waitress took advantage of L.M. and should have said something presumes she knew the double tip was a mistake. She easily could have thought that L.M. was simply being overly generous on this special occasion.
L.M. says that her letter to the manager of the MGM Grand's restaurant asking for clarity on the policy has gone unanswered. Even if the manager doesn't agree with L.M.'s complaint, it's wrong for him not to respond. That's just good customer service.
The right thing for the restaurant to do is to make its automatic-gratuity policy clearer to diners. On the Web site for its restaurants, there is a note that all parties over six must call ahead. When called, the restaurant representative should inform the customer when an automatic gratuity will be charged. The customer shouldn't have to ask.
But that doesn't mean that L.M. shouldn't be held responsible for paying the bill she signed off on. The right thing for her to do is pay it. You can bet that from now on she'll read her dinner bills much more closely, regardless of whether she's caught up in the celebratory moment.
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