A supervisor with whom you've worked is up for a promotion. As part of the routine of the promotion process, his superiors send an e-mail to all company employees asking for any feedback on the fellow's performance and his suitability for the job.
You happen to know that the guy has been less than a stellar supervisor, failing to show up for appointments, bullying employees, playing fast and loose with his expense reports and hiring family members for positions once held by more competent employees. Based on past history at the company, however, you also know that, once things get to this stage of the promotion cycle, they are pretty much a done deal. Anything you raise as an issue is likely to fall on deaf ears.
Should you respond honestly and fully to the e-mail, including all the supervisor's blemishes that you can document? Or, figuring that this is a battle not worth waging, should you make no response?
Post your thoughts here by clicking on "comments" or "post a comment" below. Please include your name, hometown, and state, province, or country. Readers' comments may appear in an upcoming column. Or e-mail your comments to me at rightthing@comcast.net.
You can also respond to the poll with this question that will appear on the right-hand side of the blog until polling is closed.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business, is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics. He is also the administrator of www.jeffreyseglin.com, a Web log focused on ethical issues.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@comcast.net.
c.2010 Jeffrey L. Seglin
Monday, August 30, 2010
THE RIGHT THING: THE WHOLE TRUTH
There's an all-volunteer newspaper located in a town about 25 miles southeast of Los Angeles. The newspaper has been around for 30 years, established as a not-for-profit enterprise designed to inform and "empower" local residents to become engaged in their community. Every week about 10,000 copies are distributed to area residents.
One of the newspaper's volunteer reporters e-mailed me about a predicament in which she has found herself.
My reader has some journalistic training in her distant past, but the editor/publisher of the paper, who inherited the job from her father, has no such training. Recently they found themselves at odds over a question of journalistic ethics.
My reader was assigned to cover a meeting at which a city agency invited "stakeholders" to discuss housing issues. At the meeting one man introduced himself as representing a local volunteer agency.
"He said some ugly things," my reader reports, "like objecting to being told by the state that our affluent city should provide housing for the poor."
He also referred to certain areas of the city as "dumps."
When my reader filed her report on the meeting, the editor/publisher cut from her story the man's affiliation with the local agency.
"They do good work," she said, "and shouldn't be dragged through the mud for one person's opinion."
"This does not feel good to me," my reader writes. "We criticize a lot of what the city and some businesspeople do. Shouldn't the do-gooders be equally accountable?"
Since this man's organization was invited to the meeting and he was sent to represent it, she believes that both his comments and his affiliation are fair game.
"Is the editor's action unacceptable?" she asks. "Are there limits I should set for my work?"
My reader's editor has every right to be concerned about fairness. If the speaker at the meeting was identified as the spokesperson for the group in question, however, that affiliation should be mentioned. Were his comments strictly "one person's opinion," he wouldn't have been invited to the meeting. Whether or not his remarks accurately reflect the organization's positions, he was there as its representative.
The editor's action is unacceptable, because she responded to a reasonable concern but didn't address that concern. If she was truly concerned about how this representative's comments might reflect on his organization, the right thing to do would have been to instruct my reader to do some follow-up reporting. She ought to have called the organization to see if it wanted to respond to his comments or to clarify the organization's position.
The fault is not entirely the editor's, however. If my reader wasn't asked to do this extra research, she should have suggested it. In fact, she should have made that effort in her initial reporting. The apparent conflict between the organization's ideals and the attitudes of its representative cried out for further exploration.
Simply printing the gentleman's comments without reporting his affiliation was poor reporting, since it didn't accurately reflect what happened at the meeting. Everyone there knew that he was indeed speaking on behalf of this particular organization, and the newspaper ought to have conveyed this relevant information to its readers.
As far as my reader setting limitations on her work, any writer working for a publication - whether volunteer or paid, whether covering politics or, say, writing an ethics column - is at the behest of the editor to whom he or she reports. Good editors will push their writers to do their best and most accurate work.
Unfortunately, not all writers are as thorough as their editors would like them to be, nor are they all blessed with good editors. The whole point of having two people in the process is to see that the best of each is reflected in the final product - which doesn't seem to have happened in this case.
c.2010 Jeffrey L. Seglin
One of the newspaper's volunteer reporters e-mailed me about a predicament in which she has found herself.
My reader has some journalistic training in her distant past, but the editor/publisher of the paper, who inherited the job from her father, has no such training. Recently they found themselves at odds over a question of journalistic ethics.
My reader was assigned to cover a meeting at which a city agency invited "stakeholders" to discuss housing issues. At the meeting one man introduced himself as representing a local volunteer agency.
"He said some ugly things," my reader reports, "like objecting to being told by the state that our affluent city should provide housing for the poor."
He also referred to certain areas of the city as "dumps."
When my reader filed her report on the meeting, the editor/publisher cut from her story the man's affiliation with the local agency.
"They do good work," she said, "and shouldn't be dragged through the mud for one person's opinion."
"This does not feel good to me," my reader writes. "We criticize a lot of what the city and some businesspeople do. Shouldn't the do-gooders be equally accountable?"
Since this man's organization was invited to the meeting and he was sent to represent it, she believes that both his comments and his affiliation are fair game.
"Is the editor's action unacceptable?" she asks. "Are there limits I should set for my work?"
My reader's editor has every right to be concerned about fairness. If the speaker at the meeting was identified as the spokesperson for the group in question, however, that affiliation should be mentioned. Were his comments strictly "one person's opinion," he wouldn't have been invited to the meeting. Whether or not his remarks accurately reflect the organization's positions, he was there as its representative.
The editor's action is unacceptable, because she responded to a reasonable concern but didn't address that concern. If she was truly concerned about how this representative's comments might reflect on his organization, the right thing to do would have been to instruct my reader to do some follow-up reporting. She ought to have called the organization to see if it wanted to respond to his comments or to clarify the organization's position.
The fault is not entirely the editor's, however. If my reader wasn't asked to do this extra research, she should have suggested it. In fact, she should have made that effort in her initial reporting. The apparent conflict between the organization's ideals and the attitudes of its representative cried out for further exploration.
Simply printing the gentleman's comments without reporting his affiliation was poor reporting, since it didn't accurately reflect what happened at the meeting. Everyone there knew that he was indeed speaking on behalf of this particular organization, and the newspaper ought to have conveyed this relevant information to its readers.
As far as my reader setting limitations on her work, any writer working for a publication - whether volunteer or paid, whether covering politics or, say, writing an ethics column - is at the behest of the editor to whom he or she reports. Good editors will push their writers to do their best and most accurate work.
Unfortunately, not all writers are as thorough as their editors would like them to be, nor are they all blessed with good editors. The whole point of having two people in the process is to see that the best of each is reflected in the final product - which doesn't seem to have happened in this case.
c.2010 Jeffrey L. Seglin
Sunday, August 22, 2010
THE RIGHT THING: WATERED-DOWN ETHICS
In the town where I live, residents are asked to follow voluntary water restrictions. To conserve water we are asked, among other things, not to water down our sidewalks or patios and to limit the watering of lawns to every other day - depending on our house numbers - between 7 at night and 7 in the morning.
The notice of these restrictions on the town's Web site makes clear that they are not mandatory, but that "water conservation is always a good plan."
Generally speaking, my family and I have chosen to adhere to the voluntary restrictions. We notice a few area residents who do water their lawns during the daytime, but that's a choice they make. Because the restrictions are voluntary, it's none of our business.
A reader in New York writes that years ago, when his area was suffering a drought, the local government banned lawn watering altogether and also issued a list of recommended water-saving measures, which included not letting the water run while brushing your teeth.
"A friend of mine insisted that he would continue to let the water run, because he was paying for the water and this was the way he was used to brushing his teeth," my reader writes. "He didn't like being told what to do in so personal a matter, regardless of the circumstances."
My reader tells me that he has occasionally thought about his friend's response in later years, "as environmental concerns have escalated and various methods of reducing one's environmental impact have proliferated."
He observes that a number of religions, in one way or another, impose an ethical obligation to consider the environment, which can be done by various means, from shunning high-pollution cars to installing insulation that will reduce energy use.
"Would you say, however, that in the world of today there is a general ethical obligation to consider one's environmental impact and reduce it when possible?," he asks. "Or is this still a matter of personal choice?"
By virtue of the fact that any of us can choose to act any way in any given situation, regardless of the ethics of our behavior or the potential consequences, most choices boil down to personal ones. That has been and still is the case with environmental issues. Outside of legal requirements, there is no general ethical obligation in this area and we cannot demand that others comply with our own personal ethics.
If ethics is, as the authors Margaret Wheatley and Myron Kellner Rogers write in A Simpler Way (Berrett-Koehler, 1999), "how we behave when we decide we belong together," however, then my reader's friend fell short of the mark by not considering the impact of his choices on his community at large. So far as we know, he did seem to follow the mandatory restrictions, so he didn't challenge the ethics of the mandate by adhering to his personal lawn-watering choice.
After considering how his actions might affect others, the water-running, tooth-brushing friend might still decide to adhere to his customary practice. Without thinking through how his behavior might impede others, however, he wasn't doing the right thing.
When there's a clear recognition that a particular action has a deleterious impact on others in our community, it falls on each of us at least to consider that we may have an ethical obligation to avoid that action. To act without thinking, through sheer force of habit, runs counter to the whole idea of ethics.
The notice of these restrictions on the town's Web site makes clear that they are not mandatory, but that "water conservation is always a good plan."
Generally speaking, my family and I have chosen to adhere to the voluntary restrictions. We notice a few area residents who do water their lawns during the daytime, but that's a choice they make. Because the restrictions are voluntary, it's none of our business.
A reader in New York writes that years ago, when his area was suffering a drought, the local government banned lawn watering altogether and also issued a list of recommended water-saving measures, which included not letting the water run while brushing your teeth.
"A friend of mine insisted that he would continue to let the water run, because he was paying for the water and this was the way he was used to brushing his teeth," my reader writes. "He didn't like being told what to do in so personal a matter, regardless of the circumstances."
My reader tells me that he has occasionally thought about his friend's response in later years, "as environmental concerns have escalated and various methods of reducing one's environmental impact have proliferated."
He observes that a number of religions, in one way or another, impose an ethical obligation to consider the environment, which can be done by various means, from shunning high-pollution cars to installing insulation that will reduce energy use.
"Would you say, however, that in the world of today there is a general ethical obligation to consider one's environmental impact and reduce it when possible?," he asks. "Or is this still a matter of personal choice?"
By virtue of the fact that any of us can choose to act any way in any given situation, regardless of the ethics of our behavior or the potential consequences, most choices boil down to personal ones. That has been and still is the case with environmental issues. Outside of legal requirements, there is no general ethical obligation in this area and we cannot demand that others comply with our own personal ethics.
If ethics is, as the authors Margaret Wheatley and Myron Kellner Rogers write in A Simpler Way (Berrett-Koehler, 1999), "how we behave when we decide we belong together," however, then my reader's friend fell short of the mark by not considering the impact of his choices on his community at large. So far as we know, he did seem to follow the mandatory restrictions, so he didn't challenge the ethics of the mandate by adhering to his personal lawn-watering choice.
After considering how his actions might affect others, the water-running, tooth-brushing friend might still decide to adhere to his customary practice. Without thinking through how his behavior might impede others, however, he wasn't doing the right thing.
When there's a clear recognition that a particular action has a deleterious impact on others in our community, it falls on each of us at least to consider that we may have an ethical obligation to avoid that action. To act without thinking, through sheer force of habit, runs counter to the whole idea of ethics.
SOUND OFF: GRADING UP
Of the readers who responded to an unscientific poll on my column's blog, 61 percent believe that it was wrong for Loyola Law School to raise its recent graduates' grades retroactively, even if other law schools grade less rigorously, while 39 percent consider it OK to raise the grades.
"Law firms would be aware that a school was more rigorous in its grading policies, and would be able to weigh candidates with that criteria in mind," writes Madilyn Bruening of Salt Lake City, Utah. "Isn't that the reason some schools are more prestigious than others, because they have a more difficult curriculum?"
William Jacobson of Cypress, Calif., considers such post-grade inflation to be an act of fraud.
"The retroactive raising of GPAs by the law school, with the sole purpose of making their students `look more attractive' to outside employers, would appear to be ... a false misrepresentation of fact done specifically to deceive said employers into considering students who otherwise might not be considered ... Despite the popular misconception, lawyers are held to high ethical standards ... so should the law schools be."
Check out other opinions here, or post your own by clicking on "Comments" or "Post a comment" below.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@comcast.net.
"Law firms would be aware that a school was more rigorous in its grading policies, and would be able to weigh candidates with that criteria in mind," writes Madilyn Bruening of Salt Lake City, Utah. "Isn't that the reason some schools are more prestigious than others, because they have a more difficult curriculum?"
William Jacobson of Cypress, Calif., considers such post-grade inflation to be an act of fraud.
"The retroactive raising of GPAs by the law school, with the sole purpose of making their students `look more attractive' to outside employers, would appear to be ... a false misrepresentation of fact done specifically to deceive said employers into considering students who otherwise might not be considered ... Despite the popular misconception, lawyers are held to high ethical standards ... so should the law schools be."
Check out other opinions here, or post your own by clicking on "Comments" or "Post a comment" below.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@comcast.net.
Sunday, August 15, 2010
SOUND OFF: LOOSE LIPS
While sitting on the lawn at a recent Cape Cod Baseball League game, I overheard a woman behind me talking to another fan about her job as a fund raiser at a private high school in Boston. Asked whether she knew a particular local business owner, she replied, "Oh, I know him. He's good for a $10,000 donation every year."
Lists of donors to many not-for-profit organizations are regularly published, and there's no reason to assume that the donor in question wanted to remain anonymous. Even so, was my fellow fan in fair territory when discussing donors by name - and amounts - in a public setting? Or was she wrong to be so free with the information? Or is the real culprit here the fellow fan - me - for inadvertently listening in on what was presumably meant to be a private conversation, regardless of where it took place?
Post your thoughts here by clicking on "comments" or "post a comment" below. Please include your name, hometown, and state, province, or country. Readers' comments may appear in an upcoming column. Or e-mail your comments to me at rightthing@nytimes.com.
You can also respond to the poll with this question that will appear on the right-hand side of the blog until polling is closed.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics. He is also the administrator of The Right Thing (http://www.jeffreyseglin.com/, a Web log focused on ethical issues.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
Lists of donors to many not-for-profit organizations are regularly published, and there's no reason to assume that the donor in question wanted to remain anonymous. Even so, was my fellow fan in fair territory when discussing donors by name - and amounts - in a public setting? Or was she wrong to be so free with the information? Or is the real culprit here the fellow fan - me - for inadvertently listening in on what was presumably meant to be a private conversation, regardless of where it took place?
Post your thoughts here by clicking on "comments" or "post a comment" below. Please include your name, hometown, and state, province, or country. Readers' comments may appear in an upcoming column. Or e-mail your comments to me at rightthing@nytimes.com.
You can also respond to the poll with this question that will appear on the right-hand side of the blog until polling is closed.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics. He is also the administrator of The Right Thing (http://www.jeffreyseglin.com/, a Web log focused on ethical issues.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
THE RIGHT THING: BARKING MAD
About two months ago a woman moved to Miami to take a new job. A month later her brother came to visit from another city, bringing with him his small dog, which his sister had agreed to take in for him temporarily. He travels a great deal for work and couldn't handle having a pet at the moment.
The sister didn't want a dog and wouldn't describe herself as a "pet person," but she wanted to help out her sibling, so she agreed to take the dog.
They did not, however, discuss when her brother might retrieve his dog. The unspoken agreement was that the dog would be returned to him at some point, although that could be months or years away. He left some food for the dog, but it soon became his sister's responsibility to care for the dog.
The sister soon realized that caring for a pet is "a pain" and not something she wants to do. The dog barks a great deal, she reports, and moreover she has a housemate who has her own dog. The two-pet household "can be a handful at times."
About a week ago the situation got even more complicated: Her housemate called her, out of the blue, to tell her that a mutual friend would be happy to take the brother's dog. The sister was taken by surprise, since she had no idea that her housemate was making any effort to have the dog taken off their hands.
It bothers the sister that her roommate brought up the issue with an outside party before discussing it with her, but the idea appeals to her because it would enable her to give up responsibility for the dog while still having access to it and knowing that it was being taken care of by their mutual friend, who loves pets.
While a big part of her wants to get rid of the dog, however, she doesn't know how or if to tell her brother the news, or even if she has the right to give away his dog, even though she is the one who is now spending her time and money to care for it.
She senses that, if she keeps the dog, her brother won't want it back for quite some time. She also assumes that, if he ever did want it back, the mutual friend would "probably" give the dog back to her brother. And then another part of her wants to keep the dog herself, simply to get even with her roommate for going behind her back to get rid of the animal.
What's the right course in this complicated situation?
The sister is asking the wrong questions in trying to figure out how to respond to the mutual friend's offer. Clearly she still thinks of the dog as belonging to her brother, so before doing anything else she needs to check with him to see what his wishes are.
Simply giving away the dog without letting him know should not be an option. It was placed in her care, but not given to her as a gift ... or as a curse. The brother is still the rightful owner, so it's up to him whether the mutual friend - who might well provide the dog a better home - should get that opportunity.
If he OKs the arrangement with the mutual friend, the sister should make sure that the friend understands the situation and realizes that the dog still belongs to her brother, who may well want it back someday.
As for keeping the dog to "get even" with her roommate, given that she doesn't really like caring for the dog herself, that resolution would be in nobody's - and no dog's - best interest.
The overarching lesson here is that it's important to be clear on the specifics when you agree to do a favor for a loved one, especially when another living being is involved. Having not done that initially, the sister needs to do so now.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate) ¶
The sister didn't want a dog and wouldn't describe herself as a "pet person," but she wanted to help out her sibling, so she agreed to take the dog.
They did not, however, discuss when her brother might retrieve his dog. The unspoken agreement was that the dog would be returned to him at some point, although that could be months or years away. He left some food for the dog, but it soon became his sister's responsibility to care for the dog.
The sister soon realized that caring for a pet is "a pain" and not something she wants to do. The dog barks a great deal, she reports, and moreover she has a housemate who has her own dog. The two-pet household "can be a handful at times."
About a week ago the situation got even more complicated: Her housemate called her, out of the blue, to tell her that a mutual friend would be happy to take the brother's dog. The sister was taken by surprise, since she had no idea that her housemate was making any effort to have the dog taken off their hands.
It bothers the sister that her roommate brought up the issue with an outside party before discussing it with her, but the idea appeals to her because it would enable her to give up responsibility for the dog while still having access to it and knowing that it was being taken care of by their mutual friend, who loves pets.
While a big part of her wants to get rid of the dog, however, she doesn't know how or if to tell her brother the news, or even if she has the right to give away his dog, even though she is the one who is now spending her time and money to care for it.
She senses that, if she keeps the dog, her brother won't want it back for quite some time. She also assumes that, if he ever did want it back, the mutual friend would "probably" give the dog back to her brother. And then another part of her wants to keep the dog herself, simply to get even with her roommate for going behind her back to get rid of the animal.
What's the right course in this complicated situation?
The sister is asking the wrong questions in trying to figure out how to respond to the mutual friend's offer. Clearly she still thinks of the dog as belonging to her brother, so before doing anything else she needs to check with him to see what his wishes are.
Simply giving away the dog without letting him know should not be an option. It was placed in her care, but not given to her as a gift ... or as a curse. The brother is still the rightful owner, so it's up to him whether the mutual friend - who might well provide the dog a better home - should get that opportunity.
If he OKs the arrangement with the mutual friend, the sister should make sure that the friend understands the situation and realizes that the dog still belongs to her brother, who may well want it back someday.
As for keeping the dog to "get even" with her roommate, given that she doesn't really like caring for the dog herself, that resolution would be in nobody's - and no dog's - best interest.
The overarching lesson here is that it's important to be clear on the specifics when you agree to do a favor for a loved one, especially when another living being is involved. Having not done that initially, the sister needs to do so now.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate) ¶
Sunday, August 08, 2010
THE RIGHT THING: BUGS IN THE SYSTEM
Having to replace a company you hate doing business with can be a real pain, but the contract-renewal process should be fairly simple. After all, if you're happy with them and they're happy with you, where's the problem?
Nonetheless Peter, a reader from Manila in the Philippines, has managed to find a catch.
Peter likes the service his company receives from the termite-control company it has retained to ensure that its premises are free of pesky pests. The annual contract calls for the exterminators to check out Peter's facility every month, even if no pests have been spotted in the interim, to make sure that the premises are free and clear. If termites are detected, the pest-control company eradicates them. Like clockwork, the exterminators show up to do their job.
Their home office is not so efficient, however, about getting a new contract to Peter's company for renewal each year.
"Every year we have to remind them two or three times to send a contract," Peter writes.
Though a new contract has not been signed, however, and technically there is no agreement between the companies, the work still carries on.
"Their field personnel continue to go to our place," Peter says. "Obviously it is the administrative personnel who is not preparing the paperwork."
The same thing happened this year, but with a significant difference: Once again the contract has lapsed, but this time Peter and his colleagues have not reminded the termite company about the renewal - meaning that, for the past couple of months, they haven't been billed for the services they're receiving.
"We have always been honest in the past," Peter writes, "but feel that, if they don't bear the consequences of their negligence, they will never shape up. Are we justified not to remind them anymore and enjoy the free service until they find out?"
Having to remind a vendor to bill you can indeed be a nuisance. There's simply something wrong about having to chase people to give them money. It's their job to bill you in a timely manner and, when it comes time for contract renewal, it's their job to see that it gets done.
There's obviously some satisfaction to be gained by withholding payment from the termite-control company until such time, if ever, that its administrators realize that they've been working for free. I'm not convinced, however, that it would actually get them to change their poor management of existing contracts. Presumably their ineptitude has cost them in the past, but not enough to get them to shape up.
More broadly, it is wrong to take advantage of their inefficiency to get free service. However vexing their inability to follow through may be, it's no excuse for Peter and his company to get service that they're not paying for and, therefore, not entitled to. Getting something for nothing is only occasionally the ethical route, and this isn't one of those times.
If Peter's colleagues are sufficiently vexed by the exterminators' habitual laxness with contracts, they have every right to not re-up and instead find another company that's more to their liking. If the current company asks why they're making a change, they should answer truthfully.
If they're overall satisfied with the services being provided, however, they should simply accept that a once-a-year headache is part of the cost of doing business with this company. They can and should strongly voice their dissatisfaction at having to remind the company every year when the contract comes due, but not paying for what they're getting isn't a fair way to express their annoyance.
Personally, I'd bite the bullet and carry on as in past years. Nagging the exterminators to send you a contract once a year is surely aggravating, but I imagine it pales in comparison to the problems of dealing with a company that sends its contracts promptly but does a lousy job on the actual termite control.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
Nonetheless Peter, a reader from Manila in the Philippines, has managed to find a catch.
Peter likes the service his company receives from the termite-control company it has retained to ensure that its premises are free of pesky pests. The annual contract calls for the exterminators to check out Peter's facility every month, even if no pests have been spotted in the interim, to make sure that the premises are free and clear. If termites are detected, the pest-control company eradicates them. Like clockwork, the exterminators show up to do their job.
Their home office is not so efficient, however, about getting a new contract to Peter's company for renewal each year.
"Every year we have to remind them two or three times to send a contract," Peter writes.
Though a new contract has not been signed, however, and technically there is no agreement between the companies, the work still carries on.
"Their field personnel continue to go to our place," Peter says. "Obviously it is the administrative personnel who is not preparing the paperwork."
The same thing happened this year, but with a significant difference: Once again the contract has lapsed, but this time Peter and his colleagues have not reminded the termite company about the renewal - meaning that, for the past couple of months, they haven't been billed for the services they're receiving.
"We have always been honest in the past," Peter writes, "but feel that, if they don't bear the consequences of their negligence, they will never shape up. Are we justified not to remind them anymore and enjoy the free service until they find out?"
Having to remind a vendor to bill you can indeed be a nuisance. There's simply something wrong about having to chase people to give them money. It's their job to bill you in a timely manner and, when it comes time for contract renewal, it's their job to see that it gets done.
There's obviously some satisfaction to be gained by withholding payment from the termite-control company until such time, if ever, that its administrators realize that they've been working for free. I'm not convinced, however, that it would actually get them to change their poor management of existing contracts. Presumably their ineptitude has cost them in the past, but not enough to get them to shape up.
More broadly, it is wrong to take advantage of their inefficiency to get free service. However vexing their inability to follow through may be, it's no excuse for Peter and his company to get service that they're not paying for and, therefore, not entitled to. Getting something for nothing is only occasionally the ethical route, and this isn't one of those times.
If Peter's colleagues are sufficiently vexed by the exterminators' habitual laxness with contracts, they have every right to not re-up and instead find another company that's more to their liking. If the current company asks why they're making a change, they should answer truthfully.
If they're overall satisfied with the services being provided, however, they should simply accept that a once-a-year headache is part of the cost of doing business with this company. They can and should strongly voice their dissatisfaction at having to remind the company every year when the contract comes due, but not paying for what they're getting isn't a fair way to express their annoyance.
Personally, I'd bite the bullet and carry on as in past years. Nagging the exterminators to send you a contract once a year is surely aggravating, but I imagine it pales in comparison to the problems of dealing with a company that sends its contracts promptly but does a lousy job on the actual termite control.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
SOUND OFF: HOW DUMB IS YOUR RESUME?
Of the readers who responded to an unscientific poll on my column's blog, 56 percent believe that it's OK to omit relevant experience from your resume if you believe that the omission might help you secure a job, while 44 percent consider it wrong to leave off advanced degrees or job experience for tactical reasons.
"As long as the information that is presented is accurate and the information that is left off wouldn't be damning - say a criminal record, for instance - yes, it is completely ethical to leave off information so as to better position your chances of landing the job," writes Bill Jacobson of Cypress, Calif.
"I don't see any ethical reason to include every piece of information on a resume," agrees Michael Buller of Boston, "as long as the omission doesn't create a false picture."
Charlie Seng, of Lancaster, S.C., disagrees.
"It's always best to be completely forthcoming in a job application," Seng writes. "Leaving out what you consider `enough' to get your foot in the door may later be treated by your boss as your having been dishonest to get the job."
"Being seriously overqualified for a job should not be a deterrent to applying for what's available," Patricia Selk writes. "If an employer already has another candidate in mind, or if there's an `I'm better than you' attitude that goes along with your degree(s), it won't matter what is or isn't on your resume."
Check out other opinions here, or post your own by clicking on "Comments" or "Post a comment" below.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 630 Eighth Ave., 5th floor, New York, N.Y. 10018.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
"As long as the information that is presented is accurate and the information that is left off wouldn't be damning - say a criminal record, for instance - yes, it is completely ethical to leave off information so as to better position your chances of landing the job," writes Bill Jacobson of Cypress, Calif.
"I don't see any ethical reason to include every piece of information on a resume," agrees Michael Buller of Boston, "as long as the omission doesn't create a false picture."
Charlie Seng, of Lancaster, S.C., disagrees.
"It's always best to be completely forthcoming in a job application," Seng writes. "Leaving out what you consider `enough' to get your foot in the door may later be treated by your boss as your having been dishonest to get the job."
"Being seriously overqualified for a job should not be a deterrent to applying for what's available," Patricia Selk writes. "If an employer already has another candidate in mind, or if there's an `I'm better than you' attitude that goes along with your degree(s), it won't matter what is or isn't on your resume."
Check out other opinions here, or post your own by clicking on "Comments" or "Post a comment" below.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 630 Eighth Ave., 5th floor, New York, N.Y. 10018.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
Sunday, August 01, 2010
SOUND OFF: DOES OUR BAGGAGE WEIGH US DOWN?
In a recent entry on his ethics blog, Emmanuel Tchividjian, the ethics officer of Ruder Finn, a New York-based public-relations firm, writes that Piers Morgan, a British editor and public figure, is being considered as a replacement for CNN's Larry King, who soon will leave the cable channel. Tchividjian asks if Morgan should be forgiven for the "baggage" he carries: Among other transgressions, Morgan was fired as editor of The Daily Mirror after he allowed the publication of doctored photos of troops allegedly abusing prisoners in Iraq.
But, Tchividjian asks, "Don't we all carry some baggage?" As long as we are honest, show remorse and offer an apology, Tchividjian suggests, Morgan - and the rest of us - can hope for forgiveness for the baggage we carry, though we can't demand it.
Assuming that Morgan has owned up to his errors, showed his remorse and offered a sincere apology, should he be forgiven for the baggage he carries? Or is a wrong a wrong, regardless of how the wrongdoer subsequently feels about it?
Post your thoughts here by clicking on "comments" or "post a comment" below. Please include your name, hometown, and state, province, or country. Readers' comments may appear in an upcoming column. Or e-mail your comments to me at rightthing@nytimes.com.
You can also respond to the poll with this question that will appear on the right-hand side of the blog until polling is closed.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics. He is also the administrator of The Right Thing (http://www.jeffreyseglin.com/, a Web log focused on ethical issues.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
But, Tchividjian asks, "Don't we all carry some baggage?" As long as we are honest, show remorse and offer an apology, Tchividjian suggests, Morgan - and the rest of us - can hope for forgiveness for the baggage we carry, though we can't demand it.
Assuming that Morgan has owned up to his errors, showed his remorse and offered a sincere apology, should he be forgiven for the baggage he carries? Or is a wrong a wrong, regardless of how the wrongdoer subsequently feels about it?
Post your thoughts here by clicking on "comments" or "post a comment" below. Please include your name, hometown, and state, province, or country. Readers' comments may appear in an upcoming column. Or e-mail your comments to me at rightthing@nytimes.com.
You can also respond to the poll with this question that will appear on the right-hand side of the blog until polling is closed.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics. He is also the administrator of The Right Thing (http://www.jeffreyseglin.com/, a Web log focused on ethical issues.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
THE RIGHT THING: A BURNING QUESTION
During the past couple of years, a reader from New York has found himself drawn to classic country music, artists from the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s.
"Much of their work isn't available on CD," he writes, "so I've been buying from various people who sell used vinyl records by the artists I'm interested in."
One of these sellers - the one my reader finds the most helpful, in fact - offers either to sell his customers a record or to burn them a copy of it on CD, "presumably keeping the record for future use," my reader surmises.
"I know that this is illegal, and unethical as well," he continues, "and I have made clear to him that I disapprove and would never take advantage of this option."
My reader imagines, however, that there are other people who do take him up on this offer, which is part of his standard order response. He is wondering if it is ethical to buy legal products from someone who is also engaged in selling illegal products.
"I am not personally trading in illegal goods," he writes, "but presumably the profit he makes from the records he sells to me help keep him in business ... making illegal copies. On the other hand, every record I buy is one less for him to illegally copy.
"Is it enough to limit myself to legal recordings?," he asks. "Or does his illegal activity taint even his legal activities?"
The question is an interesting one, because it pivots not on what the record-seller is doing but on what the customer knows about it and what he thinks of the practice.
If a customer knew nothing of the illegal practice, he would buy the legitimate recordings with a clear conscience. He does know, however, which complicates the situation.
It would be only a minor problem if he knew about the practice but saw nothing wrong with it. Under those circumstances, he could continue to buy the legitimate recordings without thinking twice. As for the CD copying, while it might be illegal, his own moral compass would see no problem with it and, of course, the primary legal risk would be faced by the seller. Buying legal products from a seller of illegal products is rarely if ever illegal.
Given, however, that my reader is aware of the illegal copying and considers it not only illegal but also wrong, he should ask himself if he really wants to continue to support the overall business practices of someone who engages in acts he doesn't condone.
If his convictions are as strong as he suggests, I don't believe he should. Would he, by extension, want to do business with a used-car salesperson who sold both legitimate used cars and others that had been stolen? Most customers would sensibly walk away from such a dealership, however appealing its legitimate vehicles might be, and this situation is different only in degree.
Burning copies of vinyl records to CD may feel like small potatoes, but wrong is wrong - and my reader has established that he considers some of his seller's business practices to be wrong. He must decide if he is willing to turn a blind eye solely because the seller also happens to deliver a legitimate product that is hard to find elsewhere.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
"Much of their work isn't available on CD," he writes, "so I've been buying from various people who sell used vinyl records by the artists I'm interested in."
One of these sellers - the one my reader finds the most helpful, in fact - offers either to sell his customers a record or to burn them a copy of it on CD, "presumably keeping the record for future use," my reader surmises.
"I know that this is illegal, and unethical as well," he continues, "and I have made clear to him that I disapprove and would never take advantage of this option."
My reader imagines, however, that there are other people who do take him up on this offer, which is part of his standard order response. He is wondering if it is ethical to buy legal products from someone who is also engaged in selling illegal products.
"I am not personally trading in illegal goods," he writes, "but presumably the profit he makes from the records he sells to me help keep him in business ... making illegal copies. On the other hand, every record I buy is one less for him to illegally copy.
"Is it enough to limit myself to legal recordings?," he asks. "Or does his illegal activity taint even his legal activities?"
The question is an interesting one, because it pivots not on what the record-seller is doing but on what the customer knows about it and what he thinks of the practice.
If a customer knew nothing of the illegal practice, he would buy the legitimate recordings with a clear conscience. He does know, however, which complicates the situation.
It would be only a minor problem if he knew about the practice but saw nothing wrong with it. Under those circumstances, he could continue to buy the legitimate recordings without thinking twice. As for the CD copying, while it might be illegal, his own moral compass would see no problem with it and, of course, the primary legal risk would be faced by the seller. Buying legal products from a seller of illegal products is rarely if ever illegal.
Given, however, that my reader is aware of the illegal copying and considers it not only illegal but also wrong, he should ask himself if he really wants to continue to support the overall business practices of someone who engages in acts he doesn't condone.
If his convictions are as strong as he suggests, I don't believe he should. Would he, by extension, want to do business with a used-car salesperson who sold both legitimate used cars and others that had been stolen? Most customers would sensibly walk away from such a dealership, however appealing its legitimate vehicles might be, and this situation is different only in degree.
Burning copies of vinyl records to CD may feel like small potatoes, but wrong is wrong - and my reader has established that he considers some of his seller's business practices to be wrong. He must decide if he is willing to turn a blind eye solely because the seller also happens to deliver a legitimate product that is hard to find elsewhere.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
Sunday, July 25, 2010
THE RIGHT THING: COME AND GET IT ... WHENEVER
A few weeks ago, a reader in Columbus, Ohio, writes, he was passing through the parking lot of a city park and found an envelope containing a few hundred dollars.
"There were names on the envelope," he writes, "and it wasn't hard to trace it to a couple who got married that weekend in the park."
My reader left his contact information with the park office, but didn't turn in the cash. He figured that it would be too easy for some third party to tell him that they had found the owner and returned the money ... even if they hadn't and didn't.
Ten days passed, which didn't surprise my reader, since he figured the people who had lost the money were now on their honeymoon. When the owner finally called, however, it was when my reader was on vacation. He returned the call when he got back to Columbus, five days later. By now 15 days had passed since he found the envelope.
He got a recorded answer when he called, so he left a message. He expected a quick return call, but got nothing.
"I left another message on Day 18," he writes, "and called again on Day 19, and we finally spoke."
The owner of the money said that she would call my reader that Sunday - Day 21 - to arrange a time to come to his house to pick up the envelope.
"That was yesterday," my reader writes, "and I didn't get a call."
He is "ethically comfortable" not calling the rightful owner again, he adds.
"I think three unrequited calls is enough," he explains, "and she knows how to reach me."
His question, however, looks forward rather than backward: "How long is long enough before I decide the cash is mine? If I wait another month - to Day 60 - and spend it, what do I say if she calls me on Day 61 to arrange pickup?"
He's a regular reader of my column each week, he writes, but can't remember my ever covering a situation like his.
"My wife and I have actually used the phrase, `Well, the ethics guy from the paper would say ... ' when we've talked about this."
While I have written about the importance of returning found items to their rightful owners, my reader is correct that I've never addressed how to calculate the appropriate length of time to wait before giving up on a rightful owner collecting his or her belongings.
The answer, I'm afraid, is that there is no appropriate period. What's hers is hers, and will stay hers unless she herself tells him to keep the money.
My reader did the right thing by notifying the park office about his find. If no owner had come forward after several months, he might make a good case for considering the money rightfully his to keep.
Because he has identified the owner and made initial contact with her, however, the right thing for him to do is to set aside the money until she finally makes her way to his house to pick it up. It was rude of her not to call on the appointed day, but her rudeness does not make her money any less hers.
It's obviously a nuisance to have to wait her out, but my reader already realizes that it's the right thing to do: That's why he would be at a loss to explain himself if he spent the money on Day 60 and she showed up the next day to reclaim her cash.
He's doing good by trying to get the money to its rightful owner, and he shouldn't let her lackadaisical response keep him from staying the course.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
"There were names on the envelope," he writes, "and it wasn't hard to trace it to a couple who got married that weekend in the park."
My reader left his contact information with the park office, but didn't turn in the cash. He figured that it would be too easy for some third party to tell him that they had found the owner and returned the money ... even if they hadn't and didn't.
Ten days passed, which didn't surprise my reader, since he figured the people who had lost the money were now on their honeymoon. When the owner finally called, however, it was when my reader was on vacation. He returned the call when he got back to Columbus, five days later. By now 15 days had passed since he found the envelope.
He got a recorded answer when he called, so he left a message. He expected a quick return call, but got nothing.
"I left another message on Day 18," he writes, "and called again on Day 19, and we finally spoke."
The owner of the money said that she would call my reader that Sunday - Day 21 - to arrange a time to come to his house to pick up the envelope.
"That was yesterday," my reader writes, "and I didn't get a call."
He is "ethically comfortable" not calling the rightful owner again, he adds.
"I think three unrequited calls is enough," he explains, "and she knows how to reach me."
His question, however, looks forward rather than backward: "How long is long enough before I decide the cash is mine? If I wait another month - to Day 60 - and spend it, what do I say if she calls me on Day 61 to arrange pickup?"
He's a regular reader of my column each week, he writes, but can't remember my ever covering a situation like his.
"My wife and I have actually used the phrase, `Well, the ethics guy from the paper would say ... ' when we've talked about this."
While I have written about the importance of returning found items to their rightful owners, my reader is correct that I've never addressed how to calculate the appropriate length of time to wait before giving up on a rightful owner collecting his or her belongings.
The answer, I'm afraid, is that there is no appropriate period. What's hers is hers, and will stay hers unless she herself tells him to keep the money.
My reader did the right thing by notifying the park office about his find. If no owner had come forward after several months, he might make a good case for considering the money rightfully his to keep.
Because he has identified the owner and made initial contact with her, however, the right thing for him to do is to set aside the money until she finally makes her way to his house to pick it up. It was rude of her not to call on the appointed day, but her rudeness does not make her money any less hers.
It's obviously a nuisance to have to wait her out, but my reader already realizes that it's the right thing to do: That's why he would be at a loss to explain himself if he spent the money on Day 60 and she showed up the next day to reclaim her cash.
He's doing good by trying to get the money to its rightful owner, and he shouldn't let her lackadaisical response keep him from staying the course.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
SOUND OFF: FACING OFF ON FACEBOOK
The Charlotte Observer recently featured an article about a waitress who had lost her job for having used Facebook to post disparaging comments about a customer who left her a lousy tip. Of the readers who responded to an unscientific poll on my column's blog, 67 percent believe it fair for a company to fire an employee for online comments that might reflect ill on the company, while 32 percent believe that, because it's a personal page, it's none of the company's business.
"Although I am not an employment-law specialist, I would point out that there are some state laws that restrict the right of the employer to discharge an employee for comments made outside the employment setting," writes Bob Coffield, a health-care lawyer in West Virginia. "Social media has further blurred the work/personal lives of persons, and we will continue to see the development of requirements/laws that try to define the boundaries of proper behavior."
"Let this be a wake-up lesson," writes Bill Jacobson of Cypress, Calif. "You are employed at-will ... As soon as you start working against the company's interests, then you tip the balance toward them being better off without you."
"I agree that what she did was ill advised," another reader writes. "But, if she was a good employee who used bad judgment one time, the appropriate response by a wise employer would be to have her post an appropriate apology."
Check out other opinions here, or post your own by clicking on "Comments" or "Post a comment" below.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 630 Eighth Ave., 5th floor, New York, N.Y. 10018.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
"Although I am not an employment-law specialist, I would point out that there are some state laws that restrict the right of the employer to discharge an employee for comments made outside the employment setting," writes Bob Coffield, a health-care lawyer in West Virginia. "Social media has further blurred the work/personal lives of persons, and we will continue to see the development of requirements/laws that try to define the boundaries of proper behavior."
"Let this be a wake-up lesson," writes Bill Jacobson of Cypress, Calif. "You are employed at-will ... As soon as you start working against the company's interests, then you tip the balance toward them being better off without you."
"I agree that what she did was ill advised," another reader writes. "But, if she was a good employee who used bad judgment one time, the appropriate response by a wise employer would be to have her post an appropriate apology."
Check out other opinions here, or post your own by clicking on "Comments" or "Post a comment" below.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 630 Eighth Ave., 5th floor, New York, N.Y. 10018.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
Sunday, July 18, 2010
SOUND OFF: WE'RE ALL ABOVE AVERAGE NOW
In June, in a front-page story in The New York Times, Catherine Rampell reported that in the past two years at least 10 American law schools have changed their grading policies in their students' favor. Loyola Law School Los Angeles has decided to retroactively raise each of its graduates' grade-point average by .333, she wrote, "to make its students look more attractive in a competitive job market."
Assuming that lawyers from other schools were indeed graded less rigorously than Loyola's graduates, is it OK to raise the GPAs retroactively? Or should the original GPAs stand, regardless of what other law schools did?
Post your thoughts here by clicking on "comments" or "post a comment" below. Please include your name, hometown, and state, province, or country. Readers' comments may appear in an upcoming column. Or e-mail your comments to me at rightthing@nytimes.com.
You can also respond to the poll with this question that will appear on the right-hand side of the blog until polling is closed.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics. He is also the administrator of The Right Thing (http://www.jeffreyseglin.com/, a Web log focused on ethical issues.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 620 Eighth Ave., 5th floor, New York, N.Y. 10018.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
Assuming that lawyers from other schools were indeed graded less rigorously than Loyola's graduates, is it OK to raise the GPAs retroactively? Or should the original GPAs stand, regardless of what other law schools did?
Post your thoughts here by clicking on "comments" or "post a comment" below. Please include your name, hometown, and state, province, or country. Readers' comments may appear in an upcoming column. Or e-mail your comments to me at rightthing@nytimes.com.
You can also respond to the poll with this question that will appear on the right-hand side of the blog until polling is closed.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics. He is also the administrator of The Right Thing (http://www.jeffreyseglin.com/, a Web log focused on ethical issues.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 620 Eighth Ave., 5th floor, New York, N.Y. 10018.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
THE RIGHT THING: SHOULD YOU LOOK A BANK ERROR IN THE MOUTH?
When his most recent bank statement arrived from J.P. Morgan Chase, T.M., a reader in Ohio, was surprised to find that it did not include a charge of $64.04 for a debit-card purchase he had made, about six weeks earlier, from a large sporting-goods store in the area.
T.M. doesn't recall anything unusual about the transaction, and he had previously used his debit card at the store without having a problem. Years ago, however, he had a similar thing happen to him at a restaurant in the same shopping area as the sporting-goods store.
"It was a large, locally based Italian restaurant with several locations in the Midwest," he writes. "We used to eat there a lot. I don't recall following up with that merchant, but I also don't recall paying for the lunch."
Regardless of his past experience, T.M. wonders what the right thing to do is, given his current situation with the sporting-goods store.
It occurs to T.M. that the absence of the charge might be due to some sort of debit-card promotion - "Use your debit card and your bill is on us!" He acknowledges, however, that Chase would probably have told him if that were the case.
"Other than waiting to see if the charge goes through at some point in the future," T.M. writes, "I'm wondering what I should do - anything?"
While it's always a good feeling to draw a "Bank Error in Your Favor" card, T.M.'s small windfall should not make him feel tingly with delight. The mistake that resulted in the debit-card transaction not registering may well have been the sporting-goods store's, but T.M. knows he made the purchase. He still has whatever it was he bought there and, as of right now, he hasn't paid for it. No matter how you slice it, that's not a situation likely to pass ethical muster.
Some stores have posted policies about mistakes in transactions resulting in favorable outcomes for the customer - for instance, a purchase being free at some restaurants if a cashier doesn't provide you with a receipt, or a supermarket offering customers free items if the scanner rings up the wrong price.
Even so, unless T.M.'s sporting-goods store has a posted policy that it won't charge customers if the debit doesn't show up on their bill within a certain period of time, the right thing is for T.M. to meet his ethical obligation to pay what he knows he owes.
In buying the goods, he undertook to give the store the agreed-upon price. It's good that he attempted to do so, and he can't be faulted for the fact that the electronic transfer somehow went awry, but the end result is that he has not lived up to his agreement. He needs to do so.
If the sporting-goods store had erroneously charged T.M. twice for his purchase, you can bet that he wouldn't hesitate to call the store and/or Chase to see that the mistake was rectified.
T.M. should exercise the same diligence to set things right, even when he does not stand to benefit financially from doing so, and regardless of whether the store will reward him for his honesty.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
T.M. doesn't recall anything unusual about the transaction, and he had previously used his debit card at the store without having a problem. Years ago, however, he had a similar thing happen to him at a restaurant in the same shopping area as the sporting-goods store.
"It was a large, locally based Italian restaurant with several locations in the Midwest," he writes. "We used to eat there a lot. I don't recall following up with that merchant, but I also don't recall paying for the lunch."
Regardless of his past experience, T.M. wonders what the right thing to do is, given his current situation with the sporting-goods store.
It occurs to T.M. that the absence of the charge might be due to some sort of debit-card promotion - "Use your debit card and your bill is on us!" He acknowledges, however, that Chase would probably have told him if that were the case.
"Other than waiting to see if the charge goes through at some point in the future," T.M. writes, "I'm wondering what I should do - anything?"
While it's always a good feeling to draw a "Bank Error in Your Favor" card, T.M.'s small windfall should not make him feel tingly with delight. The mistake that resulted in the debit-card transaction not registering may well have been the sporting-goods store's, but T.M. knows he made the purchase. He still has whatever it was he bought there and, as of right now, he hasn't paid for it. No matter how you slice it, that's not a situation likely to pass ethical muster.
Some stores have posted policies about mistakes in transactions resulting in favorable outcomes for the customer - for instance, a purchase being free at some restaurants if a cashier doesn't provide you with a receipt, or a supermarket offering customers free items if the scanner rings up the wrong price.
Even so, unless T.M.'s sporting-goods store has a posted policy that it won't charge customers if the debit doesn't show up on their bill within a certain period of time, the right thing is for T.M. to meet his ethical obligation to pay what he knows he owes.
In buying the goods, he undertook to give the store the agreed-upon price. It's good that he attempted to do so, and he can't be faulted for the fact that the electronic transfer somehow went awry, but the end result is that he has not lived up to his agreement. He needs to do so.
If the sporting-goods store had erroneously charged T.M. twice for his purchase, you can bet that he wouldn't hesitate to call the store and/or Chase to see that the mistake was rectified.
T.M. should exercise the same diligence to set things right, even when he does not stand to benefit financially from doing so, and regardless of whether the store will reward him for his honesty.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
Sunday, July 11, 2010
THE RIGHT THING: WHO NEEDS A (CHEAP) TICKET?
Months before her planned visit to Manhattan to see her son, Eric, a reader from Ohio named Patricia had purchased tickets for them to see August Wilson's play, "Fences," and the musical "La Cage aux Folles."
The play was a limited run starring Oscar winner Denzel Washington, making it a hot ticket, and the tickets became even hotter after Washington won a Tony Award for his performance. Patricia never saw either show, however, because an emergency occurred shortly before her scheduled departure and she was forced to cancel the trip.
The tickets did not go to waste, though, because her son was able to resell them on the Internet ... and therein rests a tale.
Patricia writes that, because her ticket for "Fences" was hot, it was worth far more than its face value on the open market. Believing it ethically wrong to ask for more than his mother had paid for it, however, her son sold it for only the face value.
His mother disagrees with his take on the situation.
"If a property becomes worth more than what the owner paid for it," she asks, "is it ethically wrong to sell that property for the new market value?"
Anti-scalping laws exist for a variety of reasons, whether to protect the public from unscrupulous resellers or to help avoid the sale of fraudulent tickets to performances or sporting events. The laws regarding resale of such tickets vary from state to state. Some prohibit it, some require resellers to be licensed. Some put limits on how much of a markup, if any, is permissible. Auction Web sites, such as eBay, often post state regulations on such matters, and they can be dauntingly complex.
The law is not the issue here, however. It would be "obviously wrong" to ask her son to do anything illegal, Patricia writes, but she believes that it would not be illegal to mark up the price of her "Fences" ticket, noting that her ticket for "La Cage aux Folles" sold for much less than face value.
"Assuming that selling the ticket for the greater value was legal," she writes, "isn't it just good business sense to do so? I don't see this as an ethics question, but obviously my son does."
I appreciate Eric's urge to be ethical, but - so far as no laws are being violated - I don't believe there would have been anything wrong in his letting the market dictate the price of his mother's tickets. As she says, the value of items can change, and the price a seller paid for an item seldom has anything to do with how much a buyer pays for it. If my grandson bought a packet of Yugioh cards, came across a valuable one and decided to sell it for more than the cost of the whole packet, there would be nothing wrong with that, if he could find another collector who wanted the card and was willing to pay for it.
That said, the fact that Eric considers it unethical isn't irrelevant. Ethics vary from person to person, and what's fine for one person may be wrong for another.
If this comes up again in the future, the right thing for my reader and her son to do will be to determine the applicable laws and then come to some agreement about how to price her tickets. If Eric isn't comfortable selling them for more than face value, he shouldn't have to, and my reader shouldn't force the issue. She should sell the tickets herself or find someone else to help her, someone who is not uncomfortable with her pricing requirements.
There's nothing wrong with letting the market dictate the price of the tickets, but it's not mandatory, and Eric has every right to say no if he doesn't want to get involved.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
The play was a limited run starring Oscar winner Denzel Washington, making it a hot ticket, and the tickets became even hotter after Washington won a Tony Award for his performance. Patricia never saw either show, however, because an emergency occurred shortly before her scheduled departure and she was forced to cancel the trip.
The tickets did not go to waste, though, because her son was able to resell them on the Internet ... and therein rests a tale.
Patricia writes that, because her ticket for "Fences" was hot, it was worth far more than its face value on the open market. Believing it ethically wrong to ask for more than his mother had paid for it, however, her son sold it for only the face value.
His mother disagrees with his take on the situation.
"If a property becomes worth more than what the owner paid for it," she asks, "is it ethically wrong to sell that property for the new market value?"
Anti-scalping laws exist for a variety of reasons, whether to protect the public from unscrupulous resellers or to help avoid the sale of fraudulent tickets to performances or sporting events. The laws regarding resale of such tickets vary from state to state. Some prohibit it, some require resellers to be licensed. Some put limits on how much of a markup, if any, is permissible. Auction Web sites, such as eBay, often post state regulations on such matters, and they can be dauntingly complex.
The law is not the issue here, however. It would be "obviously wrong" to ask her son to do anything illegal, Patricia writes, but she believes that it would not be illegal to mark up the price of her "Fences" ticket, noting that her ticket for "La Cage aux Folles" sold for much less than face value.
"Assuming that selling the ticket for the greater value was legal," she writes, "isn't it just good business sense to do so? I don't see this as an ethics question, but obviously my son does."
I appreciate Eric's urge to be ethical, but - so far as no laws are being violated - I don't believe there would have been anything wrong in his letting the market dictate the price of his mother's tickets. As she says, the value of items can change, and the price a seller paid for an item seldom has anything to do with how much a buyer pays for it. If my grandson bought a packet of Yugioh cards, came across a valuable one and decided to sell it for more than the cost of the whole packet, there would be nothing wrong with that, if he could find another collector who wanted the card and was willing to pay for it.
That said, the fact that Eric considers it unethical isn't irrelevant. Ethics vary from person to person, and what's fine for one person may be wrong for another.
If this comes up again in the future, the right thing for my reader and her son to do will be to determine the applicable laws and then come to some agreement about how to price her tickets. If Eric isn't comfortable selling them for more than face value, he shouldn't have to, and my reader shouldn't force the issue. She should sell the tickets herself or find someone else to help her, someone who is not uncomfortable with her pricing requirements.
There's nothing wrong with letting the market dictate the price of the tickets, but it's not mandatory, and Eric has every right to say no if he doesn't want to get involved.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
SOUND OFF: BREAD LINES
Of the readers who responded to an unscientific poll on my column's blog, 46 percent said that they would pay the full-menu price for items offered at the St. Louis Bread Co. in Clayton, Mo., which allows customers to donate whatever they can and believe is appropriate for the food they purchase. Another 46 percent said that they would pay more than the menu price to support the nonprofit foundation that runs the store. Only 2 percent said that they would pay as little as possible in an effort to get a good deal.
"There doesn't seem to be an option for `I'd pay what I thought the product was worth, which might be more or less than the menu price, depending on how good the bread is and how reasonable the menu prices are,'" writes Shmuel Ross of Brooklyn, N.Y.
Another reader seems to concur: "I'd pay what I felt the item was worth, but no more than the menu price."
Finally, a reader sees the whole experiment as doomed.
"This is why the communist states failed," that reader writes. "Having this method of payment makes one reluctant to pay at all. The true believers felt that they were getting the short end of the stick by paying for those who didn't pay."
Check out other opinions here, or post your own by clicking on "Comments" or "Post a comment" below.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 630 Eighth Ave., 5th floor, New York, N.Y. 10018.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
"There doesn't seem to be an option for `I'd pay what I thought the product was worth, which might be more or less than the menu price, depending on how good the bread is and how reasonable the menu prices are,'" writes Shmuel Ross of Brooklyn, N.Y.
Another reader seems to concur: "I'd pay what I felt the item was worth, but no more than the menu price."
Finally, a reader sees the whole experiment as doomed.
"This is why the communist states failed," that reader writes. "Having this method of payment makes one reluctant to pay at all. The true believers felt that they were getting the short end of the stick by paying for those who didn't pay."
Check out other opinions here, or post your own by clicking on "Comments" or "Post a comment" below.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 630 Eighth Ave., 5th floor, New York, N.Y. 10018.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
Sunday, July 04, 2010
SOUND OFF: DUMBING DOWN THE RESUME
As many public figures have learned in recent years, there is no ethical justification for embellishing your resume to claim degrees or experience you don't have. In a tight job market, however, what do you think about leaving out experience or degrees you may have in an attempt not to scare off potential employers who might find you overqualified? In a recent article in The Boston Globe, reporter Katie Johnston Chase looked at the trend of jobseekers omitting such experience from their resumes in an effort to "dumb down" their credentials and get a foot in the door.
Is it OK to omit relevant experience from your resume if you believe that the omission might help you secure a job? Or is it wrong to leave off advanced degrees and jobs that you actually have?
Post your thoughts here by clicking on "comments" or "post a comment" below. Please include your name, hometown, and state, province, or country. Readers' comments may appear in an upcoming column. Or e-mail your comments to me at rightthing@nytimes.com.
You can also respond to the poll with this question that will appear on the right-hand side of the blog until polling is closed.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics. He is also the administrator of The Right Thing, a Web log focused on ethical issues.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 620 Eighth Ave., 5th floor, New York, N.Y. 10018.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
Is it OK to omit relevant experience from your resume if you believe that the omission might help you secure a job? Or is it wrong to leave off advanced degrees and jobs that you actually have?
Post your thoughts here by clicking on "comments" or "post a comment" below. Please include your name, hometown, and state, province, or country. Readers' comments may appear in an upcoming column. Or e-mail your comments to me at rightthing@nytimes.com.
You can also respond to the poll with this question that will appear on the right-hand side of the blog until polling is closed.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics. He is also the administrator of The Right Thing, a Web log focused on ethical issues.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 620 Eighth Ave., 5th floor, New York, N.Y. 10018.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
THE RIGHT THING: UP IN THE AIR
A shared trip can cement a friendship ... or ruin it forever. Sometimes you don't even have to go.
A reader was planning a trip with a friend, and had already made the hotel reservations. The problem was airfare: Since the trip was for a holiday weekend, my reader was having trouble finding reasonably priced tickets.
"I asked my friend to see if she could find a better deal," my reader writes.
That proved to be a good idea: Her friend soon called to say that she had been able to find tickets at a price that, while still high, was better than either of them had found previously.
"I told her that, although the price is high, to go ahead," my reader recalls.
A few days later, however, the two happened to meet, and my reader's friend asked if she had bought her airline ticket yet. Apparently she had misunderstood the situation and bought only her own ticket.
"I was amazed and upset," my reader writes, "knowing that, as time goes by, the price only goes up. Indeed, when I did get online and bought the ticket, the difference was about $180 more than what she had quoted me."
Sensing how upset my reader was, her friend has offered to pay the difference in the airfares. My reader feels awkward about the whole thing, however, especially in light of the fact that she is in a better financial position than her friend. What's more, she is not only a friend to this woman, but also her mentor.
"What do you think is the ethical course here?," she asks.
Clearly there was a miscommunication between my reader and her friend. The mistake was an honest one and, while it is gracious of her friend to offer to pay the difference in the ticket prices, she has no obligation to do so. Likewise, though she has chosen to do so, my reader has no obligation to accept the offer.
In short, the question here is not so much "What is the right thing to do?," but rather "What is the best thing to do?"
Frankly, there's likely to be awkwardness no matter which way my reader chooses to resolve the issue. Does she really want to risk an unpleasant trip if she lets her friend pay part of her fare? But, if my reader pays the full cost, is she going to be able to keep that from coloring her feelings toward her friend on the trip?
On balance I think it would be best for my reader to foot the full cost. From an ethical perspective, it's significant that she is in a better position to pay for the more expensive ticket than is her friend. In a situation involving an honest mistake, the resolution that does the least overall damage is usually the ethical choice. And it is, after all, my reader's ticket, so she bears at least some of the fault for not having made sure that her friend understood that she was expected to book both tickets.
Given that my reader is not adamant that her friend pay the difference between the tickets, the right thing for her to do is to chalk up the whole incident to a miscommunication and take responsibility for her own ticket. A good lesson for future excursions is to be explicit anytime she wants someone else to book tickets or attend to other essential business - or, of course, to do it herself rather than leave it to others.
Before she decides to foot the bill for the additional charges, however, my reader should make sure that she is capable of not holding a grudge against her friend. As her friend's mentor, she can use the whole experience as a lesson in the importance of clear communications.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
A reader was planning a trip with a friend, and had already made the hotel reservations. The problem was airfare: Since the trip was for a holiday weekend, my reader was having trouble finding reasonably priced tickets.
"I asked my friend to see if she could find a better deal," my reader writes.
That proved to be a good idea: Her friend soon called to say that she had been able to find tickets at a price that, while still high, was better than either of them had found previously.
"I told her that, although the price is high, to go ahead," my reader recalls.
A few days later, however, the two happened to meet, and my reader's friend asked if she had bought her airline ticket yet. Apparently she had misunderstood the situation and bought only her own ticket.
"I was amazed and upset," my reader writes, "knowing that, as time goes by, the price only goes up. Indeed, when I did get online and bought the ticket, the difference was about $180 more than what she had quoted me."
Sensing how upset my reader was, her friend has offered to pay the difference in the airfares. My reader feels awkward about the whole thing, however, especially in light of the fact that she is in a better financial position than her friend. What's more, she is not only a friend to this woman, but also her mentor.
"What do you think is the ethical course here?," she asks.
Clearly there was a miscommunication between my reader and her friend. The mistake was an honest one and, while it is gracious of her friend to offer to pay the difference in the ticket prices, she has no obligation to do so. Likewise, though she has chosen to do so, my reader has no obligation to accept the offer.
In short, the question here is not so much "What is the right thing to do?," but rather "What is the best thing to do?"
Frankly, there's likely to be awkwardness no matter which way my reader chooses to resolve the issue. Does she really want to risk an unpleasant trip if she lets her friend pay part of her fare? But, if my reader pays the full cost, is she going to be able to keep that from coloring her feelings toward her friend on the trip?
On balance I think it would be best for my reader to foot the full cost. From an ethical perspective, it's significant that she is in a better position to pay for the more expensive ticket than is her friend. In a situation involving an honest mistake, the resolution that does the least overall damage is usually the ethical choice. And it is, after all, my reader's ticket, so she bears at least some of the fault for not having made sure that her friend understood that she was expected to book both tickets.
Given that my reader is not adamant that her friend pay the difference between the tickets, the right thing for her to do is to chalk up the whole incident to a miscommunication and take responsibility for her own ticket. A good lesson for future excursions is to be explicit anytime she wants someone else to book tickets or attend to other essential business - or, of course, to do it herself rather than leave it to others.
Before she decides to foot the bill for the additional charges, however, my reader should make sure that she is capable of not holding a grudge against her friend. As her friend's mentor, she can use the whole experience as a lesson in the importance of clear communications.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
Sunday, June 27, 2010
THE RIGHT THING: HAVE FUN ... BUT NOT TOO MUCH FUN
The National Collegiate Athletic Association, based in Indianapolis, is the main organization that governs and sets rules for college sports in the United States and Canada. This has put it smack in the middle of a number of controversies lately - if the issue of whether there should be a college-football playoff system were a matter of ethics, I'd have to get a bigger mailbox - but I hadn't previously had occasion to consider an issue brought to my attention by R.C., a reader from Alabama.
"Is the NCAA's rule governing `excessive celebration' fair and ethical?," he asks.
My reader is referring to NCAA Football Rule 9-2, which specifies that a 15-yard penalty be assessed for any "delayed, excessive, prolonged or choreographed act by which a player (or players) attempts to focus attention on himself (or themselves)."
R.C. contends that certain human responses "are innate and therefore uncontrollable." How then, he asks, "can the NCAA expect the very primal instinct to celebrate the accomplishment of a goal, especially one that the individual has likely trained for years to be able to accomplish, to somehow be switched off?"
He further wants to know if it is ethical for the NCAA to profit from the interest in collegiate athletics and then to punish the players for "acting on impulses that are beyond their control?"
After all, R.C. adds, he sees these same impulses played out among the thousands of fans in attendance and untold numbers more watching in homes around the country when they simultaneously throw their hands into the air and scream.
Contending that the "excessive celebration" rule has affected the final outcome of several contests and led to widely publicized outcries from both fans and athletes, R.C. asks: "If the fans, coaches and players have a consensus view of this rule that differs from that of the sanctioning body, is it incumbent upon that body to change the rule?"
R.C.'s question takes on particular relevance given the NCAA's April decision to change its rules so that, starting in 2011, the penalty for taunting an opposing team on the way to scoring a touchdown will include the loss of that touchdown - obviously a potential game-changer. The current taunting rule requires only a 15-yard penalty assessed on the extra-point attempt or subsequent kickoff.
I'm guessing that R.C.'s team may have come out on the wrong side of an "excessive celebration" penalty recently, and I understand his frustration. However, I don't think there's anything unethical about the rule itself.
Fans rarely if ever get to set the rules for organized sports. The NCAA is under no ethical obligation to change its rules simply because the public believes it should. The views of fans - along with those of coaches and players - can and should be taken into account, but ultimately the NCAA's only obligation is to establish the rules that it believes are in the best interest of the game.
Granted, it may be instinctual for a player who scores to want to celebrate his feat or even to rub his opponents' noses in their failure. That doesn't mean that they should be allowed to do so. It also may be instinctual for players to want to poke the other guy in the eye, but the rules don't allow it and that's that.
The ways that players line up, block and tackle are regulated, so why not the ways they celebrate? Particularly since the NCAA rule seems targeted not at spur-of-the-moment exultation but rather at choreographed showmanship that goes beyond the spurs of instinct.
The whole point of rules is to control players' impulses and channel them into sportsmanlike competition. R.C. gives the players too little credit for their ability to do so. Football players control their emotions constantly to avoid penalties, and this is only one more instance of this perennial process.
Coaches make sure that their players understand what's OK and what's not OK when it comes to tackling an opponent. It's up to them to make sure that the players also understand what is and isn't permissible in celebrating a touchdown.
Players who are serious about winning will have no problem mustering the restraint needed to avoid a game-changing penalty.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
"Is the NCAA's rule governing `excessive celebration' fair and ethical?," he asks.
My reader is referring to NCAA Football Rule 9-2, which specifies that a 15-yard penalty be assessed for any "delayed, excessive, prolonged or choreographed act by which a player (or players) attempts to focus attention on himself (or themselves)."
R.C. contends that certain human responses "are innate and therefore uncontrollable." How then, he asks, "can the NCAA expect the very primal instinct to celebrate the accomplishment of a goal, especially one that the individual has likely trained for years to be able to accomplish, to somehow be switched off?"
He further wants to know if it is ethical for the NCAA to profit from the interest in collegiate athletics and then to punish the players for "acting on impulses that are beyond their control?"
After all, R.C. adds, he sees these same impulses played out among the thousands of fans in attendance and untold numbers more watching in homes around the country when they simultaneously throw their hands into the air and scream.
Contending that the "excessive celebration" rule has affected the final outcome of several contests and led to widely publicized outcries from both fans and athletes, R.C. asks: "If the fans, coaches and players have a consensus view of this rule that differs from that of the sanctioning body, is it incumbent upon that body to change the rule?"
R.C.'s question takes on particular relevance given the NCAA's April decision to change its rules so that, starting in 2011, the penalty for taunting an opposing team on the way to scoring a touchdown will include the loss of that touchdown - obviously a potential game-changer. The current taunting rule requires only a 15-yard penalty assessed on the extra-point attempt or subsequent kickoff.
I'm guessing that R.C.'s team may have come out on the wrong side of an "excessive celebration" penalty recently, and I understand his frustration. However, I don't think there's anything unethical about the rule itself.
Fans rarely if ever get to set the rules for organized sports. The NCAA is under no ethical obligation to change its rules simply because the public believes it should. The views of fans - along with those of coaches and players - can and should be taken into account, but ultimately the NCAA's only obligation is to establish the rules that it believes are in the best interest of the game.
Granted, it may be instinctual for a player who scores to want to celebrate his feat or even to rub his opponents' noses in their failure. That doesn't mean that they should be allowed to do so. It also may be instinctual for players to want to poke the other guy in the eye, but the rules don't allow it and that's that.
The ways that players line up, block and tackle are regulated, so why not the ways they celebrate? Particularly since the NCAA rule seems targeted not at spur-of-the-moment exultation but rather at choreographed showmanship that goes beyond the spurs of instinct.
The whole point of rules is to control players' impulses and channel them into sportsmanlike competition. R.C. gives the players too little credit for their ability to do so. Football players control their emotions constantly to avoid penalties, and this is only one more instance of this perennial process.
Coaches make sure that their players understand what's OK and what's not OK when it comes to tackling an opponent. It's up to them to make sure that the players also understand what is and isn't permissible in celebrating a touchdown.
Players who are serious about winning will have no problem mustering the restraint needed to avoid a game-changing penalty.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
SOUND OFF: TAKE THEMSELVES OUT OF THE BALL GAME?
Of the readers who responded to an unscientific poll on my column's blog, 49 percent believe that it would be right for the Major League Baseball Players Association to boycott the 2011 All-Star Game, which is scheduled to be played in Phoenix, in protest against the bill passed in April by the Arizona State Legislature to crack down on illegal immigrants, while 51 percent believe that it is wrong to mix baseball with politics.
Maggie Lawrence of Culpepper, Va., believes that, given that "the Arizona legislation is simply trying to do what the federal legislation says it will do - but doesn't," such a boycott "is just another simple-minded grandstand."
"The union has no business getting into this," writes Phil Clutts of Harrisburg, N.C. "It is wrong indeed for baseball players to propose a boycott of a game because it would take place in a state that is trying to do what the federal government is unwilling or unable to do properly."
On the other hand, one reader writes, "This country has a Constitution, and two of the freedoms it guarantees are speech and association. The baseball folks can speak or associate as they please."
Check out other opinions here, or post your own by clicking on "Comments" or "Post a comment" below.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 630 Eighth Ave., 5th floor, New York, N.Y. 10018.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
Maggie Lawrence of Culpepper, Va., believes that, given that "the Arizona legislation is simply trying to do what the federal legislation says it will do - but doesn't," such a boycott "is just another simple-minded grandstand."
"The union has no business getting into this," writes Phil Clutts of Harrisburg, N.C. "It is wrong indeed for baseball players to propose a boycott of a game because it would take place in a state that is trying to do what the federal government is unwilling or unable to do properly."
On the other hand, one reader writes, "This country has a Constitution, and two of the freedoms it guarantees are speech and association. The baseball folks can speak or associate as they please."
Check out other opinions here, or post your own by clicking on "Comments" or "Post a comment" below.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 630 Eighth Ave., 5th floor, New York, N.Y. 10018.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
Sunday, June 20, 2010
SOUND OFF: FACEBOOK FIRING
Charlie Seng, a reader from Lancaster, S.C., sent me a front-page article from The Charlotte Observer about a waitress who lost her job for having posted disparaging comments on Facebook about a customer who left her a lousy tip. Seng wonders what the readers of the column think of a dismissal based on postings on an employee's personal Facebook page.
Good question. What do you think? Is it fair for a company to fire an employee for online comments that might reflect ill on the company? Or does the fact that it's a personal page make it none of the company's business?
Post your thoughts here by clicking on "comments" or "post a comment" below. Please include your name, hometown, and state, province, or country. Readers' comments may appear in an upcoming column. Or e-mail your comments to me at rightthing@nytimes.com.
You can also respond to the poll with this question that will appear on the right-hand side of the blog until polling is closed.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics. He is also the administrator of The Right Thing, a Web log focused on ethical issues.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 620 Eighth Ave., 5th floor, New York, N.Y. 10018.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
Good question. What do you think? Is it fair for a company to fire an employee for online comments that might reflect ill on the company? Or does the fact that it's a personal page make it none of the company's business?
Post your thoughts here by clicking on "comments" or "post a comment" below. Please include your name, hometown, and state, province, or country. Readers' comments may appear in an upcoming column. Or e-mail your comments to me at rightthing@nytimes.com.
You can also respond to the poll with this question that will appear on the right-hand side of the blog until polling is closed.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics. He is also the administrator of The Right Thing, a Web log focused on ethical issues.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 620 Eighth Ave., 5th floor, New York, N.Y. 10018.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
THE RIGHT THING: THE EARLY BIRD LOSES THE DEPOSIT
In late May a reader from Columbus, Ohio, purchased a house. Because the current tenants had a lease running through the end of August, my reader planned to move in on Sept. 1, figuring that this would give the current renters plenty of time to find a new place to live.
At the closing for the house sale, the previous owner gave my reader a copy of the renters' current lease, plus a prorated share of the rent they had paid for May and their original security deposit of $1,295, one month's rent.
The house had been put on the market in mid-April, and at that time the tenants gave 30 days' notice that they intended to move out by the end of May, which they have done.
The sticking point: The lease stipulates that the renters will forfeit their deposit if they move before their lease expires, but the renters have made clear to my reader that they expect their security deposit returned in full.
The former owner told my reader that, if he still owned the house, he would not return their deposit because they had violated the terms of the lease by bringing in a cat and also by moving before the lease expired. My reader's lawyer agrees.
When the renters told the previous owner that they were planning to move, there was no discussion about the return of the security deposit. Since then, however, it has become a major bone of contention between them and the new owner.
"They are driving me crazy with phone calls and text messages," my reader writes.
He figures that the former renters are responsible for repairs to the house that will cost about $400, which should rightly be deducted from the deposit in any case. The question is, what about the rest of the money?
"Do I have to return the security deposit to them, now that they have vacated?," he asks. "I used to own several properties. Now I remember why I got rid of them.
"What is the right thing to do?"
I have often said, in this column and elsewhere, that what's legal and what's ethical aren't always the same thing. In this case, for example, the legalities are clear: As long as the renters weren't misled and the lease clearly states the terms of the agreement, then my reader has no legal obligation to return the money. It's an open-and-shut case.
For him, though, the ethics are obviously foggier. What's the story?
In my opinion this is a case in which the law and the ethics go hand-in-hand. The renters entered into an agreement without coercion, and their landlord lived up to his side of the deal. They should therefore do the same and, since they moved before the lease expired, write off the security deposit. That a new landlord held the lease when they made their early departure has no bearing whatsoever on their obligation to honor their agreement.
My reader is unhappy that the renters feel that they are being dealt with unfairly, and he admits that he feels inclined to give them something back - but is also bothered by "their attitude of entitlement."
However, my reader is not ethically bound to see that everybody feels that they have been dealt with fairly, only to actually deal with everybody fairly. If he chooses to return some portion of the renters' deposit, it will be strictly out of the goodness of his heart, not out of any ethical obligation to do so. Whether or not it's reflected in their attitude, the renters are not entitled to any of the money back.
The renters didn't ask me for advice. If they had, I'd tell them to reread their lease and acknowledge that, by moving before it expired, they forfeited their security deposit. If they hoped to have this section of the lease waived, they should have taken that up with the previous owner.
As for my reader, he's already doing the right thing, even if he's feeling bad about it. If his compassion moves him to return some of the deposit, I hope he'll at least make sure that he keeps enough to cover the cost of the necessary repairs.
"I have always been on the losing end of these situations," my reader tells me, but in this case he doesn't have to be.
His sympathy for his former renters does him credit, but there's nothing wrong with expecting them to honor the lease they signed.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
At the closing for the house sale, the previous owner gave my reader a copy of the renters' current lease, plus a prorated share of the rent they had paid for May and their original security deposit of $1,295, one month's rent.
The house had been put on the market in mid-April, and at that time the tenants gave 30 days' notice that they intended to move out by the end of May, which they have done.
The sticking point: The lease stipulates that the renters will forfeit their deposit if they move before their lease expires, but the renters have made clear to my reader that they expect their security deposit returned in full.
The former owner told my reader that, if he still owned the house, he would not return their deposit because they had violated the terms of the lease by bringing in a cat and also by moving before the lease expired. My reader's lawyer agrees.
When the renters told the previous owner that they were planning to move, there was no discussion about the return of the security deposit. Since then, however, it has become a major bone of contention between them and the new owner.
"They are driving me crazy with phone calls and text messages," my reader writes.
He figures that the former renters are responsible for repairs to the house that will cost about $400, which should rightly be deducted from the deposit in any case. The question is, what about the rest of the money?
"Do I have to return the security deposit to them, now that they have vacated?," he asks. "I used to own several properties. Now I remember why I got rid of them.
"What is the right thing to do?"
I have often said, in this column and elsewhere, that what's legal and what's ethical aren't always the same thing. In this case, for example, the legalities are clear: As long as the renters weren't misled and the lease clearly states the terms of the agreement, then my reader has no legal obligation to return the money. It's an open-and-shut case.
For him, though, the ethics are obviously foggier. What's the story?
In my opinion this is a case in which the law and the ethics go hand-in-hand. The renters entered into an agreement without coercion, and their landlord lived up to his side of the deal. They should therefore do the same and, since they moved before the lease expired, write off the security deposit. That a new landlord held the lease when they made their early departure has no bearing whatsoever on their obligation to honor their agreement.
My reader is unhappy that the renters feel that they are being dealt with unfairly, and he admits that he feels inclined to give them something back - but is also bothered by "their attitude of entitlement."
However, my reader is not ethically bound to see that everybody feels that they have been dealt with fairly, only to actually deal with everybody fairly. If he chooses to return some portion of the renters' deposit, it will be strictly out of the goodness of his heart, not out of any ethical obligation to do so. Whether or not it's reflected in their attitude, the renters are not entitled to any of the money back.
The renters didn't ask me for advice. If they had, I'd tell them to reread their lease and acknowledge that, by moving before it expired, they forfeited their security deposit. If they hoped to have this section of the lease waived, they should have taken that up with the previous owner.
As for my reader, he's already doing the right thing, even if he's feeling bad about it. If his compassion moves him to return some of the deposit, I hope he'll at least make sure that he keeps enough to cover the cost of the necessary repairs.
"I have always been on the losing end of these situations," my reader tells me, but in this case he doesn't have to be.
His sympathy for his former renters does him credit, but there's nothing wrong with expecting them to honor the lease they signed.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
Sunday, June 13, 2010
THE RIGHT THING: A LESSON FROM A TEACHER
A reader of the column tells me that she has "a doozy of an ethical question" for me, one which belongs to that touchy ethical category "something for nothing."
Awhile back she signed up for a teacher-rewards card at her local office-supply company. Every few months she receives a reward check, the amount of which is based on how much she has purchased at the store.
During the past year her rewards have grown significantly - but the growth in the amount she's getting is "not from my personal purchases, because I know I am not spending the kind of money to generate the rewards I often get."
She has cashed some of the smaller rewards checks, she writes, since she figures that they are based on her actual purchases. The larger checks have really thrown her, however, and she isn't sure what to do.
"My purse was stolen last year," she writes, "but I cannot think someone who stole my purse is using my card. If this someone is using my card for educator discounts, especially someone who stole my purse, then I feel I have the right to reap the rewards and have the last laugh."
My reader wonders if her school or school district are somehow tied to her personal account, with her getting credit for the institution's purchases.
"If this is the case," she acknowledges, "the district does not have access to its rewards and it's an obvious error."
Since most of her purchases are for her classroom and students, however, she wonders if it is so bad that a teacher might be benefiting from the district's purchases.
She asked the school's budget secretary, who orders school supplies, about the situation.
"She just laughed," my reader reports, "and said, `Good for you if that is happening. At least someone is getting something for all we spend.'"
My reader assumes that, if she asks the store to investigate, it will probably not care and wonder why she cares.
"Or they will cancel my card, issue a new one and no one will get the checks," she adds. "Am I entitled to spend the reward check on an account issued to me, when someone who spends a lot at the store is tied to my account in error? Or is it unethical?"
There are situations in which it's ethical to accept something for nothing, but they're few and far between, and sadly this isn't one of them.
Unless the store is accidentally crediting my reader for purchases that aren't being made, in which case she's being given the store's money by accident, it seems fair to assume that somebody - let's say Buyer X - is making purchases and my reader is getting the credit instead of Buyer X. In either case, someone is being deprived of what's due, and my reader is reaping the benefits.
It doesn't really matter who the loser is, and the budget secretary's cavalier response doesn't get my reader off the hook if it should be the district. It's not the secretary's money, after all, and I doubt that the district has authorized her to write blank checks at will.
My reader wouldn't even consider withdrawing funds that her bank had credited to her account erroneously - at least, I hope she wouldn't - and this is the same thing. The funds are simply being credited to an account at a store, rather than at a bank. Whose they are is unclear, but they aren't hers and she isn't entitled to make use of them.
The right thing for my reader to do is to alert the store about what has been happening. The store's management should care that the appropriate person gets credited for the purchases, and so should my reader. So too should Buyer X, who is making considerable purchases and having the rewards channeled to the account of a complete stranger.
I agree that it seems unlikely that it's the purse thief who is making these purchases. If it is, though, my reader coming clean might help the store use the information to track down the criminal if he or she uses the card in the future.
General rule, though: We all know what's ours and what isn't. If it's not yours, it's rarely ethical to use it for your own advantage.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
Awhile back she signed up for a teacher-rewards card at her local office-supply company. Every few months she receives a reward check, the amount of which is based on how much she has purchased at the store.
During the past year her rewards have grown significantly - but the growth in the amount she's getting is "not from my personal purchases, because I know I am not spending the kind of money to generate the rewards I often get."
She has cashed some of the smaller rewards checks, she writes, since she figures that they are based on her actual purchases. The larger checks have really thrown her, however, and she isn't sure what to do.
"My purse was stolen last year," she writes, "but I cannot think someone who stole my purse is using my card. If this someone is using my card for educator discounts, especially someone who stole my purse, then I feel I have the right to reap the rewards and have the last laugh."
My reader wonders if her school or school district are somehow tied to her personal account, with her getting credit for the institution's purchases.
"If this is the case," she acknowledges, "the district does not have access to its rewards and it's an obvious error."
Since most of her purchases are for her classroom and students, however, she wonders if it is so bad that a teacher might be benefiting from the district's purchases.
She asked the school's budget secretary, who orders school supplies, about the situation.
"She just laughed," my reader reports, "and said, `Good for you if that is happening. At least someone is getting something for all we spend.'"
My reader assumes that, if she asks the store to investigate, it will probably not care and wonder why she cares.
"Or they will cancel my card, issue a new one and no one will get the checks," she adds. "Am I entitled to spend the reward check on an account issued to me, when someone who spends a lot at the store is tied to my account in error? Or is it unethical?"
There are situations in which it's ethical to accept something for nothing, but they're few and far between, and sadly this isn't one of them.
Unless the store is accidentally crediting my reader for purchases that aren't being made, in which case she's being given the store's money by accident, it seems fair to assume that somebody - let's say Buyer X - is making purchases and my reader is getting the credit instead of Buyer X. In either case, someone is being deprived of what's due, and my reader is reaping the benefits.
It doesn't really matter who the loser is, and the budget secretary's cavalier response doesn't get my reader off the hook if it should be the district. It's not the secretary's money, after all, and I doubt that the district has authorized her to write blank checks at will.
My reader wouldn't even consider withdrawing funds that her bank had credited to her account erroneously - at least, I hope she wouldn't - and this is the same thing. The funds are simply being credited to an account at a store, rather than at a bank. Whose they are is unclear, but they aren't hers and she isn't entitled to make use of them.
The right thing for my reader to do is to alert the store about what has been happening. The store's management should care that the appropriate person gets credited for the purchases, and so should my reader. So too should Buyer X, who is making considerable purchases and having the rewards channeled to the account of a complete stranger.
I agree that it seems unlikely that it's the purse thief who is making these purchases. If it is, though, my reader coming clean might help the store use the information to track down the criminal if he or she uses the card in the future.
General rule, though: We all know what's ours and what isn't. If it's not yours, it's rarely ethical to use it for your own advantage.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
SOUND OFF: TO FLAME OR NOT TO FLAME?
Is it OK to hide behind e-mail, rather than to talk directly to someone? Does doing so risk escalating a situation that might have been handled more civilly and effectively if done person to person?
Readers were mixed in their responses to an unscientific poll on my column's blog. Of the readers who responded, 43 percent believe it is perfectly ethical to use e-mail to express ideas - and particularly attitudes - that you would be reluctant to express in person, while 57 percent believe that e-mail should be limited to the expression of ideas and attitudes that you'd be comfortable conveying face to face.
As Maggie Lawrence of Culpepper, Va., sees it, the issue is not about ethics.
"It's about manners," she writes. "It's just easier for people to be unmannerly when they have a layer of technology or anonymity - or both - between themselves and the recipient."
Lawrence's observation is well taken, and I generally agree, although my experience with readers who e-mail me has been a notable exception: Even when they write passionately in response to a topic or pose a vexing question to me, by and large they do so civilly. So keep those e-mails coming.
Check out other opinions on the hiding-behind-e-mail question here, or post your own by clicking on "Comments" or "Post a comment" below.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 630 Eighth Ave., 5th floor, New York, N.Y. 10018.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
Readers were mixed in their responses to an unscientific poll on my column's blog. Of the readers who responded, 43 percent believe it is perfectly ethical to use e-mail to express ideas - and particularly attitudes - that you would be reluctant to express in person, while 57 percent believe that e-mail should be limited to the expression of ideas and attitudes that you'd be comfortable conveying face to face.
As Maggie Lawrence of Culpepper, Va., sees it, the issue is not about ethics.
"It's about manners," she writes. "It's just easier for people to be unmannerly when they have a layer of technology or anonymity - or both - between themselves and the recipient."
Lawrence's observation is well taken, and I generally agree, although my experience with readers who e-mail me has been a notable exception: Even when they write passionately in response to a topic or pose a vexing question to me, by and large they do so civilly. So keep those e-mails coming.
Check out other opinions on the hiding-behind-e-mail question here, or post your own by clicking on "Comments" or "Post a comment" below.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 630 Eighth Ave., 5th floor, New York, N.Y. 10018.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
Sunday, June 06, 2010
SOUND OFF: PAY WHAT YOU WANT
Panera Bread Co., a national chain of bakeries and restaurants, has launched a not-for-profit store called St. Louis Bread Co. Cares in Clayton, Mo., that uses a new pricing model: Customers can donate whatever they can and believe is appropriate for the food that they purchase. If this store can be sustained, Panera will open similar stores elsewhere, with the proceeds going to the nonprofit foundation that runs the store.
If you were to visit this store, or one of its branches if it expands, would you pay the full menu price for your purchases? pay a bit more, if you could afford to, in order to support the effort? or pay as little as possible in the interest of getting a good deal? Tell me which and why.
Post your thoughts here by clicking on "comments" or "post a comment" below. Please include your name, hometown, and state, province, or country. Readers' comments may appear in an upcoming column. Or e-mail your comments to me at rightthing@nytimes.com.
You can also respond to the poll with this question that will appear on the right-hand side of the blog until polling is closed.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics. He is also the administrator of The Right Thing, a Web log focused on ethical issues.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com
or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 620 Eighth Ave., 5th floor, New York, N.Y. 10018.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
If you were to visit this store, or one of its branches if it expands, would you pay the full menu price for your purchases? pay a bit more, if you could afford to, in order to support the effort? or pay as little as possible in the interest of getting a good deal? Tell me which and why.
Post your thoughts here by clicking on "comments" or "post a comment" below. Please include your name, hometown, and state, province, or country. Readers' comments may appear in an upcoming column. Or e-mail your comments to me at rightthing@nytimes.com.
You can also respond to the poll with this question that will appear on the right-hand side of the blog until polling is closed.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics. He is also the administrator of The Right Thing, a Web log focused on ethical issues.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com
or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 620 Eighth Ave., 5th floor, New York, N.Y. 10018.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
THE RIGHT THING: LYING TO DO GOOD
A reader from Reynoldsburg, Ohio, works on the line in a factory to which, once a quarter, the local chapter of the American Red Cross sends its bloodmobile to collect donations from the workers. During these blood drives, employees are allowed to leave their positions on the line, with their manager's approval, to donate blood.
"The process can take anywhere from 15 to 30 minutes," my reader tells me. "It's a nice break from work."
My reader is among the many who choose to give blood regularly. According to estimates by the World Health Organization, more than 92 million blood donations are made annually. Roughly 16 million units are collected in the United States each year. To recognize those who donate blood, World Blood Donor Day is held each year in a different country. This year it will fall on June 14 and be hosted by Spain in Barcelona.
The Red Cross asks all prospective donors to answer dozens of questions to determine their eligibility to give blood. Among those excluded are people who spent more than three months in the United Kingdom between 1980 and 1996, those who have been tattooed within the past 12 months at an unlicensed facility, woman who are pregnant, people who have ever used intravenous drugs that were not prescribed by a physician and "any male who has had sexual contact with another male, even once, since 1977."
That last provision has been called into question. Researchers have argued, in a recent article in The Canadian Medical Association Journal, that the ban against donations by men who have had sex with other men "no longer makes sense," given the improvements in HIV tests for donated blood. Nonetheless the ban still stands, which presents a challenge for my reader.
"A co-worker confided in me that he is a homosexual," he writes. "He went so far as to tell me that, although he is in a relationship, he continues to `sleep around.'"
Despite the Red Cross guidelines, this co-worker continues to donate blood each time the bloodmobile comes to the plant.
"He told me, when they ask him the qualifying question concerning his sexual activity, he lies so that he can continue the process," my reader reports.
My reader has made repeated attempts to get his co-worker to halt this practice, he says, but his colleague "sees nothing wrong with what he is doing and refuses to discontinue his donations."
My reader is confident that the Red Cross tests the donated blood, and thus that his co-worker's blood is not tainted. Even so, his co-worker is still deceiving the Red Cross and his manager, so he wonders, "Should I discreetly alert someone of this deceit?"
It's no wonder that my reader is torn. Under normal circumstances, "outing" someone as a homosexual is inexcusable. This fact is, quite simply, nobody's business but his or her own.
These are not normal circumstances, however.
There is some merit in the medical researchers' argument that the ban on donations by homosexual men has outlived its usefulness. In March a letter from 18 United States senators asked the Food and Drug Administration, which establishes blood-donation guidelines in the U.S., to reconsider the policy, and the FDA has announced that it will hold an advisory-committee meeting to revisit this ban in June.
For now, however, the ban stands. Neither my reader nor his co-worker is a doctor, and it is not their place to determine whether the rules need to be changed. It's their job to abide by them or, if they cannot or if they think the rules ill-advised, to not give blood.
My reader's co-worker is wrong to lie in order to give blood, and my reader is right to have made every effort to convince him to be honest with the blood collectors. Because those pleas have fallen on deaf ears, he must take the next step.
The right thing for my reader to do is to let his co-worker know that he plans to tell the Red Cross representatives that his co-worker does not qualify as a blood donor under the current rules. He doesn't need to explain exactly why, merely to tell them that his co-worker has misrepresented himself in filling out the form for past donations.
Hopefully the prospect of having his lie exposed will be enough to cause his co-worker to stop giving blood, until such time as the ban may be revoked. If he does not, however, my reader should carry out his plan and talk to the Red Cross.
It's a pity that this will almost certainly cause friction between the two men. I see no reason to doubt that the co-worker's desire to give blood is motivated strictly by generosity, and it's unfortunate that he finds himself in a position in which he can't do good without lying.
The safety of the blood supply must be paramount, however, and it's my reader's responsibility to see that his co-worker is held accountable for his actions.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
"The process can take anywhere from 15 to 30 minutes," my reader tells me. "It's a nice break from work."
My reader is among the many who choose to give blood regularly. According to estimates by the World Health Organization, more than 92 million blood donations are made annually. Roughly 16 million units are collected in the United States each year. To recognize those who donate blood, World Blood Donor Day is held each year in a different country. This year it will fall on June 14 and be hosted by Spain in Barcelona.
The Red Cross asks all prospective donors to answer dozens of questions to determine their eligibility to give blood. Among those excluded are people who spent more than three months in the United Kingdom between 1980 and 1996, those who have been tattooed within the past 12 months at an unlicensed facility, woman who are pregnant, people who have ever used intravenous drugs that were not prescribed by a physician and "any male who has had sexual contact with another male, even once, since 1977."
That last provision has been called into question. Researchers have argued, in a recent article in The Canadian Medical Association Journal, that the ban against donations by men who have had sex with other men "no longer makes sense," given the improvements in HIV tests for donated blood. Nonetheless the ban still stands, which presents a challenge for my reader.
"A co-worker confided in me that he is a homosexual," he writes. "He went so far as to tell me that, although he is in a relationship, he continues to `sleep around.'"
Despite the Red Cross guidelines, this co-worker continues to donate blood each time the bloodmobile comes to the plant.
"He told me, when they ask him the qualifying question concerning his sexual activity, he lies so that he can continue the process," my reader reports.
My reader has made repeated attempts to get his co-worker to halt this practice, he says, but his colleague "sees nothing wrong with what he is doing and refuses to discontinue his donations."
My reader is confident that the Red Cross tests the donated blood, and thus that his co-worker's blood is not tainted. Even so, his co-worker is still deceiving the Red Cross and his manager, so he wonders, "Should I discreetly alert someone of this deceit?"
It's no wonder that my reader is torn. Under normal circumstances, "outing" someone as a homosexual is inexcusable. This fact is, quite simply, nobody's business but his or her own.
These are not normal circumstances, however.
There is some merit in the medical researchers' argument that the ban on donations by homosexual men has outlived its usefulness. In March a letter from 18 United States senators asked the Food and Drug Administration, which establishes blood-donation guidelines in the U.S., to reconsider the policy, and the FDA has announced that it will hold an advisory-committee meeting to revisit this ban in June.
For now, however, the ban stands. Neither my reader nor his co-worker is a doctor, and it is not their place to determine whether the rules need to be changed. It's their job to abide by them or, if they cannot or if they think the rules ill-advised, to not give blood.
My reader's co-worker is wrong to lie in order to give blood, and my reader is right to have made every effort to convince him to be honest with the blood collectors. Because those pleas have fallen on deaf ears, he must take the next step.
The right thing for my reader to do is to let his co-worker know that he plans to tell the Red Cross representatives that his co-worker does not qualify as a blood donor under the current rules. He doesn't need to explain exactly why, merely to tell them that his co-worker has misrepresented himself in filling out the form for past donations.
Hopefully the prospect of having his lie exposed will be enough to cause his co-worker to stop giving blood, until such time as the ban may be revoked. If he does not, however, my reader should carry out his plan and talk to the Red Cross.
It's a pity that this will almost certainly cause friction between the two men. I see no reason to doubt that the co-worker's desire to give blood is motivated strictly by generosity, and it's unfortunate that he finds himself in a position in which he can't do good without lying.
The safety of the blood supply must be paramount, however, and it's my reader's responsibility to see that his co-worker is held accountable for his actions.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
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