A few weeks ago, a reader in Columbus, Ohio, writes, he was passing through the parking lot of a city park and found an envelope containing a few hundred dollars.
"There were names on the envelope," he writes, "and it wasn't hard to trace it to a couple who got married that weekend in the park."
My reader left his contact information with the park office, but didn't turn in the cash. He figured that it would be too easy for some third party to tell him that they had found the owner and returned the money ... even if they hadn't and didn't.
Ten days passed, which didn't surprise my reader, since he figured the people who had lost the money were now on their honeymoon. When the owner finally called, however, it was when my reader was on vacation. He returned the call when he got back to Columbus, five days later. By now 15 days had passed since he found the envelope.
He got a recorded answer when he called, so he left a message. He expected a quick return call, but got nothing.
"I left another message on Day 18," he writes, "and called again on Day 19, and we finally spoke."
The owner of the money said that she would call my reader that Sunday - Day 21 - to arrange a time to come to his house to pick up the envelope.
"That was yesterday," my reader writes, "and I didn't get a call."
He is "ethically comfortable" not calling the rightful owner again, he adds.
"I think three unrequited calls is enough," he explains, "and she knows how to reach me."
His question, however, looks forward rather than backward: "How long is long enough before I decide the cash is mine? If I wait another month - to Day 60 - and spend it, what do I say if she calls me on Day 61 to arrange pickup?"
He's a regular reader of my column each week, he writes, but can't remember my ever covering a situation like his.
"My wife and I have actually used the phrase, `Well, the ethics guy from the paper would say ... ' when we've talked about this."
While I have written about the importance of returning found items to their rightful owners, my reader is correct that I've never addressed how to calculate the appropriate length of time to wait before giving up on a rightful owner collecting his or her belongings.
The answer, I'm afraid, is that there is no appropriate period. What's hers is hers, and will stay hers unless she herself tells him to keep the money.
My reader did the right thing by notifying the park office about his find. If no owner had come forward after several months, he might make a good case for considering the money rightfully his to keep.
Because he has identified the owner and made initial contact with her, however, the right thing for him to do is to set aside the money until she finally makes her way to his house to pick it up. It was rude of her not to call on the appointed day, but her rudeness does not make her money any less hers.
It's obviously a nuisance to have to wait her out, but my reader already realizes that it's the right thing to do: That's why he would be at a loss to explain himself if he spent the money on Day 60 and she showed up the next day to reclaim her cash.
He's doing good by trying to get the money to its rightful owner, and he shouldn't let her lackadaisical response keep him from staying the course.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
Sunday, July 25, 2010
SOUND OFF: FACING OFF ON FACEBOOK
The Charlotte Observer recently featured an article about a waitress who had lost her job for having used Facebook to post disparaging comments about a customer who left her a lousy tip. Of the readers who responded to an unscientific poll on my column's blog, 67 percent believe it fair for a company to fire an employee for online comments that might reflect ill on the company, while 32 percent believe that, because it's a personal page, it's none of the company's business.
"Although I am not an employment-law specialist, I would point out that there are some state laws that restrict the right of the employer to discharge an employee for comments made outside the employment setting," writes Bob Coffield, a health-care lawyer in West Virginia. "Social media has further blurred the work/personal lives of persons, and we will continue to see the development of requirements/laws that try to define the boundaries of proper behavior."
"Let this be a wake-up lesson," writes Bill Jacobson of Cypress, Calif. "You are employed at-will ... As soon as you start working against the company's interests, then you tip the balance toward them being better off without you."
"I agree that what she did was ill advised," another reader writes. "But, if she was a good employee who used bad judgment one time, the appropriate response by a wise employer would be to have her post an appropriate apology."
Check out other opinions here, or post your own by clicking on "Comments" or "Post a comment" below.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 630 Eighth Ave., 5th floor, New York, N.Y. 10018.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
"Although I am not an employment-law specialist, I would point out that there are some state laws that restrict the right of the employer to discharge an employee for comments made outside the employment setting," writes Bob Coffield, a health-care lawyer in West Virginia. "Social media has further blurred the work/personal lives of persons, and we will continue to see the development of requirements/laws that try to define the boundaries of proper behavior."
"Let this be a wake-up lesson," writes Bill Jacobson of Cypress, Calif. "You are employed at-will ... As soon as you start working against the company's interests, then you tip the balance toward them being better off without you."
"I agree that what she did was ill advised," another reader writes. "But, if she was a good employee who used bad judgment one time, the appropriate response by a wise employer would be to have her post an appropriate apology."
Check out other opinions here, or post your own by clicking on "Comments" or "Post a comment" below.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 630 Eighth Ave., 5th floor, New York, N.Y. 10018.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
Sunday, July 18, 2010
SOUND OFF: WE'RE ALL ABOVE AVERAGE NOW
In June, in a front-page story in The New York Times, Catherine Rampell reported that in the past two years at least 10 American law schools have changed their grading policies in their students' favor. Loyola Law School Los Angeles has decided to retroactively raise each of its graduates' grade-point average by .333, she wrote, "to make its students look more attractive in a competitive job market."
Assuming that lawyers from other schools were indeed graded less rigorously than Loyola's graduates, is it OK to raise the GPAs retroactively? Or should the original GPAs stand, regardless of what other law schools did?
Post your thoughts here by clicking on "comments" or "post a comment" below. Please include your name, hometown, and state, province, or country. Readers' comments may appear in an upcoming column. Or e-mail your comments to me at rightthing@nytimes.com.
You can also respond to the poll with this question that will appear on the right-hand side of the blog until polling is closed.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics. He is also the administrator of The Right Thing (http://www.jeffreyseglin.com/, a Web log focused on ethical issues.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 620 Eighth Ave., 5th floor, New York, N.Y. 10018.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
Assuming that lawyers from other schools were indeed graded less rigorously than Loyola's graduates, is it OK to raise the GPAs retroactively? Or should the original GPAs stand, regardless of what other law schools did?
Post your thoughts here by clicking on "comments" or "post a comment" below. Please include your name, hometown, and state, province, or country. Readers' comments may appear in an upcoming column. Or e-mail your comments to me at rightthing@nytimes.com.
You can also respond to the poll with this question that will appear on the right-hand side of the blog until polling is closed.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics. He is also the administrator of The Right Thing (http://www.jeffreyseglin.com/, a Web log focused on ethical issues.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 620 Eighth Ave., 5th floor, New York, N.Y. 10018.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
THE RIGHT THING: SHOULD YOU LOOK A BANK ERROR IN THE MOUTH?
When his most recent bank statement arrived from J.P. Morgan Chase, T.M., a reader in Ohio, was surprised to find that it did not include a charge of $64.04 for a debit-card purchase he had made, about six weeks earlier, from a large sporting-goods store in the area.
T.M. doesn't recall anything unusual about the transaction, and he had previously used his debit card at the store without having a problem. Years ago, however, he had a similar thing happen to him at a restaurant in the same shopping area as the sporting-goods store.
"It was a large, locally based Italian restaurant with several locations in the Midwest," he writes. "We used to eat there a lot. I don't recall following up with that merchant, but I also don't recall paying for the lunch."
Regardless of his past experience, T.M. wonders what the right thing to do is, given his current situation with the sporting-goods store.
It occurs to T.M. that the absence of the charge might be due to some sort of debit-card promotion - "Use your debit card and your bill is on us!" He acknowledges, however, that Chase would probably have told him if that were the case.
"Other than waiting to see if the charge goes through at some point in the future," T.M. writes, "I'm wondering what I should do - anything?"
While it's always a good feeling to draw a "Bank Error in Your Favor" card, T.M.'s small windfall should not make him feel tingly with delight. The mistake that resulted in the debit-card transaction not registering may well have been the sporting-goods store's, but T.M. knows he made the purchase. He still has whatever it was he bought there and, as of right now, he hasn't paid for it. No matter how you slice it, that's not a situation likely to pass ethical muster.
Some stores have posted policies about mistakes in transactions resulting in favorable outcomes for the customer - for instance, a purchase being free at some restaurants if a cashier doesn't provide you with a receipt, or a supermarket offering customers free items if the scanner rings up the wrong price.
Even so, unless T.M.'s sporting-goods store has a posted policy that it won't charge customers if the debit doesn't show up on their bill within a certain period of time, the right thing is for T.M. to meet his ethical obligation to pay what he knows he owes.
In buying the goods, he undertook to give the store the agreed-upon price. It's good that he attempted to do so, and he can't be faulted for the fact that the electronic transfer somehow went awry, but the end result is that he has not lived up to his agreement. He needs to do so.
If the sporting-goods store had erroneously charged T.M. twice for his purchase, you can bet that he wouldn't hesitate to call the store and/or Chase to see that the mistake was rectified.
T.M. should exercise the same diligence to set things right, even when he does not stand to benefit financially from doing so, and regardless of whether the store will reward him for his honesty.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
T.M. doesn't recall anything unusual about the transaction, and he had previously used his debit card at the store without having a problem. Years ago, however, he had a similar thing happen to him at a restaurant in the same shopping area as the sporting-goods store.
"It was a large, locally based Italian restaurant with several locations in the Midwest," he writes. "We used to eat there a lot. I don't recall following up with that merchant, but I also don't recall paying for the lunch."
Regardless of his past experience, T.M. wonders what the right thing to do is, given his current situation with the sporting-goods store.
It occurs to T.M. that the absence of the charge might be due to some sort of debit-card promotion - "Use your debit card and your bill is on us!" He acknowledges, however, that Chase would probably have told him if that were the case.
"Other than waiting to see if the charge goes through at some point in the future," T.M. writes, "I'm wondering what I should do - anything?"
While it's always a good feeling to draw a "Bank Error in Your Favor" card, T.M.'s small windfall should not make him feel tingly with delight. The mistake that resulted in the debit-card transaction not registering may well have been the sporting-goods store's, but T.M. knows he made the purchase. He still has whatever it was he bought there and, as of right now, he hasn't paid for it. No matter how you slice it, that's not a situation likely to pass ethical muster.
Some stores have posted policies about mistakes in transactions resulting in favorable outcomes for the customer - for instance, a purchase being free at some restaurants if a cashier doesn't provide you with a receipt, or a supermarket offering customers free items if the scanner rings up the wrong price.
Even so, unless T.M.'s sporting-goods store has a posted policy that it won't charge customers if the debit doesn't show up on their bill within a certain period of time, the right thing is for T.M. to meet his ethical obligation to pay what he knows he owes.
In buying the goods, he undertook to give the store the agreed-upon price. It's good that he attempted to do so, and he can't be faulted for the fact that the electronic transfer somehow went awry, but the end result is that he has not lived up to his agreement. He needs to do so.
If the sporting-goods store had erroneously charged T.M. twice for his purchase, you can bet that he wouldn't hesitate to call the store and/or Chase to see that the mistake was rectified.
T.M. should exercise the same diligence to set things right, even when he does not stand to benefit financially from doing so, and regardless of whether the store will reward him for his honesty.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
Sunday, July 11, 2010
THE RIGHT THING: WHO NEEDS A (CHEAP) TICKET?
Months before her planned visit to Manhattan to see her son, Eric, a reader from Ohio named Patricia had purchased tickets for them to see August Wilson's play, "Fences," and the musical "La Cage aux Folles."
The play was a limited run starring Oscar winner Denzel Washington, making it a hot ticket, and the tickets became even hotter after Washington won a Tony Award for his performance. Patricia never saw either show, however, because an emergency occurred shortly before her scheduled departure and she was forced to cancel the trip.
The tickets did not go to waste, though, because her son was able to resell them on the Internet ... and therein rests a tale.
Patricia writes that, because her ticket for "Fences" was hot, it was worth far more than its face value on the open market. Believing it ethically wrong to ask for more than his mother had paid for it, however, her son sold it for only the face value.
His mother disagrees with his take on the situation.
"If a property becomes worth more than what the owner paid for it," she asks, "is it ethically wrong to sell that property for the new market value?"
Anti-scalping laws exist for a variety of reasons, whether to protect the public from unscrupulous resellers or to help avoid the sale of fraudulent tickets to performances or sporting events. The laws regarding resale of such tickets vary from state to state. Some prohibit it, some require resellers to be licensed. Some put limits on how much of a markup, if any, is permissible. Auction Web sites, such as eBay, often post state regulations on such matters, and they can be dauntingly complex.
The law is not the issue here, however. It would be "obviously wrong" to ask her son to do anything illegal, Patricia writes, but she believes that it would not be illegal to mark up the price of her "Fences" ticket, noting that her ticket for "La Cage aux Folles" sold for much less than face value.
"Assuming that selling the ticket for the greater value was legal," she writes, "isn't it just good business sense to do so? I don't see this as an ethics question, but obviously my son does."
I appreciate Eric's urge to be ethical, but - so far as no laws are being violated - I don't believe there would have been anything wrong in his letting the market dictate the price of his mother's tickets. As she says, the value of items can change, and the price a seller paid for an item seldom has anything to do with how much a buyer pays for it. If my grandson bought a packet of Yugioh cards, came across a valuable one and decided to sell it for more than the cost of the whole packet, there would be nothing wrong with that, if he could find another collector who wanted the card and was willing to pay for it.
That said, the fact that Eric considers it unethical isn't irrelevant. Ethics vary from person to person, and what's fine for one person may be wrong for another.
If this comes up again in the future, the right thing for my reader and her son to do will be to determine the applicable laws and then come to some agreement about how to price her tickets. If Eric isn't comfortable selling them for more than face value, he shouldn't have to, and my reader shouldn't force the issue. She should sell the tickets herself or find someone else to help her, someone who is not uncomfortable with her pricing requirements.
There's nothing wrong with letting the market dictate the price of the tickets, but it's not mandatory, and Eric has every right to say no if he doesn't want to get involved.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
The play was a limited run starring Oscar winner Denzel Washington, making it a hot ticket, and the tickets became even hotter after Washington won a Tony Award for his performance. Patricia never saw either show, however, because an emergency occurred shortly before her scheduled departure and she was forced to cancel the trip.
The tickets did not go to waste, though, because her son was able to resell them on the Internet ... and therein rests a tale.
Patricia writes that, because her ticket for "Fences" was hot, it was worth far more than its face value on the open market. Believing it ethically wrong to ask for more than his mother had paid for it, however, her son sold it for only the face value.
His mother disagrees with his take on the situation.
"If a property becomes worth more than what the owner paid for it," she asks, "is it ethically wrong to sell that property for the new market value?"
Anti-scalping laws exist for a variety of reasons, whether to protect the public from unscrupulous resellers or to help avoid the sale of fraudulent tickets to performances or sporting events. The laws regarding resale of such tickets vary from state to state. Some prohibit it, some require resellers to be licensed. Some put limits on how much of a markup, if any, is permissible. Auction Web sites, such as eBay, often post state regulations on such matters, and they can be dauntingly complex.
The law is not the issue here, however. It would be "obviously wrong" to ask her son to do anything illegal, Patricia writes, but she believes that it would not be illegal to mark up the price of her "Fences" ticket, noting that her ticket for "La Cage aux Folles" sold for much less than face value.
"Assuming that selling the ticket for the greater value was legal," she writes, "isn't it just good business sense to do so? I don't see this as an ethics question, but obviously my son does."
I appreciate Eric's urge to be ethical, but - so far as no laws are being violated - I don't believe there would have been anything wrong in his letting the market dictate the price of his mother's tickets. As she says, the value of items can change, and the price a seller paid for an item seldom has anything to do with how much a buyer pays for it. If my grandson bought a packet of Yugioh cards, came across a valuable one and decided to sell it for more than the cost of the whole packet, there would be nothing wrong with that, if he could find another collector who wanted the card and was willing to pay for it.
That said, the fact that Eric considers it unethical isn't irrelevant. Ethics vary from person to person, and what's fine for one person may be wrong for another.
If this comes up again in the future, the right thing for my reader and her son to do will be to determine the applicable laws and then come to some agreement about how to price her tickets. If Eric isn't comfortable selling them for more than face value, he shouldn't have to, and my reader shouldn't force the issue. She should sell the tickets herself or find someone else to help her, someone who is not uncomfortable with her pricing requirements.
There's nothing wrong with letting the market dictate the price of the tickets, but it's not mandatory, and Eric has every right to say no if he doesn't want to get involved.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
SOUND OFF: BREAD LINES
Of the readers who responded to an unscientific poll on my column's blog, 46 percent said that they would pay the full-menu price for items offered at the St. Louis Bread Co. in Clayton, Mo., which allows customers to donate whatever they can and believe is appropriate for the food they purchase. Another 46 percent said that they would pay more than the menu price to support the nonprofit foundation that runs the store. Only 2 percent said that they would pay as little as possible in an effort to get a good deal.
"There doesn't seem to be an option for `I'd pay what I thought the product was worth, which might be more or less than the menu price, depending on how good the bread is and how reasonable the menu prices are,'" writes Shmuel Ross of Brooklyn, N.Y.
Another reader seems to concur: "I'd pay what I felt the item was worth, but no more than the menu price."
Finally, a reader sees the whole experiment as doomed.
"This is why the communist states failed," that reader writes. "Having this method of payment makes one reluctant to pay at all. The true believers felt that they were getting the short end of the stick by paying for those who didn't pay."
Check out other opinions here, or post your own by clicking on "Comments" or "Post a comment" below.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 630 Eighth Ave., 5th floor, New York, N.Y. 10018.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
"There doesn't seem to be an option for `I'd pay what I thought the product was worth, which might be more or less than the menu price, depending on how good the bread is and how reasonable the menu prices are,'" writes Shmuel Ross of Brooklyn, N.Y.
Another reader seems to concur: "I'd pay what I felt the item was worth, but no more than the menu price."
Finally, a reader sees the whole experiment as doomed.
"This is why the communist states failed," that reader writes. "Having this method of payment makes one reluctant to pay at all. The true believers felt that they were getting the short end of the stick by paying for those who didn't pay."
Check out other opinions here, or post your own by clicking on "Comments" or "Post a comment" below.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 630 Eighth Ave., 5th floor, New York, N.Y. 10018.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
Sunday, July 04, 2010
SOUND OFF: DUMBING DOWN THE RESUME
As many public figures have learned in recent years, there is no ethical justification for embellishing your resume to claim degrees or experience you don't have. In a tight job market, however, what do you think about leaving out experience or degrees you may have in an attempt not to scare off potential employers who might find you overqualified? In a recent article in The Boston Globe, reporter Katie Johnston Chase looked at the trend of jobseekers omitting such experience from their resumes in an effort to "dumb down" their credentials and get a foot in the door.
Is it OK to omit relevant experience from your resume if you believe that the omission might help you secure a job? Or is it wrong to leave off advanced degrees and jobs that you actually have?
Post your thoughts here by clicking on "comments" or "post a comment" below. Please include your name, hometown, and state, province, or country. Readers' comments may appear in an upcoming column. Or e-mail your comments to me at rightthing@nytimes.com.
You can also respond to the poll with this question that will appear on the right-hand side of the blog until polling is closed.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics. He is also the administrator of The Right Thing, a Web log focused on ethical issues.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 620 Eighth Ave., 5th floor, New York, N.Y. 10018.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
Is it OK to omit relevant experience from your resume if you believe that the omission might help you secure a job? Or is it wrong to leave off advanced degrees and jobs that you actually have?
Post your thoughts here by clicking on "comments" or "post a comment" below. Please include your name, hometown, and state, province, or country. Readers' comments may appear in an upcoming column. Or e-mail your comments to me at rightthing@nytimes.com.
You can also respond to the poll with this question that will appear on the right-hand side of the blog until polling is closed.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics. He is also the administrator of The Right Thing, a Web log focused on ethical issues.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 620 Eighth Ave., 5th floor, New York, N.Y. 10018.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
THE RIGHT THING: UP IN THE AIR
A shared trip can cement a friendship ... or ruin it forever. Sometimes you don't even have to go.
A reader was planning a trip with a friend, and had already made the hotel reservations. The problem was airfare: Since the trip was for a holiday weekend, my reader was having trouble finding reasonably priced tickets.
"I asked my friend to see if she could find a better deal," my reader writes.
That proved to be a good idea: Her friend soon called to say that she had been able to find tickets at a price that, while still high, was better than either of them had found previously.
"I told her that, although the price is high, to go ahead," my reader recalls.
A few days later, however, the two happened to meet, and my reader's friend asked if she had bought her airline ticket yet. Apparently she had misunderstood the situation and bought only her own ticket.
"I was amazed and upset," my reader writes, "knowing that, as time goes by, the price only goes up. Indeed, when I did get online and bought the ticket, the difference was about $180 more than what she had quoted me."
Sensing how upset my reader was, her friend has offered to pay the difference in the airfares. My reader feels awkward about the whole thing, however, especially in light of the fact that she is in a better financial position than her friend. What's more, she is not only a friend to this woman, but also her mentor.
"What do you think is the ethical course here?," she asks.
Clearly there was a miscommunication between my reader and her friend. The mistake was an honest one and, while it is gracious of her friend to offer to pay the difference in the ticket prices, she has no obligation to do so. Likewise, though she has chosen to do so, my reader has no obligation to accept the offer.
In short, the question here is not so much "What is the right thing to do?," but rather "What is the best thing to do?"
Frankly, there's likely to be awkwardness no matter which way my reader chooses to resolve the issue. Does she really want to risk an unpleasant trip if she lets her friend pay part of her fare? But, if my reader pays the full cost, is she going to be able to keep that from coloring her feelings toward her friend on the trip?
On balance I think it would be best for my reader to foot the full cost. From an ethical perspective, it's significant that she is in a better position to pay for the more expensive ticket than is her friend. In a situation involving an honest mistake, the resolution that does the least overall damage is usually the ethical choice. And it is, after all, my reader's ticket, so she bears at least some of the fault for not having made sure that her friend understood that she was expected to book both tickets.
Given that my reader is not adamant that her friend pay the difference between the tickets, the right thing for her to do is to chalk up the whole incident to a miscommunication and take responsibility for her own ticket. A good lesson for future excursions is to be explicit anytime she wants someone else to book tickets or attend to other essential business - or, of course, to do it herself rather than leave it to others.
Before she decides to foot the bill for the additional charges, however, my reader should make sure that she is capable of not holding a grudge against her friend. As her friend's mentor, she can use the whole experience as a lesson in the importance of clear communications.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
A reader was planning a trip with a friend, and had already made the hotel reservations. The problem was airfare: Since the trip was for a holiday weekend, my reader was having trouble finding reasonably priced tickets.
"I asked my friend to see if she could find a better deal," my reader writes.
That proved to be a good idea: Her friend soon called to say that she had been able to find tickets at a price that, while still high, was better than either of them had found previously.
"I told her that, although the price is high, to go ahead," my reader recalls.
A few days later, however, the two happened to meet, and my reader's friend asked if she had bought her airline ticket yet. Apparently she had misunderstood the situation and bought only her own ticket.
"I was amazed and upset," my reader writes, "knowing that, as time goes by, the price only goes up. Indeed, when I did get online and bought the ticket, the difference was about $180 more than what she had quoted me."
Sensing how upset my reader was, her friend has offered to pay the difference in the airfares. My reader feels awkward about the whole thing, however, especially in light of the fact that she is in a better financial position than her friend. What's more, she is not only a friend to this woman, but also her mentor.
"What do you think is the ethical course here?," she asks.
Clearly there was a miscommunication between my reader and her friend. The mistake was an honest one and, while it is gracious of her friend to offer to pay the difference in the ticket prices, she has no obligation to do so. Likewise, though she has chosen to do so, my reader has no obligation to accept the offer.
In short, the question here is not so much "What is the right thing to do?," but rather "What is the best thing to do?"
Frankly, there's likely to be awkwardness no matter which way my reader chooses to resolve the issue. Does she really want to risk an unpleasant trip if she lets her friend pay part of her fare? But, if my reader pays the full cost, is she going to be able to keep that from coloring her feelings toward her friend on the trip?
On balance I think it would be best for my reader to foot the full cost. From an ethical perspective, it's significant that she is in a better position to pay for the more expensive ticket than is her friend. In a situation involving an honest mistake, the resolution that does the least overall damage is usually the ethical choice. And it is, after all, my reader's ticket, so she bears at least some of the fault for not having made sure that her friend understood that she was expected to book both tickets.
Given that my reader is not adamant that her friend pay the difference between the tickets, the right thing for her to do is to chalk up the whole incident to a miscommunication and take responsibility for her own ticket. A good lesson for future excursions is to be explicit anytime she wants someone else to book tickets or attend to other essential business - or, of course, to do it herself rather than leave it to others.
Before she decides to foot the bill for the additional charges, however, my reader should make sure that she is capable of not holding a grudge against her friend. As her friend's mentor, she can use the whole experience as a lesson in the importance of clear communications.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
Sunday, June 27, 2010
THE RIGHT THING: HAVE FUN ... BUT NOT TOO MUCH FUN
The National Collegiate Athletic Association, based in Indianapolis, is the main organization that governs and sets rules for college sports in the United States and Canada. This has put it smack in the middle of a number of controversies lately - if the issue of whether there should be a college-football playoff system were a matter of ethics, I'd have to get a bigger mailbox - but I hadn't previously had occasion to consider an issue brought to my attention by R.C., a reader from Alabama.
"Is the NCAA's rule governing `excessive celebration' fair and ethical?," he asks.
My reader is referring to NCAA Football Rule 9-2, which specifies that a 15-yard penalty be assessed for any "delayed, excessive, prolonged or choreographed act by which a player (or players) attempts to focus attention on himself (or themselves)."
R.C. contends that certain human responses "are innate and therefore uncontrollable." How then, he asks, "can the NCAA expect the very primal instinct to celebrate the accomplishment of a goal, especially one that the individual has likely trained for years to be able to accomplish, to somehow be switched off?"
He further wants to know if it is ethical for the NCAA to profit from the interest in collegiate athletics and then to punish the players for "acting on impulses that are beyond their control?"
After all, R.C. adds, he sees these same impulses played out among the thousands of fans in attendance and untold numbers more watching in homes around the country when they simultaneously throw their hands into the air and scream.
Contending that the "excessive celebration" rule has affected the final outcome of several contests and led to widely publicized outcries from both fans and athletes, R.C. asks: "If the fans, coaches and players have a consensus view of this rule that differs from that of the sanctioning body, is it incumbent upon that body to change the rule?"
R.C.'s question takes on particular relevance given the NCAA's April decision to change its rules so that, starting in 2011, the penalty for taunting an opposing team on the way to scoring a touchdown will include the loss of that touchdown - obviously a potential game-changer. The current taunting rule requires only a 15-yard penalty assessed on the extra-point attempt or subsequent kickoff.
I'm guessing that R.C.'s team may have come out on the wrong side of an "excessive celebration" penalty recently, and I understand his frustration. However, I don't think there's anything unethical about the rule itself.
Fans rarely if ever get to set the rules for organized sports. The NCAA is under no ethical obligation to change its rules simply because the public believes it should. The views of fans - along with those of coaches and players - can and should be taken into account, but ultimately the NCAA's only obligation is to establish the rules that it believes are in the best interest of the game.
Granted, it may be instinctual for a player who scores to want to celebrate his feat or even to rub his opponents' noses in their failure. That doesn't mean that they should be allowed to do so. It also may be instinctual for players to want to poke the other guy in the eye, but the rules don't allow it and that's that.
The ways that players line up, block and tackle are regulated, so why not the ways they celebrate? Particularly since the NCAA rule seems targeted not at spur-of-the-moment exultation but rather at choreographed showmanship that goes beyond the spurs of instinct.
The whole point of rules is to control players' impulses and channel them into sportsmanlike competition. R.C. gives the players too little credit for their ability to do so. Football players control their emotions constantly to avoid penalties, and this is only one more instance of this perennial process.
Coaches make sure that their players understand what's OK and what's not OK when it comes to tackling an opponent. It's up to them to make sure that the players also understand what is and isn't permissible in celebrating a touchdown.
Players who are serious about winning will have no problem mustering the restraint needed to avoid a game-changing penalty.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
"Is the NCAA's rule governing `excessive celebration' fair and ethical?," he asks.
My reader is referring to NCAA Football Rule 9-2, which specifies that a 15-yard penalty be assessed for any "delayed, excessive, prolonged or choreographed act by which a player (or players) attempts to focus attention on himself (or themselves)."
R.C. contends that certain human responses "are innate and therefore uncontrollable." How then, he asks, "can the NCAA expect the very primal instinct to celebrate the accomplishment of a goal, especially one that the individual has likely trained for years to be able to accomplish, to somehow be switched off?"
He further wants to know if it is ethical for the NCAA to profit from the interest in collegiate athletics and then to punish the players for "acting on impulses that are beyond their control?"
After all, R.C. adds, he sees these same impulses played out among the thousands of fans in attendance and untold numbers more watching in homes around the country when they simultaneously throw their hands into the air and scream.
Contending that the "excessive celebration" rule has affected the final outcome of several contests and led to widely publicized outcries from both fans and athletes, R.C. asks: "If the fans, coaches and players have a consensus view of this rule that differs from that of the sanctioning body, is it incumbent upon that body to change the rule?"
R.C.'s question takes on particular relevance given the NCAA's April decision to change its rules so that, starting in 2011, the penalty for taunting an opposing team on the way to scoring a touchdown will include the loss of that touchdown - obviously a potential game-changer. The current taunting rule requires only a 15-yard penalty assessed on the extra-point attempt or subsequent kickoff.
I'm guessing that R.C.'s team may have come out on the wrong side of an "excessive celebration" penalty recently, and I understand his frustration. However, I don't think there's anything unethical about the rule itself.
Fans rarely if ever get to set the rules for organized sports. The NCAA is under no ethical obligation to change its rules simply because the public believes it should. The views of fans - along with those of coaches and players - can and should be taken into account, but ultimately the NCAA's only obligation is to establish the rules that it believes are in the best interest of the game.
Granted, it may be instinctual for a player who scores to want to celebrate his feat or even to rub his opponents' noses in their failure. That doesn't mean that they should be allowed to do so. It also may be instinctual for players to want to poke the other guy in the eye, but the rules don't allow it and that's that.
The ways that players line up, block and tackle are regulated, so why not the ways they celebrate? Particularly since the NCAA rule seems targeted not at spur-of-the-moment exultation but rather at choreographed showmanship that goes beyond the spurs of instinct.
The whole point of rules is to control players' impulses and channel them into sportsmanlike competition. R.C. gives the players too little credit for their ability to do so. Football players control their emotions constantly to avoid penalties, and this is only one more instance of this perennial process.
Coaches make sure that their players understand what's OK and what's not OK when it comes to tackling an opponent. It's up to them to make sure that the players also understand what is and isn't permissible in celebrating a touchdown.
Players who are serious about winning will have no problem mustering the restraint needed to avoid a game-changing penalty.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
SOUND OFF: TAKE THEMSELVES OUT OF THE BALL GAME?
Of the readers who responded to an unscientific poll on my column's blog, 49 percent believe that it would be right for the Major League Baseball Players Association to boycott the 2011 All-Star Game, which is scheduled to be played in Phoenix, in protest against the bill passed in April by the Arizona State Legislature to crack down on illegal immigrants, while 51 percent believe that it is wrong to mix baseball with politics.
Maggie Lawrence of Culpepper, Va., believes that, given that "the Arizona legislation is simply trying to do what the federal legislation says it will do - but doesn't," such a boycott "is just another simple-minded grandstand."
"The union has no business getting into this," writes Phil Clutts of Harrisburg, N.C. "It is wrong indeed for baseball players to propose a boycott of a game because it would take place in a state that is trying to do what the federal government is unwilling or unable to do properly."
On the other hand, one reader writes, "This country has a Constitution, and two of the freedoms it guarantees are speech and association. The baseball folks can speak or associate as they please."
Check out other opinions here, or post your own by clicking on "Comments" or "Post a comment" below.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 630 Eighth Ave., 5th floor, New York, N.Y. 10018.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
Maggie Lawrence of Culpepper, Va., believes that, given that "the Arizona legislation is simply trying to do what the federal legislation says it will do - but doesn't," such a boycott "is just another simple-minded grandstand."
"The union has no business getting into this," writes Phil Clutts of Harrisburg, N.C. "It is wrong indeed for baseball players to propose a boycott of a game because it would take place in a state that is trying to do what the federal government is unwilling or unable to do properly."
On the other hand, one reader writes, "This country has a Constitution, and two of the freedoms it guarantees are speech and association. The baseball folks can speak or associate as they please."
Check out other opinions here, or post your own by clicking on "Comments" or "Post a comment" below.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 630 Eighth Ave., 5th floor, New York, N.Y. 10018.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
Sunday, June 20, 2010
SOUND OFF: FACEBOOK FIRING
Charlie Seng, a reader from Lancaster, S.C., sent me a front-page article from The Charlotte Observer about a waitress who lost her job for having posted disparaging comments on Facebook about a customer who left her a lousy tip. Seng wonders what the readers of the column think of a dismissal based on postings on an employee's personal Facebook page.
Good question. What do you think? Is it fair for a company to fire an employee for online comments that might reflect ill on the company? Or does the fact that it's a personal page make it none of the company's business?
Post your thoughts here by clicking on "comments" or "post a comment" below. Please include your name, hometown, and state, province, or country. Readers' comments may appear in an upcoming column. Or e-mail your comments to me at rightthing@nytimes.com.
You can also respond to the poll with this question that will appear on the right-hand side of the blog until polling is closed.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics. He is also the administrator of The Right Thing, a Web log focused on ethical issues.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 620 Eighth Ave., 5th floor, New York, N.Y. 10018.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
Good question. What do you think? Is it fair for a company to fire an employee for online comments that might reflect ill on the company? Or does the fact that it's a personal page make it none of the company's business?
Post your thoughts here by clicking on "comments" or "post a comment" below. Please include your name, hometown, and state, province, or country. Readers' comments may appear in an upcoming column. Or e-mail your comments to me at rightthing@nytimes.com.
You can also respond to the poll with this question that will appear on the right-hand side of the blog until polling is closed.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics. He is also the administrator of The Right Thing, a Web log focused on ethical issues.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 620 Eighth Ave., 5th floor, New York, N.Y. 10018.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
THE RIGHT THING: THE EARLY BIRD LOSES THE DEPOSIT
In late May a reader from Columbus, Ohio, purchased a house. Because the current tenants had a lease running through the end of August, my reader planned to move in on Sept. 1, figuring that this would give the current renters plenty of time to find a new place to live.
At the closing for the house sale, the previous owner gave my reader a copy of the renters' current lease, plus a prorated share of the rent they had paid for May and their original security deposit of $1,295, one month's rent.
The house had been put on the market in mid-April, and at that time the tenants gave 30 days' notice that they intended to move out by the end of May, which they have done.
The sticking point: The lease stipulates that the renters will forfeit their deposit if they move before their lease expires, but the renters have made clear to my reader that they expect their security deposit returned in full.
The former owner told my reader that, if he still owned the house, he would not return their deposit because they had violated the terms of the lease by bringing in a cat and also by moving before the lease expired. My reader's lawyer agrees.
When the renters told the previous owner that they were planning to move, there was no discussion about the return of the security deposit. Since then, however, it has become a major bone of contention between them and the new owner.
"They are driving me crazy with phone calls and text messages," my reader writes.
He figures that the former renters are responsible for repairs to the house that will cost about $400, which should rightly be deducted from the deposit in any case. The question is, what about the rest of the money?
"Do I have to return the security deposit to them, now that they have vacated?," he asks. "I used to own several properties. Now I remember why I got rid of them.
"What is the right thing to do?"
I have often said, in this column and elsewhere, that what's legal and what's ethical aren't always the same thing. In this case, for example, the legalities are clear: As long as the renters weren't misled and the lease clearly states the terms of the agreement, then my reader has no legal obligation to return the money. It's an open-and-shut case.
For him, though, the ethics are obviously foggier. What's the story?
In my opinion this is a case in which the law and the ethics go hand-in-hand. The renters entered into an agreement without coercion, and their landlord lived up to his side of the deal. They should therefore do the same and, since they moved before the lease expired, write off the security deposit. That a new landlord held the lease when they made their early departure has no bearing whatsoever on their obligation to honor their agreement.
My reader is unhappy that the renters feel that they are being dealt with unfairly, and he admits that he feels inclined to give them something back - but is also bothered by "their attitude of entitlement."
However, my reader is not ethically bound to see that everybody feels that they have been dealt with fairly, only to actually deal with everybody fairly. If he chooses to return some portion of the renters' deposit, it will be strictly out of the goodness of his heart, not out of any ethical obligation to do so. Whether or not it's reflected in their attitude, the renters are not entitled to any of the money back.
The renters didn't ask me for advice. If they had, I'd tell them to reread their lease and acknowledge that, by moving before it expired, they forfeited their security deposit. If they hoped to have this section of the lease waived, they should have taken that up with the previous owner.
As for my reader, he's already doing the right thing, even if he's feeling bad about it. If his compassion moves him to return some of the deposit, I hope he'll at least make sure that he keeps enough to cover the cost of the necessary repairs.
"I have always been on the losing end of these situations," my reader tells me, but in this case he doesn't have to be.
His sympathy for his former renters does him credit, but there's nothing wrong with expecting them to honor the lease they signed.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
At the closing for the house sale, the previous owner gave my reader a copy of the renters' current lease, plus a prorated share of the rent they had paid for May and their original security deposit of $1,295, one month's rent.
The house had been put on the market in mid-April, and at that time the tenants gave 30 days' notice that they intended to move out by the end of May, which they have done.
The sticking point: The lease stipulates that the renters will forfeit their deposit if they move before their lease expires, but the renters have made clear to my reader that they expect their security deposit returned in full.
The former owner told my reader that, if he still owned the house, he would not return their deposit because they had violated the terms of the lease by bringing in a cat and also by moving before the lease expired. My reader's lawyer agrees.
When the renters told the previous owner that they were planning to move, there was no discussion about the return of the security deposit. Since then, however, it has become a major bone of contention between them and the new owner.
"They are driving me crazy with phone calls and text messages," my reader writes.
He figures that the former renters are responsible for repairs to the house that will cost about $400, which should rightly be deducted from the deposit in any case. The question is, what about the rest of the money?
"Do I have to return the security deposit to them, now that they have vacated?," he asks. "I used to own several properties. Now I remember why I got rid of them.
"What is the right thing to do?"
I have often said, in this column and elsewhere, that what's legal and what's ethical aren't always the same thing. In this case, for example, the legalities are clear: As long as the renters weren't misled and the lease clearly states the terms of the agreement, then my reader has no legal obligation to return the money. It's an open-and-shut case.
For him, though, the ethics are obviously foggier. What's the story?
In my opinion this is a case in which the law and the ethics go hand-in-hand. The renters entered into an agreement without coercion, and their landlord lived up to his side of the deal. They should therefore do the same and, since they moved before the lease expired, write off the security deposit. That a new landlord held the lease when they made their early departure has no bearing whatsoever on their obligation to honor their agreement.
My reader is unhappy that the renters feel that they are being dealt with unfairly, and he admits that he feels inclined to give them something back - but is also bothered by "their attitude of entitlement."
However, my reader is not ethically bound to see that everybody feels that they have been dealt with fairly, only to actually deal with everybody fairly. If he chooses to return some portion of the renters' deposit, it will be strictly out of the goodness of his heart, not out of any ethical obligation to do so. Whether or not it's reflected in their attitude, the renters are not entitled to any of the money back.
The renters didn't ask me for advice. If they had, I'd tell them to reread their lease and acknowledge that, by moving before it expired, they forfeited their security deposit. If they hoped to have this section of the lease waived, they should have taken that up with the previous owner.
As for my reader, he's already doing the right thing, even if he's feeling bad about it. If his compassion moves him to return some of the deposit, I hope he'll at least make sure that he keeps enough to cover the cost of the necessary repairs.
"I have always been on the losing end of these situations," my reader tells me, but in this case he doesn't have to be.
His sympathy for his former renters does him credit, but there's nothing wrong with expecting them to honor the lease they signed.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
Sunday, June 13, 2010
THE RIGHT THING: A LESSON FROM A TEACHER
A reader of the column tells me that she has "a doozy of an ethical question" for me, one which belongs to that touchy ethical category "something for nothing."
Awhile back she signed up for a teacher-rewards card at her local office-supply company. Every few months she receives a reward check, the amount of which is based on how much she has purchased at the store.
During the past year her rewards have grown significantly - but the growth in the amount she's getting is "not from my personal purchases, because I know I am not spending the kind of money to generate the rewards I often get."
She has cashed some of the smaller rewards checks, she writes, since she figures that they are based on her actual purchases. The larger checks have really thrown her, however, and she isn't sure what to do.
"My purse was stolen last year," she writes, "but I cannot think someone who stole my purse is using my card. If this someone is using my card for educator discounts, especially someone who stole my purse, then I feel I have the right to reap the rewards and have the last laugh."
My reader wonders if her school or school district are somehow tied to her personal account, with her getting credit for the institution's purchases.
"If this is the case," she acknowledges, "the district does not have access to its rewards and it's an obvious error."
Since most of her purchases are for her classroom and students, however, she wonders if it is so bad that a teacher might be benefiting from the district's purchases.
She asked the school's budget secretary, who orders school supplies, about the situation.
"She just laughed," my reader reports, "and said, `Good for you if that is happening. At least someone is getting something for all we spend.'"
My reader assumes that, if she asks the store to investigate, it will probably not care and wonder why she cares.
"Or they will cancel my card, issue a new one and no one will get the checks," she adds. "Am I entitled to spend the reward check on an account issued to me, when someone who spends a lot at the store is tied to my account in error? Or is it unethical?"
There are situations in which it's ethical to accept something for nothing, but they're few and far between, and sadly this isn't one of them.
Unless the store is accidentally crediting my reader for purchases that aren't being made, in which case she's being given the store's money by accident, it seems fair to assume that somebody - let's say Buyer X - is making purchases and my reader is getting the credit instead of Buyer X. In either case, someone is being deprived of what's due, and my reader is reaping the benefits.
It doesn't really matter who the loser is, and the budget secretary's cavalier response doesn't get my reader off the hook if it should be the district. It's not the secretary's money, after all, and I doubt that the district has authorized her to write blank checks at will.
My reader wouldn't even consider withdrawing funds that her bank had credited to her account erroneously - at least, I hope she wouldn't - and this is the same thing. The funds are simply being credited to an account at a store, rather than at a bank. Whose they are is unclear, but they aren't hers and she isn't entitled to make use of them.
The right thing for my reader to do is to alert the store about what has been happening. The store's management should care that the appropriate person gets credited for the purchases, and so should my reader. So too should Buyer X, who is making considerable purchases and having the rewards channeled to the account of a complete stranger.
I agree that it seems unlikely that it's the purse thief who is making these purchases. If it is, though, my reader coming clean might help the store use the information to track down the criminal if he or she uses the card in the future.
General rule, though: We all know what's ours and what isn't. If it's not yours, it's rarely ethical to use it for your own advantage.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
Awhile back she signed up for a teacher-rewards card at her local office-supply company. Every few months she receives a reward check, the amount of which is based on how much she has purchased at the store.
During the past year her rewards have grown significantly - but the growth in the amount she's getting is "not from my personal purchases, because I know I am not spending the kind of money to generate the rewards I often get."
She has cashed some of the smaller rewards checks, she writes, since she figures that they are based on her actual purchases. The larger checks have really thrown her, however, and she isn't sure what to do.
"My purse was stolen last year," she writes, "but I cannot think someone who stole my purse is using my card. If this someone is using my card for educator discounts, especially someone who stole my purse, then I feel I have the right to reap the rewards and have the last laugh."
My reader wonders if her school or school district are somehow tied to her personal account, with her getting credit for the institution's purchases.
"If this is the case," she acknowledges, "the district does not have access to its rewards and it's an obvious error."
Since most of her purchases are for her classroom and students, however, she wonders if it is so bad that a teacher might be benefiting from the district's purchases.
She asked the school's budget secretary, who orders school supplies, about the situation.
"She just laughed," my reader reports, "and said, `Good for you if that is happening. At least someone is getting something for all we spend.'"
My reader assumes that, if she asks the store to investigate, it will probably not care and wonder why she cares.
"Or they will cancel my card, issue a new one and no one will get the checks," she adds. "Am I entitled to spend the reward check on an account issued to me, when someone who spends a lot at the store is tied to my account in error? Or is it unethical?"
There are situations in which it's ethical to accept something for nothing, but they're few and far between, and sadly this isn't one of them.
Unless the store is accidentally crediting my reader for purchases that aren't being made, in which case she's being given the store's money by accident, it seems fair to assume that somebody - let's say Buyer X - is making purchases and my reader is getting the credit instead of Buyer X. In either case, someone is being deprived of what's due, and my reader is reaping the benefits.
It doesn't really matter who the loser is, and the budget secretary's cavalier response doesn't get my reader off the hook if it should be the district. It's not the secretary's money, after all, and I doubt that the district has authorized her to write blank checks at will.
My reader wouldn't even consider withdrawing funds that her bank had credited to her account erroneously - at least, I hope she wouldn't - and this is the same thing. The funds are simply being credited to an account at a store, rather than at a bank. Whose they are is unclear, but they aren't hers and she isn't entitled to make use of them.
The right thing for my reader to do is to alert the store about what has been happening. The store's management should care that the appropriate person gets credited for the purchases, and so should my reader. So too should Buyer X, who is making considerable purchases and having the rewards channeled to the account of a complete stranger.
I agree that it seems unlikely that it's the purse thief who is making these purchases. If it is, though, my reader coming clean might help the store use the information to track down the criminal if he or she uses the card in the future.
General rule, though: We all know what's ours and what isn't. If it's not yours, it's rarely ethical to use it for your own advantage.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
SOUND OFF: TO FLAME OR NOT TO FLAME?
Is it OK to hide behind e-mail, rather than to talk directly to someone? Does doing so risk escalating a situation that might have been handled more civilly and effectively if done person to person?
Readers were mixed in their responses to an unscientific poll on my column's blog. Of the readers who responded, 43 percent believe it is perfectly ethical to use e-mail to express ideas - and particularly attitudes - that you would be reluctant to express in person, while 57 percent believe that e-mail should be limited to the expression of ideas and attitudes that you'd be comfortable conveying face to face.
As Maggie Lawrence of Culpepper, Va., sees it, the issue is not about ethics.
"It's about manners," she writes. "It's just easier for people to be unmannerly when they have a layer of technology or anonymity - or both - between themselves and the recipient."
Lawrence's observation is well taken, and I generally agree, although my experience with readers who e-mail me has been a notable exception: Even when they write passionately in response to a topic or pose a vexing question to me, by and large they do so civilly. So keep those e-mails coming.
Check out other opinions on the hiding-behind-e-mail question here, or post your own by clicking on "Comments" or "Post a comment" below.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 630 Eighth Ave., 5th floor, New York, N.Y. 10018.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
Readers were mixed in their responses to an unscientific poll on my column's blog. Of the readers who responded, 43 percent believe it is perfectly ethical to use e-mail to express ideas - and particularly attitudes - that you would be reluctant to express in person, while 57 percent believe that e-mail should be limited to the expression of ideas and attitudes that you'd be comfortable conveying face to face.
As Maggie Lawrence of Culpepper, Va., sees it, the issue is not about ethics.
"It's about manners," she writes. "It's just easier for people to be unmannerly when they have a layer of technology or anonymity - or both - between themselves and the recipient."
Lawrence's observation is well taken, and I generally agree, although my experience with readers who e-mail me has been a notable exception: Even when they write passionately in response to a topic or pose a vexing question to me, by and large they do so civilly. So keep those e-mails coming.
Check out other opinions on the hiding-behind-e-mail question here, or post your own by clicking on "Comments" or "Post a comment" below.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 630 Eighth Ave., 5th floor, New York, N.Y. 10018.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
Sunday, June 06, 2010
SOUND OFF: PAY WHAT YOU WANT
Panera Bread Co., a national chain of bakeries and restaurants, has launched a not-for-profit store called St. Louis Bread Co. Cares in Clayton, Mo., that uses a new pricing model: Customers can donate whatever they can and believe is appropriate for the food that they purchase. If this store can be sustained, Panera will open similar stores elsewhere, with the proceeds going to the nonprofit foundation that runs the store.
If you were to visit this store, or one of its branches if it expands, would you pay the full menu price for your purchases? pay a bit more, if you could afford to, in order to support the effort? or pay as little as possible in the interest of getting a good deal? Tell me which and why.
Post your thoughts here by clicking on "comments" or "post a comment" below. Please include your name, hometown, and state, province, or country. Readers' comments may appear in an upcoming column. Or e-mail your comments to me at rightthing@nytimes.com.
You can also respond to the poll with this question that will appear on the right-hand side of the blog until polling is closed.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics. He is also the administrator of The Right Thing, a Web log focused on ethical issues.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com
or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 620 Eighth Ave., 5th floor, New York, N.Y. 10018.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
If you were to visit this store, or one of its branches if it expands, would you pay the full menu price for your purchases? pay a bit more, if you could afford to, in order to support the effort? or pay as little as possible in the interest of getting a good deal? Tell me which and why.
Post your thoughts here by clicking on "comments" or "post a comment" below. Please include your name, hometown, and state, province, or country. Readers' comments may appear in an upcoming column. Or e-mail your comments to me at rightthing@nytimes.com.
You can also respond to the poll with this question that will appear on the right-hand side of the blog until polling is closed.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics. He is also the administrator of The Right Thing, a Web log focused on ethical issues.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com
or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 620 Eighth Ave., 5th floor, New York, N.Y. 10018.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
THE RIGHT THING: LYING TO DO GOOD
A reader from Reynoldsburg, Ohio, works on the line in a factory to which, once a quarter, the local chapter of the American Red Cross sends its bloodmobile to collect donations from the workers. During these blood drives, employees are allowed to leave their positions on the line, with their manager's approval, to donate blood.
"The process can take anywhere from 15 to 30 minutes," my reader tells me. "It's a nice break from work."
My reader is among the many who choose to give blood regularly. According to estimates by the World Health Organization, more than 92 million blood donations are made annually. Roughly 16 million units are collected in the United States each year. To recognize those who donate blood, World Blood Donor Day is held each year in a different country. This year it will fall on June 14 and be hosted by Spain in Barcelona.
The Red Cross asks all prospective donors to answer dozens of questions to determine their eligibility to give blood. Among those excluded are people who spent more than three months in the United Kingdom between 1980 and 1996, those who have been tattooed within the past 12 months at an unlicensed facility, woman who are pregnant, people who have ever used intravenous drugs that were not prescribed by a physician and "any male who has had sexual contact with another male, even once, since 1977."
That last provision has been called into question. Researchers have argued, in a recent article in The Canadian Medical Association Journal, that the ban against donations by men who have had sex with other men "no longer makes sense," given the improvements in HIV tests for donated blood. Nonetheless the ban still stands, which presents a challenge for my reader.
"A co-worker confided in me that he is a homosexual," he writes. "He went so far as to tell me that, although he is in a relationship, he continues to `sleep around.'"
Despite the Red Cross guidelines, this co-worker continues to donate blood each time the bloodmobile comes to the plant.
"He told me, when they ask him the qualifying question concerning his sexual activity, he lies so that he can continue the process," my reader reports.
My reader has made repeated attempts to get his co-worker to halt this practice, he says, but his colleague "sees nothing wrong with what he is doing and refuses to discontinue his donations."
My reader is confident that the Red Cross tests the donated blood, and thus that his co-worker's blood is not tainted. Even so, his co-worker is still deceiving the Red Cross and his manager, so he wonders, "Should I discreetly alert someone of this deceit?"
It's no wonder that my reader is torn. Under normal circumstances, "outing" someone as a homosexual is inexcusable. This fact is, quite simply, nobody's business but his or her own.
These are not normal circumstances, however.
There is some merit in the medical researchers' argument that the ban on donations by homosexual men has outlived its usefulness. In March a letter from 18 United States senators asked the Food and Drug Administration, which establishes blood-donation guidelines in the U.S., to reconsider the policy, and the FDA has announced that it will hold an advisory-committee meeting to revisit this ban in June.
For now, however, the ban stands. Neither my reader nor his co-worker is a doctor, and it is not their place to determine whether the rules need to be changed. It's their job to abide by them or, if they cannot or if they think the rules ill-advised, to not give blood.
My reader's co-worker is wrong to lie in order to give blood, and my reader is right to have made every effort to convince him to be honest with the blood collectors. Because those pleas have fallen on deaf ears, he must take the next step.
The right thing for my reader to do is to let his co-worker know that he plans to tell the Red Cross representatives that his co-worker does not qualify as a blood donor under the current rules. He doesn't need to explain exactly why, merely to tell them that his co-worker has misrepresented himself in filling out the form for past donations.
Hopefully the prospect of having his lie exposed will be enough to cause his co-worker to stop giving blood, until such time as the ban may be revoked. If he does not, however, my reader should carry out his plan and talk to the Red Cross.
It's a pity that this will almost certainly cause friction between the two men. I see no reason to doubt that the co-worker's desire to give blood is motivated strictly by generosity, and it's unfortunate that he finds himself in a position in which he can't do good without lying.
The safety of the blood supply must be paramount, however, and it's my reader's responsibility to see that his co-worker is held accountable for his actions.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
"The process can take anywhere from 15 to 30 minutes," my reader tells me. "It's a nice break from work."
My reader is among the many who choose to give blood regularly. According to estimates by the World Health Organization, more than 92 million blood donations are made annually. Roughly 16 million units are collected in the United States each year. To recognize those who donate blood, World Blood Donor Day is held each year in a different country. This year it will fall on June 14 and be hosted by Spain in Barcelona.
The Red Cross asks all prospective donors to answer dozens of questions to determine their eligibility to give blood. Among those excluded are people who spent more than three months in the United Kingdom between 1980 and 1996, those who have been tattooed within the past 12 months at an unlicensed facility, woman who are pregnant, people who have ever used intravenous drugs that were not prescribed by a physician and "any male who has had sexual contact with another male, even once, since 1977."
That last provision has been called into question. Researchers have argued, in a recent article in The Canadian Medical Association Journal, that the ban against donations by men who have had sex with other men "no longer makes sense," given the improvements in HIV tests for donated blood. Nonetheless the ban still stands, which presents a challenge for my reader.
"A co-worker confided in me that he is a homosexual," he writes. "He went so far as to tell me that, although he is in a relationship, he continues to `sleep around.'"
Despite the Red Cross guidelines, this co-worker continues to donate blood each time the bloodmobile comes to the plant.
"He told me, when they ask him the qualifying question concerning his sexual activity, he lies so that he can continue the process," my reader reports.
My reader has made repeated attempts to get his co-worker to halt this practice, he says, but his colleague "sees nothing wrong with what he is doing and refuses to discontinue his donations."
My reader is confident that the Red Cross tests the donated blood, and thus that his co-worker's blood is not tainted. Even so, his co-worker is still deceiving the Red Cross and his manager, so he wonders, "Should I discreetly alert someone of this deceit?"
It's no wonder that my reader is torn. Under normal circumstances, "outing" someone as a homosexual is inexcusable. This fact is, quite simply, nobody's business but his or her own.
These are not normal circumstances, however.
There is some merit in the medical researchers' argument that the ban on donations by homosexual men has outlived its usefulness. In March a letter from 18 United States senators asked the Food and Drug Administration, which establishes blood-donation guidelines in the U.S., to reconsider the policy, and the FDA has announced that it will hold an advisory-committee meeting to revisit this ban in June.
For now, however, the ban stands. Neither my reader nor his co-worker is a doctor, and it is not their place to determine whether the rules need to be changed. It's their job to abide by them or, if they cannot or if they think the rules ill-advised, to not give blood.
My reader's co-worker is wrong to lie in order to give blood, and my reader is right to have made every effort to convince him to be honest with the blood collectors. Because those pleas have fallen on deaf ears, he must take the next step.
The right thing for my reader to do is to let his co-worker know that he plans to tell the Red Cross representatives that his co-worker does not qualify as a blood donor under the current rules. He doesn't need to explain exactly why, merely to tell them that his co-worker has misrepresented himself in filling out the form for past donations.
Hopefully the prospect of having his lie exposed will be enough to cause his co-worker to stop giving blood, until such time as the ban may be revoked. If he does not, however, my reader should carry out his plan and talk to the Red Cross.
It's a pity that this will almost certainly cause friction between the two men. I see no reason to doubt that the co-worker's desire to give blood is motivated strictly by generosity, and it's unfortunate that he finds himself in a position in which he can't do good without lying.
The safety of the blood supply must be paramount, however, and it's my reader's responsibility to see that his co-worker is held accountable for his actions.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
Sunday, May 30, 2010
THE RIGHT THING: THINKING OUTSIDE THE BOX
On the corner of Farmington Avenue and Kenyon Street in Hartford, Conn., on the sidewalk between the Burger King and Ichiban restaurants, stands a machine that sells copies of The New York Times. This machine is where one of my readers, J.M., buys his copy of the paper each day.
When the daily paper's price was raised from $1.70 to $2.00, a new plate was screwed onto the machine above the coin slot. It read: "$2.00, Quarters only."
Shortly after the price increase, however, my reader inserted six quarters and two dimes, the old $1.70 price, into the machine.
"Voila!," J.M. writes. "It opened!"
When he repeated the same experiment on several other newspaper machines a few blocks up the road in West Hartford, he got the same results.
For more than a year, therefore, J.M. has been buying his New York Times every Monday through Friday at the reduced rate of $1.70.
"Can I transfer responsibility to whomever is in charge of that newspaper box," he asks, "and justify my theft by saying that the Times should know better? Or have I been stealing 30 cents a day from the Times for more than a year?"
J.M. is admittedly uncomfortable with his decision. He points out, for example, that he would never think of ripping off the newsstand at the Bradley Airport, where people pay on the honor system.
"It's the honor system," he writes, "and it just wouldn't be right."
Even so, he says, he's holding on to the slim hope - even though he knows that my column is a product of The New York Times Syndicate, and that therefore I am a representative of the company - that I might advise him to forget about it, since those operating the machines should know better.
J.M. is right, I do have an obvious conflict here, given my somewhat tenuous connection to the papers being sold in the boxes. I would hate to think that his 30 cents a day was coming out of my pay.
Even so, I'm fairly sure that my answer would be the same even if I wrote for another company. The ethics of the situation are clear, not only to me but also - given his reference to "my theft" - to him. Though he would obviously like "permission" to keep getting his paper at a discount, his practice is wrong and he should stop.
There should be no difference in the way he treats the faulty box and the way he treats the airport vendor. An unfixed glitch in the dispenser allows him to pay less and still get his paper, but he knows that the correct price is $2.00. It's not as if the machine would accept only the wrong amount - I'm sure that, if he deposited eight quarters, the box would give him his newspaper promptly.
Paying less, simply because he knows that others may also be paying less, is no different from cheating the honor system up the road simply because others may be cheating it as well.
It would have been a nice gesture to report the defective machines to the newspaper company, but he wasn't ethically obligated to do so. He was obligated to pay the right price for his newspaper, and that's the right thing for him to do now.
And, yes, since he knew from the start that he was paying too little for his newspaper, he ought to send a check for the difference to the Times Company. For a year, that would amount to $78 - it does add up.
J.M. also notes that he's keeping track of the time that elapses between his confession to me and when the box finally gets fixed. He wants to find out, he says, "how closely you in the ethics section are connected with the information-sharing apparatus at the Times."
We'll have to see on that. In the meantime, though, J.M. should pay up.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
When the daily paper's price was raised from $1.70 to $2.00, a new plate was screwed onto the machine above the coin slot. It read: "$2.00, Quarters only."
Shortly after the price increase, however, my reader inserted six quarters and two dimes, the old $1.70 price, into the machine.
"Voila!," J.M. writes. "It opened!"
When he repeated the same experiment on several other newspaper machines a few blocks up the road in West Hartford, he got the same results.
For more than a year, therefore, J.M. has been buying his New York Times every Monday through Friday at the reduced rate of $1.70.
"Can I transfer responsibility to whomever is in charge of that newspaper box," he asks, "and justify my theft by saying that the Times should know better? Or have I been stealing 30 cents a day from the Times for more than a year?"
J.M. is admittedly uncomfortable with his decision. He points out, for example, that he would never think of ripping off the newsstand at the Bradley Airport, where people pay on the honor system.
"It's the honor system," he writes, "and it just wouldn't be right."
Even so, he says, he's holding on to the slim hope - even though he knows that my column is a product of The New York Times Syndicate, and that therefore I am a representative of the company - that I might advise him to forget about it, since those operating the machines should know better.
J.M. is right, I do have an obvious conflict here, given my somewhat tenuous connection to the papers being sold in the boxes. I would hate to think that his 30 cents a day was coming out of my pay.
Even so, I'm fairly sure that my answer would be the same even if I wrote for another company. The ethics of the situation are clear, not only to me but also - given his reference to "my theft" - to him. Though he would obviously like "permission" to keep getting his paper at a discount, his practice is wrong and he should stop.
There should be no difference in the way he treats the faulty box and the way he treats the airport vendor. An unfixed glitch in the dispenser allows him to pay less and still get his paper, but he knows that the correct price is $2.00. It's not as if the machine would accept only the wrong amount - I'm sure that, if he deposited eight quarters, the box would give him his newspaper promptly.
Paying less, simply because he knows that others may also be paying less, is no different from cheating the honor system up the road simply because others may be cheating it as well.
It would have been a nice gesture to report the defective machines to the newspaper company, but he wasn't ethically obligated to do so. He was obligated to pay the right price for his newspaper, and that's the right thing for him to do now.
And, yes, since he knew from the start that he was paying too little for his newspaper, he ought to send a check for the difference to the Times Company. For a year, that would amount to $78 - it does add up.
J.M. also notes that he's keeping track of the time that elapses between his confession to me and when the box finally gets fixed. He wants to find out, he says, "how closely you in the ethics section are connected with the information-sharing apparatus at the Times."
We'll have to see on that. In the meantime, though, J.M. should pay up.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
SOUND OFF: E-BOOK THIEVES
Of the readers who responded to an unscientific poll on my column's blog, 59 percent believe that it is wrong to download electronic copies of a book without paying, even if they have paid for it in another format, while 41 percent disagree.
"When you buy a book, you are purchasing a very limited license to enjoy the content in the form presented," writes William Jacobson of Cypress, Calif. "You are not purchasing the right to download that content in any other format, unless it is specifically stated as part of the sale."
Ken Gagne of Worcester, Mass., thinks that "it's fair to create your own translation of a product you own for personal use, such as scanning a book to put on your Kindle or digitizing a CD to load onto your iPod."
He draws the line, however, at downloading additional copies of a book simply because you have paid for it in another format.
"To enjoy the fruits of someone else's translation efforts means making the investment in their version of that product. To do otherwise is still piracy."
Check out other opinions here, or post your own by clicking on "Comments" or "Post a comment" below.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 630 Eighth Ave., 5th floor, New York, N.Y. 10018.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
"When you buy a book, you are purchasing a very limited license to enjoy the content in the form presented," writes William Jacobson of Cypress, Calif. "You are not purchasing the right to download that content in any other format, unless it is specifically stated as part of the sale."
Ken Gagne of Worcester, Mass., thinks that "it's fair to create your own translation of a product you own for personal use, such as scanning a book to put on your Kindle or digitizing a CD to load onto your iPod."
He draws the line, however, at downloading additional copies of a book simply because you have paid for it in another format.
"To enjoy the fruits of someone else's translation efforts means making the investment in their version of that product. To do otherwise is still piracy."
Check out other opinions here, or post your own by clicking on "Comments" or "Post a comment" below.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 630 Eighth Ave., 5th floor, New York, N.Y. 10018.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
Sunday, May 23, 2010
SOUND OFF: BORDERLINE BASEBALL
Last month the Arizona State Legislature passed a bill designed to crack down on illegal immigrants within the state, a bill with harsh provisions that were criticized by President Barack Obama and others.
Sen. Robert Menendez (D.-N.J.) has sent a letter to the Major League Baseball Players Association, asking its members to boycott the 2011 All-Star Game, which is scheduled to be played in Phoenix.
Would it be right for the union to take a stand on the Arizona immigration bill? Or is it wrong to mix baseball with politics?
Post your thoughts here by clicking on "comments" or "post a comment" below. Please include your name, hometown, and state, province, or country. Readers' comments may appear in an upcoming column. Or e-mail your comments to me at rightthing@nytimes.com.
You can also respond to the poll with this question that will appear on the right-hand side of the blog until polling is closed.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics. He is also the administrator of The Right Thing, a Web log focused on ethical issues.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 620 Eighth Ave., 5th floor, New York, N.Y. 10018.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
Sen. Robert Menendez (D.-N.J.) has sent a letter to the Major League Baseball Players Association, asking its members to boycott the 2011 All-Star Game, which is scheduled to be played in Phoenix.
Would it be right for the union to take a stand on the Arizona immigration bill? Or is it wrong to mix baseball with politics?
Post your thoughts here by clicking on "comments" or "post a comment" below. Please include your name, hometown, and state, province, or country. Readers' comments may appear in an upcoming column. Or e-mail your comments to me at rightthing@nytimes.com.
You can also respond to the poll with this question that will appear on the right-hand side of the blog until polling is closed.
Jeffrey L. Seglin, author of The Right Thing: Conscience, Profit and Personal Responsibility in Today's Business (Smith Kerr, 2006), is an associate professor at Emerson College in Boston, where he teaches writing and ethics. He is also the administrator of The Right Thing, a Web log focused on ethical issues.
Do you have ethical questions that you need answered? Send them to rightthing@nytimes.com or to "The Right Thing," New York Times Syndicate, 620 Eighth Ave., 5th floor, New York, N.Y. 10018.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
THE RIGHT THING: OUTING THE ANONYMOUS ONLINE
Many of the newspapers that carry my column allow readers to post online comments in response, as I also do on the blog I write for the column. The newspapers generally require readers to register some basic information before they can post comments under their chosen screen names. Once they have their screen names, however, it's easy for readers to post anonymous comments, since screen names generally do little to identify the poster.
I could require readers to do similarly on my blog, of course, and I also could set up a moderating feature that would prevent any comment from being posted on the site until I had reviewed and approved it.
I could do so, but I've chosen to do neither. I do ask readers to include their names in whatever they post, but it's not mandatory, and they are free to post anything they want in response to a blog post. The only posts I delete are spam messages trying to sell cheap pharmaceuticals or other products unrelated to the blog.
While I allow readers to post anonymously, I'm not a fan of hiding behind a screen name to express a strong opinion, or even a lukewarm one. If the opinion is worth hearing, I believe, its author ought to be willing to stand behind it.
In his book Integrity (Basic Books, 1996), Stephen L. Carter talks about three steps that are essential to integrity: The first is discernment, the second is to act on what you discern and the third is to state openly what you have done and why you have done it.
Anonymity falls short of Carter's mark, in short, and I agree with him. An opinion expressed without a signature suggests that the author herself is to some degree ashamed of it. There are plenty of counterexamples in which anonymity is acceptable - say, in criticizing a totalitarian government which might punish the truth teller severely - but online commentary in a free society isn't one of them.
All of which brings me to a question I recently received from a reader in Boston.
"If someone posts a comment to an article or video online under a `nom de Web' instead of her real name," the reader writes, "and someone else comes along and recognizes that she's probably the author of that comment, is it ethical for him to give her full name in his response?
"Given the wingnut factor in many of these threads," she adds, "98 percent of the people posting comments do so under something other than their real names, so what would motivate someone to make public the identity of another commenter?"
I'm in no position to explain the motivations of someone who "outs" an anonymous poster. Perhaps the outer felt it important that the poster stand behind her comments, though that premise holds up only if the outer himself gave his name. Or perhaps he hoped to see someone whom he disagreed with shamed into taking responsibility for a view he found objectionable. Your guess is as good as mine.
I see no virtue in outing an anonymous poster, even if you are certain of his or her identity, and I don't think it's ethical to do so. If a site allows for anonymous postings, and if there is no legal or safety issue involved, then those posts should remain anonymous. It is not up to other posters to revise the site's rules, and of course there's always the possibility of doing harm by an incorrect "outing."
That said, I strongly believe that, regardless of the policy of a given site, the right thing for posters to do is to stand behind their comments by identifying themselves. It's too easy to toss brickbats when no one can hold you accountable. To be willing to affix your name to the convictions you express is a sign of integrity and gives your opinions added weight.
If the thought of revealing who you are makes you hesitant to post a comment, probably you should rethink your posting.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
I could require readers to do similarly on my blog, of course, and I also could set up a moderating feature that would prevent any comment from being posted on the site until I had reviewed and approved it.
I could do so, but I've chosen to do neither. I do ask readers to include their names in whatever they post, but it's not mandatory, and they are free to post anything they want in response to a blog post. The only posts I delete are spam messages trying to sell cheap pharmaceuticals or other products unrelated to the blog.
While I allow readers to post anonymously, I'm not a fan of hiding behind a screen name to express a strong opinion, or even a lukewarm one. If the opinion is worth hearing, I believe, its author ought to be willing to stand behind it.
In his book Integrity (Basic Books, 1996), Stephen L. Carter talks about three steps that are essential to integrity: The first is discernment, the second is to act on what you discern and the third is to state openly what you have done and why you have done it.
Anonymity falls short of Carter's mark, in short, and I agree with him. An opinion expressed without a signature suggests that the author herself is to some degree ashamed of it. There are plenty of counterexamples in which anonymity is acceptable - say, in criticizing a totalitarian government which might punish the truth teller severely - but online commentary in a free society isn't one of them.
All of which brings me to a question I recently received from a reader in Boston.
"If someone posts a comment to an article or video online under a `nom de Web' instead of her real name," the reader writes, "and someone else comes along and recognizes that she's probably the author of that comment, is it ethical for him to give her full name in his response?
"Given the wingnut factor in many of these threads," she adds, "98 percent of the people posting comments do so under something other than their real names, so what would motivate someone to make public the identity of another commenter?"
I'm in no position to explain the motivations of someone who "outs" an anonymous poster. Perhaps the outer felt it important that the poster stand behind her comments, though that premise holds up only if the outer himself gave his name. Or perhaps he hoped to see someone whom he disagreed with shamed into taking responsibility for a view he found objectionable. Your guess is as good as mine.
I see no virtue in outing an anonymous poster, even if you are certain of his or her identity, and I don't think it's ethical to do so. If a site allows for anonymous postings, and if there is no legal or safety issue involved, then those posts should remain anonymous. It is not up to other posters to revise the site's rules, and of course there's always the possibility of doing harm by an incorrect "outing."
That said, I strongly believe that, regardless of the policy of a given site, the right thing for posters to do is to stand behind their comments by identifying themselves. It's too easy to toss brickbats when no one can hold you accountable. To be willing to affix your name to the convictions you express is a sign of integrity and gives your opinions added weight.
If the thought of revealing who you are makes you hesitant to post a comment, probably you should rethink your posting.
c.2010 The New York Times Syndicate (Distributed by The New York Times Syndicate)
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